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INTRODUCTION 
 
 "We Sweat and Toil" is a study of the origins of early American political thought 
and argues for a more expansive approach, both chronologically and methodologically, to 
our understanding of colonial politics.  Most studies of the political history of early 
America begin with the end of the French and Indian War.  In this well-known telling of 
Anglo-American history, the debts accrued by England in fighting to secure their Atlantic 
holdings left the home government in dire need of new sources of revenue, which led it to 
implement a series of new taxes on the colonies.  These imperial acts redefined the 
relationship between colony and metropole, one that, from the perspective of the 
colonists, newly encroached upon the political power and autonomy of colonial leaders.  
The change in imperial policy was vital to the emergence of a uniquely American 
political thought because it forced colonists to justify their claims to political authority 
and to explain their role and place within the empire.  Political thought in America, or at 
least its formal articulation in print, has thereby been understood as being largely 
reactive, pushed into existence by imperial actions.  Given the concentrated nature of this 
brief gestational period of American political thought, historians have examined these 
years in microscopic detail and have identified the key issue as one of ideological origins, 
giving rise to two distinct versions of the politics of the Revolution, one liberal and the 
other republican.  In the "republican thesis," the classical politics of virtue dominated 
American political thought, which explained the fears, goals, and governing solutions of 
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the rebelling colonists.
1
  The republican interpretation of the Revolution has been highly 
influential, peaking in prominence in the 1970s and 80s, but never fully succeeded in 
supplanting the older "liberal thesis."  Historians have continued to find evidence that 
liberal ideas of rights, property, and consent were central to Revolutionary ideology.
2
  
The importance of this debate in understanding early American political thought, 
however, is connected to and largely dependent upon the particular periodization that 
posits its creation in the late eighteenth century.
3
 
 A new, revisionist approach to the study of early American politics has emerged 
that is intent on expanding its chronological parameters.  The pioneering voice in these 
                                                          
1
 For the classic account that captures the older "liberal" thesis, see Carl Becker, The Declaration of 
Independence: A Study of the History of Political Ideas (New York: Knopf, 1942).  On the republican 
challenge to the "liberal" explanations, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1967); Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 
1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); and J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975).  For a direct attempt to downplay the importance of Locke in Revolutionary 
politics, see John Dunn, "The Politics of John Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century," in 
John Yolton, ed., John Locke: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).  
The 1970s and 1980s marked a high point for the influence of republicanism in the historiography of the 
late English empire and early United States.  A prominent article in the 1990s, though, exposed the broad 
and sometime vacuous definition of the term that become prominent with its rising popularity and 
criticized its often excessive application.  See, Daniel T. Rodgers, "Republicanism: The Career of a 
Concept," Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (June 1992): 11-38.  Michael Winship has attempted to 
test with the falloff of the use of the term "republican" in the historiography with modest, but still largely 
indicative results.   See fn. 2 in "Godly Republicanism and the Origins of the Massachusetts Polity," The 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 63 (Jul., 2006): 427-462.  For an argument pushing for more 
specific definition of the term, see, Blair Worden, "Republicanism, Regicide, and Republic: The English 
Experience," in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, ed. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 307-308.  
2
 For the liberal response to the "republican" thesis, see Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in 
the Historical Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of 
Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988); Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and 
the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Steven Dworetz, The 
Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1990), and Yuhtaro Ohmori, "The Artillery of Mr. Locke": The Use of Locke's "Second Treatise" in Pre-
Revolutionary America, 1764-1776 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1988). 
3
 See Michael Zuckert's "amalgam" thesis in his Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 164-166.  For a recent account of the debate and where it stands, see 
Alan Gibson, Understanding the Founding: The Crucial Questions (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2007). 
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efforts has been Craig Yirush and his recent work on the roots of American political 
theory.
4
  A key piece of evidence for Yirush and the revisionist position is the set of 
instructions given by the Massachusetts General Court in 1762 to its London agent, 
Jasper Maudit, one year before the French and Indian War had reached its conclusion.  
The instructions were complex and offered numerous justifications of colonial rights.  
Clearly influenced by Locke's Second Treatise, the instructions referenced the "natural 
rights" of all British subjects as well as "of all humankind" and laid claim to the liberty 
"of all men" to live free from any arbitrary power.  Beyond a claim to "natural rights," 
they also pointed to their allegiance to the sovereign, which they argued did not dissipate 
over long distances, so neither should the various privileges that accompanied their 
birthright as Englishmen.  And finally, the instructions put forth an additional argument, 
appealing to the economic "interest" of the Nation, which they argued would be best 
served by the continuing grant of certain liberties to the English colonists.
5
  For Yirush, 
the colonial position in 1762, as reflected in these instructions, was too sophisticated for 
this to have been its first iteration.  This document, he claims, even falls outside of the 
standard chronological parameters of most studies of early American political thought 
and is proof of a developing colonial political theory far earlier than 1763.
6
   
 The complex justification of colonial rights in 1762 was the result of numerous 
battles between colonial elites and English officials that preceded the French and Indian 
                                                          
4
 Craig Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675-1775 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1-26. 
5
 On the language of "interest" and its prevalence by the end of the seventeenth century, see Alan 
Houston and Steve Pincus, "Introduction. Modernity and later-seventeenth-century England" and Pincus, 
"From Holy Cause to economic interest: the study of population and the invention of the state," in 
Houston and Pincus, eds., A Nation Transformed: England and the Restoration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 1-19; 272-298. 
6
 Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire, 4. 
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War.  As early as the 1660s, for instance, the crown was pressuring the leaders of 
Massachusetts to adjust some of their political practices in ways that the local leaders 
considered to be violations of their charter.  The 1680s witnessed revocations of several 
charters and the creation of the Dominion of New England, and in the early 1700s, the 
crown launched multiple attacks against the charters of the private colonies.
7
  These 
challenges to local authority within the empire encouraged colonial leaders to develop 
tactics and formulate rationales to secure their political power.  The political thought on 
display in Jasper Maudit's instructions had a long history in early America, as colonists 
constructed complex legal and constitutional defenses of their political rights.
8
  All of 
                                                          
7
 On these late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century attacks of colonial charters, see , David 
S. Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Robert M. Bliss, 
Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); Michael Winship, "Godly Republicanism and the Origins 
of the Massachusetts Polity," William and Mary Quarterly 63 (2006), 427-462; J.M Sosin, English America 
and the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II: Transatlantic Politics, Commerce, and Kinship (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1980); Michael Hall, Edward Randolph and the American Colonies, 1676-
1703 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960; Richard Dunn, "Imperial Pressures on 
Massachusetts and Jamaica, 1675-1700," in Alison G. Olson and Richard M. Brown, eds., Anglo-American 
Political Relations, 1675-1775 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 52-75; John C. Rainbolt, "A 
New Look at Stuart 'Tyranny': The Crown's Attack on the Virginia Assembly, 1676-1689," Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography 75 (1967), 387-406. 
8
 On literature on the colonial of a constitutional argument is extensive.  See Barbara Black, "The 
Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 124 (1976), 
1157-1211 and Charles McIlwain, The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation and Jack P. 
Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire 
and the United States, 1607-1788 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986) and Greene, "John 
Phillip Reid and the Reinterpretation of the American Revolution," in Hendrick Hartog and William E. 
Nelson, eds., Law as Culture and Culture as Law: Essays in Honor of John Phillip Reid (Madison, WI: 
Madison House, 2000).  For an overview of the literature, see Greene, "From the Perspective of Law: 
Context and Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution," in Greene, ed., Interpreting Early 
America: Historiographical Essays (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1996).  On the English 
common law in the seventeenth century, see J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: 
A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1957) and Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Legal and 
Political Thought, 1603-1642 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 
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these important political arguments would play a major role in the political thought of the 
Revolutionary period.
9
 
 "We Sweat and Toil" extends Yirush's revisionist agenda even further back into 
the history of English colonization.   Even with the revisionist approach, colonial 
historians have been reluctant to include the politics of seventeenth century America.  
Yirush's study of early American political theory, for instance, begins with the imperial 
interventions that would lead to the Glorious Revolution in America in 1689.  
Interestingly, the logic of starting with the rebellions of 1689 is actually quite similar to 
the rationale for beginning in 1763.  In 1685, James II embarked on a series of innovative 
and aggressive attacks on colonial charters, similar in effect to the ones enacted after the 
French and Indian War, which forced the colonies to defend their liberties in a more 
direct way than had occurred previously.
10
  The revisionist position agrees, then, that this 
process gave rise to a colonial defense of their political rights in America, but argues for 
a longer period of its development.  Understanding imperial policies as the crucial spark 
to the creation of these political and ideological developments in America is limiting, 
however, and largely excludes the possibility of its emergence before 1689.  But 
throughout the seventeenth century, internal political disputes within the colonies often 
resulted in broad commentaries on the empire and the rights and contributions of the 
colonists.  As long as imperial support of a governing regime was crucial to the 
maintenance of power in the colonies, which was the case throughout the seventeenth 
                                                          
9
 Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire, 1-26. 
10
 For analysis of the Glorious Revolution and early example of the colonial position of English rights, 
Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America; Jack M. Sosin, English America and the Revolution of 1688: 
Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1982); and Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire, 51-80. 
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century, then factions contending for power would often search out that support by 
formulating their place within a larger colonial vision.  These types of local disputes were 
not dependent on the imperial measures of the 1680s and were possible far earlier than 
1689.   
   The dissertation examines these "local" political tracts within the broader context 
of political ideas present in the extensive colonial literature of the seventeenth century, 
much of which has escaped the attention of political historians.   The seventeenth century 
saw the development of an expansive and growing literature on America in the form of 
promotional literature.  The publication of these tracts ebbed and flowed for individual 
colonies depending on various circumstances, but they constituted a specific genre of 
literature.
11
  The authors of the promotional tracts wrote about everything from the 
ecology to the political organization of the colonies, but most importantly, for the sake of 
effective advertisement, they debated and discussed the various means of colonial 
success.  Although not usually treated as "political" texts, these authors, in claiming that a 
particular colony would prosper in the future, had to think seriously about the social and 
political conditions that would most effectively indicate to potential migrants the future 
prospects of a colony.  This task inevitably led these authors to tackle the politics of the 
colonies and the rights of individuals within the empire. 
 When the colonists pursued their "English Rights" in America, for instance, in 
1689, the colonial promoters had already been writing and debating about the role of 
elected assemblies in America.  Since the founding of Jamestown, they had debated the 
effects on empire of representative government in the colonies.  By 1689, the political 
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 On the idea of the promotional literature as a cohesive genre, see, Catherine Armstrong, Writing North 
America in the Seventeenth Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 17-20. 
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trajectory of early English colonization was becoming increasingly clear, as every 
attempt at autocracy in America had failed to bring about a prosperous colony.  The 
promoters understood this and by the end of the century began to incorporate, almost 
without exception, the idea of elected government into their vision of a sustainable and 
expanding empire.   So when the colonists protested for their rights in 1689, they did so 
within a wider colonial discourse that had established a close connection between local 
rights and empire.  This project operates from the premise that both sides were fully 
capable of formulating a compelling constitutional case, either for or against the 
extension of "English Rights" to America.
12
  The project is less concerned with the legal 
legitimacy of their political arguments than with how both sides attempted to situate their 
political demands within the most compelling vision of empire.   
 The ideas on colonization that were developed and promulgated in the 
promotional literature would offer the colonists a powerful justification for representative 
government in America and provide a new context for our understanding of colonial 
politics in the seventeenth century.   Political studies of early America have long 
embraced a transatlantic approach.
13
  Carla Pestana's recent synthesis of politics of the 
                                                          
12
 See Barbara Black, "The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists," University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 124 (1976), 1157-1211. 
13
 On the Atlantic approach to colonial studies, see essay collection, David Armitage and Michael J. 
Braddick, eds., The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), especially 
Armitage's essay, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," 13-29.  See also Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: 
Concept and Contours (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Nicholas Canny, "Writing Atlantic 
History: Or Reconfiguring the History of Colonial British America," Journal of American History, Vol. 86 
(Dec., 1999), 1093-1114; Steve Sarson, British America, 1500-1800 (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005); and 
Alison Games, "Whose Atlantic History?", International Journal of Maritime History 13 (2001), 198-203 
and "Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities," American Historical Review, 111.3 
(2006): 741-757.  For a stilly largely laudatory but increasingly critical examination of the Atlantic 
approach, see Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, eds., Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009).  See especially Trevor Burnard's essay, "The British Atlantic," 111-136, and 
Peter Coclanis's essay in support of a more global approach, "Beyond Atlantic History," 337-350.   For a 
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English Atlantic during the revolutionary years in England, for instance, has underscored 
the constant interactions of center and periphery and the insufficiency of studying the 
colonies without highlighting these connections.
14
  In her analysis of the colonists' 
political agenda during this period, she reiterates the contention that has dominated this 
approach to colonial politics, ever since David Lovejoy's foundational study of the 
"Glorious Revolution in America."  Lovejoy argued that the colonists pursued their 
political rights through identity, laying claim to a "shared Englishness" and its attendant 
liberties, including, most importantly, the right of representative government.
15
  This 
approach is thoroughly transatlantic and vital to our understanding of the colonial 
position throughout the seventeenth century, but has limited our understanding of these 
                                                                                                                                                                             
recent circum-Atlantic approach to the history of early America, see Daniel K. Richter, Before the 
Revolution: America's Ancient Pasts (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). 
14
 Carla Pestana, The English Atlantic in the Age of Revolution, 1640-1661 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2004). 
15
 See David Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1972).  On 
its continuing influence of his study on the colonial historiography, see Richard R. Johnson, “Empire,” in A 
Companion to Colonial America (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003).  For its influence on more 
recent interpretations,  see Pestana, The English Atlantic, 157-182;  James Horn, Adapting to a New 
World: English Society in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 
334-380; Horn, “Tobacco Colonies: The Shaping of English Society in the Seventeenth Century 
Chesapeake,” in The Oxford History of the English Empire, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998),170-192; Natalie Zacek, “A Death in the Morning: The Murder of Daniel Parke,” in Cultures and 
Identities in colonial British America, eds. Robert Olwell and Alan Tully (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
2006), 223-243; and Zacek, Settler Society in the English Leeward Islands, 1670-1776 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010).  For important transatlantic studies of colonial politics in the 
seventeenth century, see Richard S. Dunn, "The Glorious Revolution and America," in The Origins of 
Empire: British Overseas Enterprise and to the close of the Seventeenth Century, vol. 1 of The Oxford 
History of the British Empire, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford, 1998), 445-66; Richard R. Johnson, "The 
Revolution of 1688-89 in the American Colonies," in The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious 
Revolution and Its World Impact, ed., Jonathan Israel (Cambridge, 1991), 215-240; Johnson, Adjustment to 
Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981); Lovejoy, 
The Glorious Revolution in America; Jack M. Sosin, English America and the Revolution of 1688: Royal 
Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982); 
Phillip S. Haffenden, New England and the English Nation, 1689 - 1713 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); 
Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in the Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), Stephen Saunders Webb, 1676: The End of American Independence (New 
York: Knopf, 1994); and Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994).    
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debates.  From this perspective, imperial policies pushed against a static conception of 
English rights in America, which the colonists clung to for a variety of social and 
economic reasons.  This approach has trouble, however, accommodating any evidence of 
a progressive agenda on the part of the colonists.  Pestana points to the upward mobility 
possible in the colonies and the lack of sufficient social credentials for many leading 
colonists, but fails to integrate this fact into her analysis of the rhetoric of "English 
Rights" in America.  Pestana's struggle to integrate the ambitions of the colonists into the 
rhetoric of their political demands reflects a larger problem in the historiography, which 
this project seeks to overcome.  Through the lens of the promotional literature and the 
promises of empire, this project reverses the prevailing approach by emphasizing empire, 
not in eighteenth century terms as a threat to colonial liberties, but as a potential avenue 
in the seventeenth century towards more political freedom.  The colonists would argue 
for "English Rights" through the workings of empire as they had come to be defined by 
the colonial promoters.  This changed perspective on empire redefines both the origins of 
American political theory and the full implications of the colonists' political rhetoric 
going forward.         
*** 
 The dissertation is organized into two parts.  The first (chapters 1 – 3) examines 
how colonization came to be defined and understood in the colonial literature by the end 
of the century, and the second (chapters 4 – 5) analyzes how these definitions came to 
play an important role in the political debates in the second half of the century.  The first 
section focuses on the promotional literature of the English colonies.  Throughout the 
century, almost every colony embarked on significant promotional campaigns to 
10 
 
advertize their respective colonies.
16
  These campaigns varied in scale and duration.  The 
Virginia Company, for instance, launched an aggressive publication campaign for early 
Virginia, which included short advertisements by the company, often in the form of 
broadsides, numerous printed sermons dedicated to the colony, and firsthand accounts by 
individual settlers like the Reverend Alexander Whitaker and John Smith.
17
  The 
literature for New England in the 1630s was also expansive, while the promotion of 
Maryland during the same decade was much more modest.  Pennsylvania, Carolina, and 
New Jersey would all embark on extensive promotional campaigns in the 1680s, leading 
to another high point in the colonial literature.  Overall, the individual authors of these 
different texts were a diverse group.  Many of these authors were religious figures, 
including the Puritan clergyman William Crashaw in Virginia, the Jesuit Andrew White 
in Maryland, and the renowned Quaker, William Penn, in Pennsylvania.  Others were 
military men, like John Smith and Richard Rich in Virginia, or wealthy investors, like 
William Bullock of Virginia or George Scot in New Jersey, or even the proprietors 
themselves, like William Penn.  And occasionally, the authors were of more humble 
background, like George Alsop in Maryland, who had arrived in the colony as an 
indentured servant.  The large majority of these works would be published in London, but 
in the 1680s, these tracts would begin to have a wider reach, as some were published in 
Ireland, Scotland, France, and Germany.  The backgrounds of the promotional authors 
and the populations that they targeted were varied, but the task before them was clear.  
They had to make the colony's future look bright and had to describe the political and 
                                                          
16
 On this literature, see quantity and dissemination of this literature, see Armstrong, Writing America. 
17
 On the volume of promotional publications for Virginia and the other southern colonies, see, Hugh T. 
Lefler, "Promotional Literature of the Southern Colonies," The Journal of Southern History 33 (Feb., 1967), 
3-25. 
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social arrangements in America that would make that future success seem most likely.  
They thought deeply about what exactly made the colonies work, how colonists would be 
involved in that process, and how this vision could be successfully conveyed in their 
writings.  As often as these tracts are criticized for hyperbole in their descriptions of the 
New World and in their predictions of individual success, they had to integrate the 
demands and hopes of migrating colonists within a plausible and credible projection of 
societal prosperity.   
 Chapter One examines the promotional literature produced through colonizing 
efforts in Virginia, New England, and Newfoundland during the early period of English 
colonization.  During these early years, Spain was the dominant power in the Atlantic 
World and archenemy of the English nation.  English colonizers strove to achieve an 
empire in America that would both challenge this hegemony and stand in stark contrast to 
Spanish precedent.
18
  This different approach to colonization was as ideologically 
appealing to the English as it was necessary given the characteristics of the Atlantic 
seaboard and its Native peoples.
19
  As stories of Spanish atrocities circulated in England, 
English writers claimed that English settlers would pursue an honest commerce, courting 
only amicable relationships with the Indians.
20
   This combined with the humanist 
                                                          
18
 For a compelling argument about the importance for the early English colonial planner of distinguishing 
between English and Spanish imperialism, see Thomas Scanlan, Colonial Writing and the New World: 
Allegories of Desire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 93-122.  For reference to Spain as the 
"ultimate other" during the seventeenth century, see  Karen Kupperman, "Forward," in Envisioning an 
English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World, eds. Robert Applebaum and John 
Sweet Wood (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2005), xi.   
19
 For an expansive argument about the importance of environment and native peoples to the trajectory 
of the Spanish and English empires, see, John Elliot, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in 
America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
20
 On the "black legend" and its popularity in England, see William S. Maltby, The Black Legend in England: 
The Development of Anti-Spanish Sentiment, 1558-1660 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971); Joseph P. 
Sanchez, The Spanish Black Legend/La Leyenda Negra Espanola: Origins of the Anti-Hispanic 
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predisposition of many colonial planners to help create a vision for the English empire 
that prioritized virtue, encouraging the colonists to be willing to sacrifice private interest 
for the higher ideals of religion, virtue, and the English Nation.
21
  For these authors, the 
potential wealth promised by the American environment was often perceived as a threat 
to the virtuous principles of English colonization, which could tempt settlers into self-
interested behaviors, and led to a hyper-vigilance among colonial planners about the 
motives of migrating colonists.  So worried about the opportunity for personal profit and 
selfish pursuits in the New World, for example, Robert Cushman delivered a sermon in 
the Plymouth in 1621, which was ultimately published in London the following year, and 
announced his intention in his title to "show the danger of self-love."  For his sermon, he 
chose to analyze the verse from 1 Corinthians 10:24: "Let no man seek his owne, But 
every man another's wealth."
22
  The problem for the colonial promoter, the large majority 
of whom understood the broader appeal of this virtuous, anti-Spanish vision of English 
colonization, was that many also acknowledged that self-interest was a powerful 
motivating force for many people, making it a characteristic as tempting to the promoter 
as it was potentially hazardous to this imperial vision.  Not surprisingly, there were 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Stereotypes/Origenes de los estereotipos antihispanicos (Albuquerque: National Park Service, 1990); 
Charles Gibson, The Black Legend: Anti-Spanish Attitudes in the Old World and the New (New York: Knopf, 
1971); and Eric Nelson, "Un-Sainting James: Othello and the 'Spanish Spirits' of Shakespeare's Globe," 
Representations 62 (1998), 58-100.  On some the contradictions that emerged between the anti-Spanish 
rhetoric and some English colonial policies, see Eric Smith's essay, "The Shadow of the Black Legend in 
John Smith's Generall Historie of Virginia," a commentary delivered as part of NEH Institute, Texts of 
Imagination and Empire, Summer 2000, http://www.folger.edu/html/folger_institute/jamestown-
new/c_griffin.htm 
21
 On the importance of humanism in early English colonization, see Andrew Fitzmaurice, Humanism and 
America: An Intellectual History of English Colonisation, 1500-1625 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003).  See also Chapter 7 in Phil Withington's Society and Early Modern England: The Vernacular 
Origins of some Powerful Ideas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 202-231.  Withington notes in his analysis 
of Irish colonization in the 1570s  that the colonial endeavor "attracted humanists like wasps to a dollop of 
jam" (203). 
22
 Robert Cushman, A Sermon Preached at Plimmoth in Nevv-England (London, 1622), 1. 
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isolated efforts during this period to come up with a new conception of English 
colonization that would not be so threatened by the self-interested individual.
23
  These 
efforts proved unsuccessful, however, because colonial promoters were unable to 
formulate an individual characteristic capable of displacing virtue as the building block of 
a healthy society.  Without that sort of ideological development, unleashing self-interest 
was too cynical a promotional tactic for most colonial authors to employ because it 
portended a dysfunctional society and seemed, at the same time, to be embracing a 
Spanish approach to empire.  This early period of colonial promotion thus ended with 
virtue and its perceived importance to the colonial endeavor maintaining its prominence 
in the literature. 
 Chapter Two focuses on the colony of Virginia and an important transformation 
that occurred in its promotional literature during the 1650s.  Considered by many to have 
been a disappointment, if not a complete failure, Virginia's promoters sought a new path 
to prosperity in the colony.  The end goals of the earlier promoters had not changed: these 
authors also wanted Virginia to court amicable relations with the Indians and to establish 
a diversified economy.  The changing political circumstances in England gave many 
observers of the colony hope that the political organization of the colonies would be 
examined anew by the powers that be.  Emboldened by the possibility of reform, there 
was an upsurge of literature on the colony during the 1650s that offered a new 
understanding of how colonization worked and how a colony would be successful.  To 
make their claims, these authors applied an emerging economic ideology in England to 
circumstances in America.  In mid-century England, a group of influential 
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Commonwealth supporters began to understand the world in increasingly commercial 
terms.  For these writers, national power was determined by wealth, which was a result, 
not of natural resources, but of the industriousness of the population.  Because they were 
convinced that self-interested motivations were a crucial spur to individual labor and 
economic activity, these authors were interested in challenging the perception of self-
interest as destructive in nature.
24
  This ideology was incredibly attractive to the colonial 
promoter.  With self-interest connected to industriousness and industriousness crucial to 
the increase in societal wealth, self-interested pursuits were interpreted as acts beneficial 
to the larger common good.  For the first time in the promotional literature, the colonial 
promoters could fully appeal to the self-interested motivations of potential migrants 
without jeopardizing their simultaneous claims to stable and lasting New World societies.  
The colonial promoters should be understood alongside the English economic thinkers 
from earlier in the century, as described by Joyce Appleby, and the Commonwealth 
thinkers at mid-century as another group of people particularly anxious to liberate self-
interest from its negative connotations.
25
  For the sake of more effective promotion, the 
Virginia promoters of the 1650s began to support this new conception of self-interest and 
its necessary protection through political rights.  The result was an articulation and 
endorsement by colonial promoters of a liberal political economy in America as the best 
way forward.   
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 Chapter Three analyzes the colonial literature into the second half of the century 
and the widespread embrace of the benefits of a liberal political economy in America.  
During the early 1680s, three colonies – South Carolina, East Jersey, and Pennsylvania – 
embarked on significant promotional campaigns.  Despite the wide variety of religious 
backgrounds and political dispositions of the various proprietary groups, the promotional 
literature, almost without exception, adopted the economic ideology of mid-century and 
its implications for society.  The promotional authors emphasized the importance of 
labor, acknowledged, if not approved, of the role of self-interest in society, and promised 
powerful elected assemblies.  These tracts were often penned by colonists in America, 
even if published abroad, and some even included letters from individual colonists to 
validate their economic and political recommendations.  The literature reached a wider 
circulation than the previous promotional campaigns as well, with some tracts being 
published in Ireland, Scotland, France, and Germany, and the prose of these tracts was 
always intended to be accessible to a large portion of the population.  The result was a 
widespread dissemination of an ideology of colonization that ceded great power to the 
industry of the settlers and great importance to the protection of their political rights.  The 
colonists, if they needed to resist any effort at centralized power in America, would have 
a ready-made and cohesive ideology that connected their political liberties to a 
sustainable and prosperous empire.   
 The second half of the dissertation examines how these ideas came to play an 
important role in the colonial politics at the end of the century, especially in the colonists' 
pursuit of local government.  Chapter Four examines an internal political conflict in 
16 
 
Maryland that occurred in 1676.
26
  A group of colonists led a short-lived and thoroughly 
unsuccessful rebellion against Lord Baltimore, the proprietor of the colony.  Shortly after 
its demise, however, a document surfaced outlining the rebels' agenda.  These dissidents 
had hoped to gain the King's support for their rebellion through their past contributions 
and future importance to the colonial endeavor.  They argued for their political 
empowerment in Maryland through the same language of empire that had risen to 
prominence in the promotional literature.  They pointed to the vital importance of their 
labor to the colony's success, the continuation of which, they argued, required certain 
political rights.  Baltimore responded with a different understanding of colonization, 
highlighting the contributions of wealthy investors and colonial proprietors, and 
contended that the important contributions of men like himself also depended on their 
political empowerment.  This rebellion is an early example of how internal conflicts in 
the colonies and their politics became imperial in scope.  As long as the approbation of 
English officials was vital to the maintenance of authority in the colonies, political power 
would find its most powerful justification in its connection to the empire.  Both the 
colonists and Baltimore utilized colonial circumstances in an effort to augment their 
political power, and in the process, polarized the politics of the colony.  The colonists' 
political position offers an important early example of how the economic ideology of 
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mid-century could be mobilized by the colonists towards a justification of political rights 
abroad.  
 Chapter Five considers the imperial debates at the end of the century, examining 
the New England rebellion of 1689.  Colonial leaders in Massachusetts protested the 
revocation of their charter and ultimately rose in rebellion against imperial officers 
shortly after the Glorious Revolution in England.
27
  They, like the Maryland dissidents of 
1676, sought royal approval and support for their actions through the same colonial 
vision.  They argued for and elaborated on the full political implications of the liberal 
economic ideology.  To highlight the importance of labor, for instance, they depicted 
America as a dangerous wilderness at the time of European discovery and solely the 
creation of settler labor.  They argued that this labor had been encouraged through a "free 
and easy" government that rewarded self-interested pursuits and individual labor.  A 
decentralized empire with local political rights, they contended, was a prosperous empire.  
This approach to colonization pushed the New England dissidents to begin theorizing 
about "the people" in New England as an idealized entity with an important role to play 
in government.  The foundational acts of "the people" in New England that justified this 
depiction were their many contributions to colonization.  In 1689, the New England 
colonists did not only resist imperial intrusions by claiming a common English identity 
and the extension of "English Rights" abroad, but proactively argued for their political 
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empowerment through a liberal economic ideology and a populist understanding of 
empire.
28
   
*** 
 This dissertation argues that the conception of "English Rights," as important and 
omnipresent as it was in the imperial political discourse, has actually obscured the 
ideological complexity of colonists' political claims.  As many historians have identified, 
the New England colonists repeatedly tried to associate themselves with the principles 
espoused by William III upon conquering England, arguing that the rights secured by the 
Glorious Revolution in England should be extended abroad.  According to this analysis, 
the Glorious Revolution established the ideological basis by which the colonists pursued 
their own liberties.
29
  But the ideological influences on the colonial position in 1689 were 
more numerous and varied.  Ever since the beginning of English colonization, the 
colonies had raised fundamental questions about the proper relationship between the 
individual and society.  The colonists made political claims in 1689, but they did so 
within longstanding political and economic discourses about colonial development.  
Approaching the colonists' defense of colonial liberties from the perspective of these 
debates throughout the century provides a different perspective on the events of 1689 and 
a more complex understanding of the claim of "English Rights" abroad. 
 By privileging the colonial history of the seventeenth century and the promotional 
literature in particular, this project integrates the aspirations of individual colonists into 
the developing political thought in the colonies.  Jack P. Greene, in what he called the 
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"most important element in the emerging British-American culture," defined the 
dominant conception of America during this period "as a place in which free people 
could pursue their own individual happiness and with a fair prospect that they might be 
successful in their several quests."
30
  The idea that colonists sought to improve their lives 
through migration implies that they sought change.  The vast majority of promotional 
materials supported this vision of colonization, which clearly suggests that something had 
to be offered to entice an individual to migrate.  Many colonists and promotional authors 
questioned the sanity of anyone who would do so for any other reason.  In his 1631 
Advertisements for the Unexperienced Planters of New England, John Smith declared, for 
instance, a person to be "double mad that will leave his friends, meanes, and freedome in 
England, to be worse there than here."
31
  The ambition for an improved life had political, 
social, and economic implications, which were all interconnected.  Lord Baltimore, for 
one, saw very little distinction between the separate categories.  In his defense of the 
expansive powers allotted to him and his descendants in his royal charter for Maryland, 
he contended in 1653 that no man "that is well in his wits" would invest as much as he 
had in a colony and then give the people the "power to make Lawes to dispose of him, 
and all his estate there."
32
  It was clear, throughout the seventeenth century, that the 
colonists, or at least the ones who wrote about their motivations to participate in 
colonization, expected to gain in some way by their migration to America.  To do so in 
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pursuit of something even approaching the status quo, would be, at least in the minds of 
most colonial writers, utter madness.  
  Despite the evidence of colonists' political ambitions, a counter narrative in the 
colonial historiography emphasizes colonial hopes, not for change, but to recreate the old 
world in America.  Bernard Bailyn, in his recent work on early America, captures this 
contention with his description of the early migrants in Virginia, who sought in the 
"crude, stump-filled tobacco farms of this subtropical lowland, to re-create a world they 
had known."
33
  The colonial political agenda of 1689 seemingly offers powerful support 
for the validity of this approach.  Colonists like Increase Mather, echoing the language of 
Lord Baltimore and John Smith, laid claim to their "English Rights" in America: "No 
English men in their Wits will ever Venture their Lives and Estates to Enlarge the Kings 
Dominions abroad . . . if their reward . . . [is] to be deprived of their English Liberties."
34
  
This analysis, however, lends a static quality to the colonial political agenda.  Imperial 
officers, like Edmund Andros, or colonial leaders, like Lord Baltimore or William 
Berkeley, pursued a governing power in the colonies that broke with English customs, 
which the colonists would resist, determined to have the same rights in America that they 
would have had in England.  This pattern to colonial rebellion has been applied to 
political action across the seventeenth century.  In his study of Bacon's Rebellion in 
Virginia, for instance, James Horn has argued that the rebellion is best understood as an 
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effort by the colonists "to restore the traditional rights of Englishmen . . . conserving old 
liberties and defending the status quo."
35
  The end result of this approach to political 
action in the colonies has been that both sides have specific and predictable roles.  The 
imperial officers or the occasionally colonial leader pursued increased political power in 
America, while the colonists sought only the status quo.  
 This approach to colonial rebellion and early American political thought has been 
important and influential, but is partly explained by the available sources.  Colonial 
leaders and imperial officers, men like Lord Baltimore and Edmund Andros, have left to 
posterity extensive writings, explaining their political ambitions and their particular 
colonial visions.
36
  There are far fewer sources to work with concerning the political 
aspirations of the broader colonial population.  For the Maryland rebellion of 1676, for 
instance, there is a single surviving document that speaks to the political aims of the 
rebels and their demands for an elected assembly.  This is one reason why early 
American political thought, usually begins, either in 1689 or 1763, only when the 
colonial leaders were forced to respond publicly to newly aggressive imperial measures.  
Because these are the primary documents by which historians have interrogated early 
American political thought, the conservative nature of the colonial political position has 
been overstated.  This lack of primary sources has helped lead to an assumption, which 
this project argues is a false one, that while almost everyone who wrote about 
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colonization admitted a connection between migration and political empowerment, the 
colonists pursued only a predominantly static political agenda in America.   
 The promotional literature of the seventeenth century has a vital role to play in 
our understanding of colonial politics because it helps to fill this void in the historical 
record.  For the promotional literature and its varying authors targeted an expansive 
audience, from the wellborn to the poor English subject.  Any reasonable effort at 
promotional literature, to be successful, had to gauge correctly the desires of those 
considering migration and make plausible promises about the potential realization of 
those goals.  Any good work of propaganda has to know its audience well.
37
 And by the 
end of the century, the promotional literature unanimously promised representative 
government and the same suffrage limits that existed in England, even though wealth and 
land was within reach of a larger percentage of the population in the colonies.  The 
emerging focus on industriousness appealed to the colonial promoter because it allowed 
those authors to integrate the settlers' aspirations from all ranks and backgrounds within a 
larger social vision of colonial success.  Instead of the status quo, the promotional 
literature offers powerful evidence that the broader population sought change and 
political empowerment just as much as elite men like Baltimore and Andros. 
 From the perspective of 1607 and with the promises of the promotional literature 
in clear view, the rhetoric of "English Rights" becomes a political strategy to maintain the 
colonial rights that had been established through migration and to give what was new and 
different in America the legitimating guise of customary rights.  The colonists, 
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throughout the seventeenth century, were constantly on the defensive about their social 
qualifications.  English observers frequently heaped abuse on the colonial population, 
which functioned as an important justification for the denial of representative government 
in America.  Lord Baltimore, for instance, in the same tract where he defended his 
governing privileges, accused the population in Maryland of being comprised of "such 
necessitous factious people as usually new Plantations consist of."
38
  In the New England 
rebellion of 1689, Edward Randolph was accused by his opponents of labeling the 
colony's leaders as upstarts, accusing the "Faction" that resisted imperial authority as 
being men "of mean Extraction," the majority of whom migrated to the colony as "poor 
servant[s]."
39
  Many colonial writers, throughout the seventeenth century, had grasped the 
social mobility inherent in the economic opportunities available in America.  John Smith 
was not alone when he identified this facet of colonization, but was exceptional in his 
enthusiastic embrace of its societal implications.  Smith boasted that in America, "every 
man may be master and owner of his owne labor and land . . . If hee have nothing but his 
hands . . . [he can] by industrie quickly grow rich."  Smith argued that through the "pains 
& vertues" of hard work, people could become "Lords of the world," but through the 
"ease of vices" such as idleness, those same people would quickly fall back, becoming 
"slaves to their [former] servants."
40
  The colonists then, with their assertions of "English 
Rights," were reacting to the imperial measures enacted by James II, but they were also 
justifying the social and political elevation made possible by colonization and foreseen by 
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Smith.  And to do this, they relied on the same narrative of colonization that had risen to 
prominence in the promotional literature, focusing on the people in America and their 
essential role in colonization.  The colonies had been created by the colonists, they 
argued, not by the contributions of wealthy proprietors like Lord Baltimore or the 
assistance and protection from the English crown.  The empire had depended on their 
contributions and would continue to do so well into the future.  Drawing on the same 
connections between industriousness, self-interest, and representative government, the 
dissenting colonists constructed an imperial vision where they had earned their "English 
Rights," not through their English identity because many in fact lacked the proper 
pedigree for elite status, but through their contributions to empire, both past and future.  
To establish and defend their local authority in the empire, the colonists had to create, 
develop, and rely upon a populist understanding of empire, establishing in the process a 
populist understanding of their own origins. 
 The social philosophy adopted by the colonists to secure their power in the empire 
was potentially much more radical than the immediate goal of achieving "English Rights" 
abroad.  In his recent work on the Revolution in 1776, Michal Rozbicki has argued that 
the revolutionary leaders created the idea of "the people" to further their own political 
gains.  He argues that in the process, they brought "the people" into the political process 
symbolically, which ultimately led to an empowered populace in actuality, ready to 
challenge the rule of the elite once the rebellion ended.  For Rozbicki, "the people" in 
America was a late eighteenth century invention of the elite colonists, one in which the 
broader population, for which the term referred to, had little to do with their own 
25 
 
creation.
41
  But the idea of "the people" in America had a much deeper and richer history.  
The empowering conception of "the people" and their role in colonization that appeared 
in the political agenda of the Maryland settlers in 1676 and in New England in 1689 took 
its persuasive power from the colonial narrative that was emerging in the promotional 
literature during the seventeenth century.  And the driving force behind this literature was 
the task of creating a plausible vision of the New World that would satisfy the demands 
of potential migrants.  "The people" in America had helped to create themselves through 
the everyday demands of English settlers, who sought to leverage their decision to 
migrate into a better life in the colonies.  The vision of a decentralized English empire, 
defined by the extension of "English Rights" abroad, made sense in 1689 because the 
actions of countless settlers throughout the seventeenth century had made it make sense.   
 "English Rights" and its mimetic implications have taken attention away from the 
attempts of colonial leaders to secure their privileges through an idealistic conception of 
"the people" and their role within the empire.  Whether understood through a liberal or 
republican paradigm, this conception of "the people" in America would become the 
central characteristic of colonial political thought that would endure throughout the 
following century and would help both ideologies reach the same radical conclusions in 
1776.  The origins of this conception of "the people," so important in the Revolution and 
in the subsequent history of the United States, rests in the imperial history of the 
seventeenth century and in the settler communities that formed the early history of the 
English colonies.  The characteristics of the people were first understood and defined in 
relationship to their roles within the English empire and their willingness to migrate to 
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the New World.  The many challenges that accompanied English efforts at "peopling" the 
New World with English settlers eventually led, by the end of the century, to a 
particularly empowered conception of "the People" in America.
42
  This process began in 
1607, not 1689, so this dissertation, in search of the roots of early American political 
thought and a better understanding of seventeenth century colonial politics, will begin 
with the first efforts by the English to establish their place in the wider Atlantic world.
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
"WHERE EVERY MAN SEEKES HIMSELF, ALL COMMETH TO NOTHING": THE 
TRIUMPH OF SOCIAL ORTHODOXY IN THE EARLY ENGLISH COLONIAL 
LITERATURE 
 
 
 To bolster the finances of its struggling colony, the Virginia Company received 
permission by the king in 1612 to organize a lottery.  Despite the fact that the lottery 
offered a new and much needed way to bolster the Company’s coffers, the new 
fundraising method did not receive a warm response in the company literature.  Virginia 
promoters often responded defensively to this method of raising revenues, admitting that 
the lottery was “no usual course in England” and acceptable only for the “most 
commendable actions.”1  The preferred model for raising money for the colonies was first 
to enflame individual concern for the common good and then to associate the colony with 
that goal.  That sort of promotion attempted to inspire a person’s better nature and then 
funnel that goodwill into the specific act of supporting the colony.  The lottery operated 
differently and appealed predominantly to an individual's desire for personal wealth.  The 
discomfort caused by this fundraising method highlights the prevailing anxieties about 
self-interest and society in early modern England. 
 A central challenge of colonization during this period that ushered in so much 
concern about self-interest in the colonial literature was the fact that the English colonies, 
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to be successful, would have to become populous and permanent settlements.  The 
Virginia promoters were selling a vision of community in the New World just as much as 
they were promising the possibilities of individual advancement.  The contemporary 
social orthodoxy in England, however, and its condemnation of economic individualism 
limited their ability to sell a colony in both directions.  The early promoters repeatedly 
chose community over self-interest and advertized their colonies in a thoroughly 
orthodox way, promising prosperous communities by way of virtuous colonists, who 
were always willing to sacrifice private gains for the larger good.  Their rampant 
anxieties about the role of self-interest in colonies, however, combined with the isolated 
challenges to this orthodoxy by some authors indicated a close and unavoidable 
connection between self-interest and the colonial endeavor.  The early writers would 
prioritize community in their advertisements for the colonies, which necessitated a 
vigorous opposition to economic individualism, but the temptation to appeal to self-
interest in the colonial promotion was never fully vanquished. 
 This chapter situates these concerns about the role of self-interest in the early 
English promotional literature within the larger context of social thought and controversy 
in sixteenth century England.  The first section examines some of the most virulent 
attacks in England on economic individualism in the form of agrarian complaints.  These 
tracts established an orthodox interpretation of self-interest, establishing it as the central 
threat to social order in England.  The second section turns to the early promotional 
literature for Virginia, New England, and Newfoundland and follows its commitment to a 
similarly aggressive indictment of self-interest and its destructive potential in the New 
World.  The many opportunities for profit in America actually heightened anxieties about 
29 
 
the consequences of self-interested behaviors and resulted in a colonial promotion that 
resembled the agrarian complaint in its strident morality.  The third section examines the 
few challenges to this approach in the colonial promotion and the failure of those authors 
to establish an acceptable alternative.    
*** 
 In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the English began a series of 
initiatives to establish colonies in the New World.  Pushed to the periphery of the Atlantic 
World by Spanish power, the English would first look to establish colonies along the 
eastern seaboard of North America or on the smaller islands in the Caribbean, such as 
Barbados in the Lesser Antilles or Providence Island, which was located much closer to 
the coast of Central America.  Spanish power and wealth was dominant during this 
period, as Providence Island would learn in 1641 when the settlement was decimated by 
Spanish forces.
2
  Raiding Spanish treasure ships had been a profitable business for 
England during the sixteenth century but, after peace was established in 1604, the English 
looked for a new way to establish their presence in the Atlantic.  With the writings of 
Richard Hakluyt the Younger, the English would find their particular roadmap to success 
in the New World.  In Principal Navigations, Hakluyt suggested that the English could 
diverge from the Spanish example of Native enslavement and the extraction of precious 
metals and build more complex economic settlements in the New World.  The English 
could then turn a whole list of New World commodities into saleable goods that could 
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significantly bolster the English economy at the expense of its European adversaries.  The 
Native Americans, he theorized, would embrace English culture and willingly provide 
labor for these endeavors as would the poor and underemployed in England.
3
  In England, 
where populations and prices were rising and "masterless" men were becoming an 
increasingly visible social problem, Hakluyt established the New World as the answer to 
these pressing problems.
4
        
  Hakluyt's call to colonize rested on a negative depiction of England's present 
circumstances.  His plan was to bolster England's suffering economy through new 
production and to provide a home for its excess population.  England' s demographic and 
economic troubles were pushing men like Hakluyt to dream of an Atlantic empire, but the 
ideological tumult caused by the crises of the sixteenth century would not be so easily 
solved.  Hakluyt assumed the easy creation of communities in the New World because of 
the availability of land and the presence of valuable commodities, but developments in 
England throughout the century had raised basic questions about what exactly sustained 
and created a community.  English colonization and the attempt to establish stable and 
lasting communities in America would highlight, instead of solve, the ongoing struggle in 
England to define the proper relationship between the individual and society.   
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 During the sixteenth century, English society was changing in fundamental ways, 
which led to new questions about the relationship between the individual and society.  
Demographically, England's population was expanding dramatically as were the prices of 
basic commodities and the need for increased agricultural production.  Whether 
predominantly cause or consequence of these changes, agricultural practices began to 
change: regions became increasingly specialized and landowners looked to maximize the 
productive capacity of their lands, most notably through the strategies of enclosure and 
engrossment.
5
  Enclosure quickly became the most prominent and symbolically powerful 
manifestation of agrarian change in England.  The controversial nature of enclosure and 
its many critics led to a flourishing literature in the form of an agrarian complaint, which 
targeted changing circumstances in the countryside and looked back to an idealized past.  
The message of this literature in sixteenth century was clear: too many landowners had 
given into the sin of covetousness, and their behavior, spurred on by personal greed, 
would continue to destabilize and weaken English society if left unchecked.  Publications 
in the style of an agrarian complaint would peak in influence during the Edward VI's 
reign, but its core message would become a "culturally authoritative orthodoxy" for the 
remainder of the century.
6
  There were, however, challenges to this understanding of 
enclosure and its condemnation of self-interest.  In parliamentary debates at the end of 
the century, the renowned colonizer Sir Walter Raleigh put forth the most coherent 
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challenge yet to this social orthodoxy.  This dissension would ensure that, on the eve of 
England most substantial efforts to colonize the New World, self-interest and its role in 
society would constitute a prominent and contested issue in English society.
7
 
  The form of the agrarian complaint in the mid-seventeenth century was simple 
and its message inherently conservative.  It idealized the past and interpreted change as a 
negative rupture in society, which was explained by the actions of covetous individuals.  
The complaint reached its peak in England as a literary form during the reign of Edward 
VI (1547-1553).  Edward embraced a radical strand of Protestantism, which combined 
with the turbulent social and economic conditions of the 1540s to produce a virulent and 
potentially radical complaint literature.  One of the leading figures involved in this 
movement was Robert Crowley, who was, either as author or publisher, involved in the 
publication of at least nineteen works of Protestant polemic from 1549-1551.  In a prose 
pamphlet of 1548, he attacked the "possessioners" in England who ignored the effect of 
their actions on their neighbors and needed to "shew themselves through love to be 
brothers of one father & membres of one body wyth them."  If not, he intoned, "they shal 
not at the laste daye enherite wyth them the kyngdom of Christe."  In these writings, the 
community was understood as an organic whole or as a body politic, where all parts of 
that body had an important role to play.  He elaborated on the metaphor of the body 
politic later in the text, when he compared the nobility to the head, shoulders, and arms 
and the peasantry to the legs and feet.  Concerned about the mistreatment of the poor in 
society, he argued that "that body is far unworthy to have either legges or feete: that wyll 
                                                          
7
 On the parliamentary debates that featured Raleigh's position on various land polices, see McRae, God 
Speed the Plough, 7-12 and Wrightson, Earthly Necessities, 209-211. 
33 
 
lette them goe bare, haveynge wherwyth to cover them."
8
  The metaphor of the body was 
such a helpful metaphor because it allotted specific functions to different body parts 
within a single system.  This vision of English society imposed a strict moral code on the 
elite and the responsibilities of stewardship that accompanied their ownership of land.  
 Within the conception of society that dominated the complaint, enclosure, 
highlighted by the rise of the great sheepmasters at the beginning of the century, clearly 
represented an anti-social act.  Opposition specifically to enclosure became almost an 
"independent subgenre of agrarian complaint" during the seventeenth century.  The 
Edwardian protestant leaders put forth some of the most aggressive attacks against 
enclosure and the self-interest that they believed was motivating such actions.  A royal 
proclamation of 1548-49 announced the establishment of the enclosure commission and 
noted: "all the land which heretofore was tilled and occupied with so many men, and did 
bring forth . . . divers families in work and labor . . . is now gotten, by insatiable 
greediness of mind, into one or two men's hands . . . and Christian people, by the greedy 
covetousness of some men, eaten up and devoured of brute beasts and driven from their 
houses by sheep and bullocks."
9
  For the opponents of enclosure at mid-century, the 
culprit was unanimously the moral sin of covetousness among the landholding class.  The 
lower ranks in society were static and powerless victims in their understanding of the 
social forces at work.  The problem allowed for an easy solution through personal 
reformation.  If the individuals pursuing the enclosure of their lands would resist the 
temptations of personal gain and put the needs of the wider community first, then the 
problems plaguing the English countryside would quickly disappear.  Hugh Latimer, the 
                                                          
8
 McRae, God Speed the Plough, 23-75, quotations on pp. 38-39. 
9
 Ibid., 50.   
34 
 
leading Protestant voice in the Edwardian reign and court preacher from 1547-1550, 
delivered a sermon in 1549, generally known as his "Last Sermon Before King Edward 
VI," that was dedicated to the issue of enclosure and began with the admonition: "Take 
heed & beware of covetousnes: take heede & beware of covetousnes: take heede & 
beware of covetousnes: take heede & beware of covetousnes."  John Hales, a member of 
Parliament and leading supporter of the enclosure commission of 1548-9, put a similar 
emphasis on the destructive nature of self-interest: "everye man must use that he hathe to 
the most benefyte of his Countreie.  Ther must be some thynge devysed to quenche this 
insatiable thrurst of gredynes of men, Covetousness must be weded out by the rootes, for 
it is the destruccion of all good things.
10
  The attack against enclosure during this period 
was the agrarian complaint at its must vitriolic.  The clear culprit was a greedy and 
misbehaving elite class. 
 This rhetoric embraced by the many Edwardian leaders had dangerous 
implications, which for many of its critics was fully evident with the popular rebellions of 
1549.  The rebellions often targeted the markings of enclosure, were anti-aristocratic in 
nature, and marked the most serious challenge to the social order in England since the 
Peasant's Revolt of 1381.  The rebellions were quickly put down and order restored, and 
although some, like Latimer, continued in the same vein, the agrarian complaint in 
England would never reach the same rhetorical heights that it had in the late 1540s.  The 
Elizabethan state retreated from the rhetorical excesses of the Edwardian leaders and 
preferred a more empirical and rationalistic approach to social and economic problems.  
The lack of any serious rural crises comparable to the 1540s helped maintain stability 
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throughout most of the Elizabethan age but, from 1596 to 1598, England experienced a 
period of extreme dearth that resulted in alarming increase in the mortality rates for 
various communities across England.  When political leaders gathered to address this 
crisis, the practice of enclosure would once again become a key issue in the debates in the 
House of Commons in both 1597 and 1601.  Sir Francis Bacon expressed the 
government's desire to see the enclosure statutes reimposed and represented the new 
approach to resisting enclosure, arguing that "inclosures of groundes bringes 
Depopulacion,which brings .1. Idleness. 2 decay of Tillage, 3. subversion of howses adn 
decrease of Charitie, and charges to the poores mayntenance. 4. the Impoverishing of the 
State of the Realme."  Bacon moved away from the intense moral focus on the sin of 
covetousness and laid out the specific social and economic consequences of enclosure.  
But while the tact of his argument was different, its central premise was not.  The practice 
of enclosure to Bacon, just as it had at mid-century, represented the economic actions of 
individuals in pursuit of private gain to the detriment of the wider community.  He 
bemoaned the depopulation of the countryside, for instance, that accompanied enclosure 
and regretted the likely consequence that "England insteed of a whole Towne full of 
people, [would become] nought but Greenfeildes a Shepheard and his Dogg."
11
  Although 
Bacon resisted the emotive language of the mid-century Complaint, another member of 
Parliament recalled that language and the conception of England as a body politic.   He 
decried covetousness, declaring that "it is strange that men can be so unnaturall as to 
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shake off the poore as if they were not part of the bodye" and conjured up the old image 
of England as a land "where sheep shall devoure men."
12
   
 The language of the complaint and the dictates of the moral economy occupied a 
powerful position in these debates, but they did face a measure of opposition.  Henry 
Jackman, a London cloth-merchant, offered an uncertain and sometimes incoherent 
defense of enclosure.  His posture was markedly defensive, which has been interpreted by 
Hal McRae as evidence of the cultural orthodoxy of his opponents' arguments, and he 
bemoaned that any person who opposed the bill immediately stood accused of taking "the 
use of the ploughe from the bowells of the earth, or the nourishment of bred from the 
bellyes of the poore."  He argued against the complete vilification of self-interest, 
asserting that "men are not to be compelled by penalties but allured by profite to any 
good exercise."  Sir Walter Raleigh supported Jackman's position through a broader 
understanding of England's economic circumstances.  He cited the wide variety of 
regional specializations and the availability of goods through foreign trade as reasons not 
to limit the agricultural options of the landowner.  "For my part," he asserted, "I do not 
like this Constraining of Men to Manure, or use the Grounds at our Wills; but rather, let 
every Man use his ground to that which it is most fit for, and therein use his own 
discretion."  He claimed to have  evidence of farmers who had made themselves "poor," 
for instance, by complying with the tillage laws.  For Raleigh, the landowner was in the 
best position to decide the proper use of his land.  He argued that "the best course is set 
[agricultural practices] at liberty, and leave every man free, which is the desire of a true 
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English man."
13
  Around the time he was making these arguments, Raleigh was actively 
pursuing enclosure on his properties in Dorset, and in the process forcing several tenants 
off his land.
14
   
 The debate over enclosure in 1597 and 1601 had put a spotlight on the nature of 
self-interest and its relationship to society.  The older rhetoric may have won the day, as 
the enclosures statutes were continued, even if inconsistently enforced, but dissent had 
entered the political discourse.  W.R.D. Jones has argued that these debates in Parliament 
at the turn of the century demonstrated that the "unity of belief concerning the type of 
society which it was the duty of the government to maintain had broken down."
15
  These 
debates occurred less than ten years before England would establish its first permanent 
settlement in the New World and provided a range of ideological possibilities for how the 
colonial planners and promoters would approach self-interest in the New World.  Jess 
Edwards has recently argued in his study of early Virginia that America appealed to men 
like Raleigh precisely because they conceived of the land in the New World as 
"desocialized" space.
16
  To Raleigh, this may have been appealing, but to his opponents 
in Parliament, this prospect would have elicited the opposite reaction.  In Francis Bacon's 
commentary on the English colonies in 1625, for instance, he may very well have had 
colonizers like Raleigh in mind when he observed that "the principal thing that hath been 
the destruction of most plantations hath been the base and hasty drawing of profit in the 
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first years.”17  The intellectual challenges posed by enclosure would be transported to the 
New World.  Those promoting colonization would have to project prosperous and stable 
communities in their efforts to attract people to the New World and, in so doing, they 
would have to weigh in on the current controversies in England.  
***  
 In the first three decades of the seventeenth century, English began colonizing 
efforts in Virginia, New England, Newfoundland, and Barbados.  All but Barbados would 
embark on aggressive publication campaigns to promote English colonization and their 
respective colony in particular.
18
  The vast majority of these authors characterized 
English colonization predominantly as a religious undertaking.  With anti-Spanish 
sentiment cresting in England at the turn of the century, the presentation of English 
efforts in the New World as the polar opposite of Spanish efforts would, these authors 
believed, make for the most attractive characterization of the colonizing endeavor.  The 
Black Legend had come to define Spanish imperialism for most English observers with 
its focus on Spanish exploitation and greed.  The promoters of English colonization were 
intent on the English doing it differently.  The English promoters targeted self-interest as 
anathema to the colonial endeavor and repeatedly stressed the importance of individual 
restraint in the New World.  These efforts recalled the language and emphasis of the 
Edwardian agrarian complaint.  In the initial efforts to define and promote English 
colonization, it was not the emerging language of individual rights put forth by Raleigh 
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and others that was deemed the best way to make colonization attractive to the English 
population but the heavily moralizing and communal rhetoric that had reached its peak in 
England fifty years prior.  
 There was a steady stream of colonial literature in England throughout the 
seventeenth century, but the period from 1607 to 1626 saw a significant upsurge in this 
production.  Catherine Armstrong has tracked the production of colonial literature from 
1607 to 1660 and has noted four peak periods of production, two of which, 1607 to 1610 
and 1622 to 1624, occurred during the first three decades of colonization.
19
  The biggest 
factor in this increased production was the Virginia Company and its commitment to 
advertizing its colony in print.  The Company’s literary production ranged from short 
broadsides to learned sermons.  Some of the authors of these works, like John Smith and 
Alexander Whitaker, had actually lived in the New World, while others, like John Donne 
and Edward Sandys, had never journeyed across the Atlantic.  The individual authors and 
forms of the publications varied, but what did not, throughout the Company’s existence, 
was its commitment to utilizing the printed word as key method for garnering support for 
the colony. 
      The Virginia Company was not alone in this belief.  While the Company dominated 
in terms of volume, most colonies started during this period produced their own 
literature.  The Bermuda Company, an offshoot of the Virginia Company, produced a few 
promotional tracts advertizing the colony.  During the 1620s, the Plymouth Company in 
New England printed various sermons to describe and advertize their efforts.  Throughout 
this period, there were various attempts to drum up support to colonize Newfoundland.  
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William Alexander, who was connected to colonizing efforts in Newfoundland, branched 
out on his own and received a grant from the king to start a new colony just south of 
Newfoundland, to be called New Scotland.  To this end, he not surprisingly published a 
tract on his plans and hopes for the colony.  There were also publications, like Richard 
Eburne’s A Plaine Pathway to Plantations, that wrote about all the English colonies, or 
authors, like John Smith, who wrote about various regions.  Despite this variety, this 
genre, as Armstrong has argued, warrants being examined as “single body of literature.”  
Despite the various voices, these works were all united by a common desire to “spread 
the word” about the New World.20 
 The dominant characteristic of this literature across the various regions was its 
religious character.  In a sermon in support of Virginia printed in 1609, William Symonds 
defined the fundamental rationale of colonization in biblical terms.  Symonds told the 
story of Abraham and God’s call to him to “goe into another countrey.”  For Symonds, 
God called Abraham away from his land and family to spread the knowledge of God to 
all nations.  He wrote that God, in fact, “with-held ſome mercy from [his people], til all 
nations haue the meanes of ſalvation.”  “The Heathen may knowe the Lord,” he 
continued, so that God will “be maginified, and sanctified, and knowne in the eyes of 
many Nations.”  That same call to Abraham, Symonds asserted, “doth binde all his 
ſonnes, according to the faith, to goe likewiſe abroad.”  Symonds argued that this general 
calling to leave one’s home and spread the world of God to new nations was as applicable 
in the early seventeenth century as it had been in Abraham’s time.21   
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 Symonds laid out the many rewards that God would bestow on individuals willing 
to enlist in such a risky and challenging endeavor.  “The Lord," he asserted, "doth 
promiſe to enrich him with many bleſsings, if he be obedient to his calling.”  These 
blessings were all encompassing, including both temporal and spiritual rewards: “In this 
bleſſing then are there all things, hauing the promiſe of the life present, and of that which 
is to come, for this is the profit, is got by Godliness.”  Symonds twice rephrased the same 
point earlier in the text: “God will bleſse him, by giuing him the good things of this 
preſent world, and that which is to come” and “the Lord will bleſſ them, and cauſe them to 
proſper.”  God also promised fame to Abraham: “I will be thine exceeding great rewarde, 
I will by thee doe ſo greate things in a ſtrange place, that thy name ſhall be remembred, as 
my name, which I shall put vpon thee.”22  The rewards God gave to Abraham would be 
the same for the colonists who did God’s work in Virginia. 
      The one requirement for God's blessing, however, was religious sincerity.  The 
colonists “muſt have a longing, and a liking to ſpread the Goſpel abroad.”  For Symonds, 
this could not happen by accident or by other motives, but only by a sincere desire to 
spread the word of God to new nations.  In fact, God actually tested the purity of 
Abraham’s motives by not telling “him whither he ſhall goe, to keep him ſuſpenſe” so that 
the “obedience of faith may the more effectually appeare.”  The “general calling” to 
spread God’s word remained, and so did, for Symonds, the focus on the actions and 
motives of those called.  Symonds warned the colonists not to test God in this manner: 
“you muſt doe your diligence to walke in thoſe wayes, by which the Lord doeth giue his 
bleſsings.  You muſt not with Idleneſſe, inforce God to worke myracles of mercie on the 
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wilfully ſinful.”  For Symonds, God’s assistance was necessary to this endeavor, and that 
assistance was dependent on the process as much as the results.  If Englishmen migrated 
to Virginia for the wrong reasons, whether it be personal profit or “carnall pleasure,” God 
would turn his back on the colony.  To succeed, the colonizing effort, as Symonds 
portrayed it, had to be fully dedicated to its religious purpose.
23
 
       Within this godly framework of English colonization, self-interested individuals and 
actions would have to be avoided.  The colonies either had to serve God or the larger 
good of England, but the motivation had to greater than the individual self.  In a printed 
sermon by William Crashaw in support of Virginia, he agreed with Symonds and intoned 
that “By [other activities] we may inrich our purses: but by this our consciences.”24   
      The attacks on those people participating in the colonies for selfish or ungodly 
reasons were frequent and pointed.  In a 1624 tract on New England, Edward Winslow 
opens with an introduction outlining the three main things that are “the overthrow and 
bane” of the colonies.  The first reason on his list was “the vain expectation of present 
profit.”  His third reason involved the low quality of individuals migrating to the colony, 
who “oft times . . . are rather the Image of men endued with bestiall, yea, diabolical 
affections, then the image of God, endued with reason, vnderstanding, and holiness.”  
These men were “too desirous of gaine” and ended up being “seekers of themselues” 
instead of pursuing the common good.
25
  In a list of three reasons why the colonies were 
failing, the pursuit of personal gain accounted for two of the three.  With the first, 
Winslow pointed to the pursuit of self-gain as its own entity and its destructive nature.  
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With the third reason, he attacked colonial malefactors but explained their behavior by 
their willingness to pursue private gain over the interests of the common good.  Reason 
one was the dangers of the pursuit of personal gain broadly stated and reason three was 
its real world consequences.  Even though Winslow claimed to offer a list of three 
separate things that were tearing apart the colonies, the pursuit of private gain was his 
dominant concern.  
        In a sermon preached in New England in 1621 and published in 1622, Robert 
Cushman focused on the problem of self-love in the colonies and its potential solution.  
In his title, he claimed the purpose of demonstrating “the danger of self-loue, and the 
sweetness of true Friendship,” and in his epigraph, called the colonists to action: “Let no 
man seeke his owne, But euery man anothers wealth.”26  Like Winslow, he located all the 
troubles of the colony in the sin of self-love.  The “bane of all these mischeifes” in New 
England was that “men are cleauing to themselves, and their owne matters, and disregard 
and contemne all others.”  He asked the New England colonists to “turne the streame 
another way” and “seek the good of your brethren.”  To this end, he instructed them to 
treat self-love in their community like a dangerous “disease” and to seek out its root so 
that “it may be cured.”  New Englanders needed to test themselves to see if they had 
become too attached to “riches and worldly wealth,” too unfamiliar with “hard labour,” 
and too sensitive to the “scornes” of worldly men.27  A similar call was made the same 
year in a separate text, commonly referred to as Mourt’s Relation: “let every man 
represse in himself and the whole bodie in each person, as so many rebels against the 
common good, all priuate respects of mens selues, nor sorting with the generall 
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conuenience.”28  The consequence of any action that put self in front of others, which a 
Virginia writer had earlier referred to as the “common corruption of time,” was the 
destruction of the colony.
29
  For Cushman, the disease of self-love did not only infect the 
individual but reached out into the larger society: “This vein must bee pricked, and this 
humor let out, els it will spoyle all . . . and the contagion of it is such . . . as will hazard 
the welfare of that societie, where selfe seekers and self louers are.”30  He applied this 
lesson specifically to New England, asserting that “one selfe-louer will weaken and 
disharten a whole Colonie.”  An earlier Virginia pamphlet agreed with the larger threats 
of individual self-love: “Priuate ends have been the bane of many excellent exploits, and 
priuate plots for the gaine of a few, have given hindrance to many good and great 
matters.”31  With the general vulnerability of the colonies in their early years, the belief 
was that the colonists would have to be especially vigilant towards all possible threats.  
The primary danger that necessitated the most attention, however, was not the external 
menace of Spain or the Indians, but the internal threat of solipsism.  The self-loving 
English colonist, not the savage native or the power-hungry Spaniard, appeared to 
Cushman and other promoters to be public enemy number one.   
       The colonial writers during this period often underscored their concern for the self-
loving individual through analogy, comparing an egocentric individual to base farm 
animals and threatening beasts.  Crashaw scolded those only willing to act on behalf of 
private motives and compared them to “sowes,” who “wallow in the mire of their profit 
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and pleasure.”32  Cushman utilized the same analogy in his sermon for New England: 
“Euen hoggs, doggs, and bruit Beasts know their own ease, and can seeke that which is 
good for themselues; And what doth this shifting, progging, and fat feeding which some 
vse, more resemble then the fashion of hoggs?”33  With this comparison to livestock, 
these authors focused on the individual’s own baseness and his/her fall from civility.  
Some authors chose the more threatening analogy of a beast to highlight not only the self-
serving individual’s own lowliness, but his/her threat to the community as well.  Robert 
Gray, in Virginia sermon from 1609, used this specific analogy in castigating those 
interested in Virginia only for personal profit: “we are not borne like beasts for our 
ielues.”34  Cushman made explicit in his sermon the full implications of the comparison.  
“A man without naturall affection or loue,” he argued, is “transformed into a beast-like 
humor . . . . He is a beast in the shape of a man; or rather an infernall Spirit, walking 
amongst men which makes the world a hell what in him lieth.”35  Better than a senseless 
livestock animal that could be easily contained, the comparison to a “beast” more 
accurately captured authorial fears about self-love in the promotion of the English 
colonies in America. 
      The colonial promotion was full of exhortations for the colonists to rid themselves of 
self-love for the good of the colony.  Two Virginia publications from 1610 included 
separate calls to “let Religion be the first aim of your hopes” and to “disperse the clowd 
of avarice which darketh his spiritual sight.”36  A Virginia sermon from the same year 
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called for colonists to “cast aside all cogitation of profit, let vs look at better things,” and 
again in 1613, a promoter cautioned colonists to be “those that lightly esteeme riches.”37  
From 1622, a Virginia promoter asked the colony’s supporters to “let not the riches and 
commodities of the World, be in your contemplation in your aduentures,” and 1624, a 
New England author intoned that “every good ſubject is bound to preferre the publicke, 
before his owne private good.”38  Even given the dire need for English migrants during 
this period, the promoters discouraged contributions from those driven by the wrong 
motives.  In 1622, a New England writer recommended that for those “who looke after 
great riches, ease, pleasure, dainties, and iollitie in this world . . . [he] would not aduise 
them to come here.”39  A Virginia author was even more adamant: “If there be any that 
came in only or principally for profit, or any that would so come in, I wish the latter may 
neuer bee in, and the former out again. . . . If any that are gone, or purpose to go in 
person, do it only that they might liue at ease and get wealth;  if others that adventure 
their money haue respected the same ends, I wish for my part the one in England again, 
and the other had his money in his purse.”40  The author of Mourt’s Relation put it most 
succinctly: “He whose liuing is but for himself, it is time he were dead.”41  For an 
endeavor that needed support in people and money, it was an aggressive stance to take to 
resist any channel of possible contributions.  For the early colonial promoter, however, 
encouraging that sort of support and participation would destroy colonization just as 
assuredly as an insufficient number of colonists would. 
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        With failure resulting from human failings and success only coming through God’s 
blessing, colonial writers worked hard to demonstrate God’s support for the colonies.  In 
the preface to Alexander Whitaker’s Good Nevves from Virginia, William Crashaw laid 
out four occurrences that clearly demonstrated God’s support for Virginia.  The first three 
all had to do with the tempest and resulting shipwreck of 1609.  The miraculous survival 
of the passengers, the even more miraculous discovery of Bermuda, and the timely arrival 
in Virginia to save a flailing colony were all interpreted as clear acts of God to save the 
colony.  His fourth proof though did not depend on the shipwreck nor was it limited to 
any one colony.  While some colonists pursued private gain and put the colonies at risk, 
the ones that supported the colony with no hope of “speedie profit” acted as proof of 
God’s support for colonization.  Crashaw had observed “able and worthy men . . . 
voluntarily vndergoe the danger of sea, and all the miseries and difficulties that 
necessarily and vndoubtedly attend a new plantation.”  For these individuals to have done 
this with a “very vncertaine hope of profit, and most certain danger of life it selfe” could 
only be explained, for Crashaw, by the “extraordinary motio~ of Gods Spirit.”  He listed 
names, like Thomas Gates, Thomas Dale, George Somers, and even the author himself, 
Alexander Whitaker, to prove this claim.  These gentlemen, he argued, had “easie, 
pleasant, and wealthy liues in England” and could not be lured away from England 
simply by profit.  By Crashaw’s logic, they had wealth at home, so that could not be their 
motive in coming to the New World.  As the pursuit of profit had been the most powerful 
threat to God’s blessing, the willingness of many to subordinate personal profit was a 
clear indication of God’s support.  Crashaw asserted that anyone upon hearing this list for 
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the first time “would certainely change their minds, and say with [him], Doubtlesse here 
is the finger of God.”42    
      As much as the colonial promoters disdained the pursuit of personal wealth, they had 
no problem asserting that wealth would be a rightful reward for their actions.  In a single 
paragraph of text, Cushman moved through how this would happen.   He argued that the 
colonists must first “settle religion here, before either profit or popularitie” and recruit 
“Godly men” over people with “wordly experience,” despite the pragmatic problems that 
may cause.  To the colonists, Cushman maintained that with this policy even “though you 
lose, the Lord shall gayne,” and they will thus most “honour God” with their 
contributions to the colony.  This godly focus though would have tangible rewards in this 
life.  Their actions would be remembered for generations for the honor of the endeavor 
and God would reward their sacrifice in the next life, but there would also be material 
rewards in this life.  “Your profit is comming,” he advised, “even in this life.”  The 
colonists could expect their efforts to “be repayed again double & treble in this world.”43  
Robert Johnson, in his earlier work on Virginia, promised in the colony an “assured hope 
of gaine, but only if the profit was “not chiefe” in the colonists’ hearts.44  The promoters 
promised profit to colonists, sometimes in grandiose terms, but it would be accomplished 
through divine means and approval.  In a Bermuda pamphlet from 1615, the author put 
forth the same idea: “There is great hope that (by the bleſſing of God) men may in time 
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live very comfortably heere, and grow rich.”45  William Crashaw laid out this process in 
detail: 
If in this action wee seeke first the Kingdome of God, all other 
things shall be added vnto us . . . If wee first and principally seeke 
the propagation of the Gospell and conuersion of soules, God wil 
undoubtedly make the voiage very profitable to all the aduentures 
and their posterities euen for matter of this life . . . there wants 
only Gods blessing to make it gainfull: now the high way to 
obtaine that, is to forget our own affections, & to neglect our own 
priuate profit in respect of Gods glorie; and he that is zealous of 
Gods glorie, God will be mindfull of his profit: and he that seekes 
only or principally spiritual things, God will reward him both with 
those Spiritual and temporal things . . . so though we do not intend 
our profit in this action, yet, if wee intend Gods honor, and the 
conuersion of soules, God will assuredly send vs great profit, 
which we may take lawfully and thankfully as his blessing.
46
 
  
God would reward only the virtuous, but when that reward came, it would be large and 
fully commensurate with the sacrifice.    
       This overall narrative of the way to colonial wealth was so powerful when the 
authors discussed individual profit, they did so in a way that posited only a passive role to 
the individual.   In the promotion of Virginia, one author claimed that if the colonists 
“bee honest, and painefull, the place will make them rich.”47  Another wrote that for the 
colonists, “it is required at their hands that they be faithfull, painefull, and honest in their 
callings; for if they be thus qualified, the countrie itself will make them rich.”48  This sort 
of unintentional “way to wealth” was more comfortable for the promoters given their 
concerns about private interest and selfish actions.  In both cases, the “land” or the 
“countrie” replaced God as the acting agent and would make the colonists rich.  If they 
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worked hard and were honest, wealth would be their reward, but importantly, as with the 
larger discourse on colonization, wealth should not be their goal.  Even in discussing the 
individual, wealth only came by misdirection.  The colonies were places where wealth 
would come but should not be pursued.   
      Colonial authors often approached the issue of self-gain on a large scale, but many 
were also happy to focus on the specific consequences of colonists who only eyed a quick 
profit.  Robert Johnson, for instance, in his tract on Virginia from 1609, retold the story 
of the Roanoke colony, pinpointing a single instance of selfish economic behavior as the 
sole reason for its failure.  As he told the story, the original plan for the colony included 
the scheduled landing of a supply ship from England in its second year.  The initial 
settlers arrived in the colony with some success and survived the winter.  The supply 
ship, however, did not show up the following year and forced the settlers to abandon the 
colony and return to England.  Those in control of the supply ship for that year “turned 
their head another way, and with greedie minds, betooke themselues wholly to hunt after 
Pillage vpon the Spanish Coast . . . and . . . were not able . . . to make vp into the land to 
visit and relieue their friends.”  In Johnson’s telling, that one moment of self-serving 
behavior wrecked the colony, and without it, Roanoke colony would have “long since 
become a most royall addition to the Crowne of England, and a very nursery and 
fountaine of much wealth and strength to this Kingdome.”49   
        Robert Johnson later complained in a separate pamphlet about the lack of 
commitment from investors only interested in gain.  In the The New Life of Virginia, he 
divided up all the investors for Virginia into three categories.  One of these groups 
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“looked for preſent gaine” and responded to any sign of trouble in the colony by “bidding 
it adiew, and neuer lookt after it more.”  This group would not stand by the colony in its 
time of need.  A separate group of adventurers would, however.  Johnson heaped praise 
on the individuals who “have not ceaſed to giue their counſels, ſpend their times, and lay 
down their monies . . . for effecting . . . ſo great a worke for their King and Countries 
honour.”  These men maintained their support of the colony through difficult times 
because they were focused on the bigger goals of colonization.  Economic failures acted 
as little discouragement to these “constant adventurers,” who even “in the greatest 
disasters neuer fainted.”50  In his earlier work on Virginia, he complained again about 
investors driven by “greedy gain” who will “flinke away with discontent, and draw [their] 
purses from the charge” if profits do not come in “presently to their expectation.”51  For 
Johnson, the right kind of Virginia adventurer was a supporter of the colony first and a 
financial investor second.  The title “adventurer” simply meant somebody who invested 
money into the endeavor; a “constant adventurer” did it for the right reasons.  These were 
the men that would make Virginia a success, while the others would fail the colony in 
tough times. 
       William Alexander published his Encouragement to the Colonies in 1624 to support 
the founding of New Scotland and expressed grave concern for how “avarice, and 
ambition” could ruin a colony.  The Spanish colonies provided one such example.  In 
pursuit of riches in the New World, the Spanish had been “drawing yearly a great number 
of Negroes from Angola, and other parts, which being but an vnnaturall merchandiſe, are 
bought at a deare rate, and maintayned with danger.”  These slaves were always “hoping 
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for better by a change” and would “Joyne with any ſtrong enemy.”52  The Spanish had 
made a decision to maximize profit at the expense of the community, and the result was a 
colony always hanging on the precipice of disaster.  Something similar had happened in 
Virginia.  Alexander claimed the English colony could have attained to “great perfection” 
by now.  The colony had already received enough suitable migrants, “who had no care 
but . . . how to build, plant, and pleniſh in ſuch ſort as might best eſtabliſhe a fortune for 
their Poſteritie.”  They were well on their way towards making “vp a new Nation.”53 This 
progress had been stunted by troubles with the natives, but also with misguided direction 
from investors.  In Alexander’s view, the investors in England had instructed the Virginia 
planters to produce only tobacco because they wanted a quick profit.  They were 
“ſtrangers” to Virginia and had “no care but how the beſt benefit may preſently bee drawn 
backe from thence.”54  In both these examples for Alexander, the decisions made in 
pursuit of immediate profit had placed the colonies at risk. 
       In his promotional tract for Newfoundland, Richard Whitbourne also provided 
examples of the pursuit of personal gain destroying the long-term sustainability of a 
colony.  Giant stones were his big concern: “diuers of our Nation doe take into their ships 
very great stones, to press and dry fish withall; which work being done, they cast those 
stones into Harbors where their ships use to ride at anchor; which will utterly spoile the 
Roades and Harbors in that Countrey.”  Dropping the stones in the water was the easiest 
way to dispose of them and did not hurt the immediate profit of the offending sailors.   In 
the long term, this practice would destroy the accessibility of the coast line.  These 
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fishermen pursued immediate profit with no concern for the island itself.  For 
Whitbourne, a plantation would solve this destructive economic competition by “the 
setting of some better order and government amongst the fishermen.”55  Like Alexander, 
Whitbourne viewed the pursuit of gain as short-sighted and destructive, so even if it did 
not bring forth the wrath of God, it would ruin the colonies all the same.   
       Whether it was drastically conceived as the hand of God or more mundanely as a 
logistical mishap, the promoters of the early colonies viewed the pursuit of personal 
profit as destructive to the colonies.   The vastness and perceived openness of the 
American environment to English settlement did not have the effect that Walter Raleigh 
hoped it would.  In fact, it moved the pendulum in the opposite direction.  The inchoate 
and undeveloped nature of the English colonies led to heightened concern about the 
destructive consequences of self-interested behavior.   In one Virginia Company 
publication, the author claimed that “wicked” persons in England could be contained 
because they were “surfet, of an able, healthy, and composed body.”  The colonies would 
not be so lucky; those same people “must needses bee the poison” of societies that were 
still “so tender, feeble, and yet vnformed.”56  Not only were the infant colonies more 
susceptible than more established communities, they also potentially attracted the wrong 
sort of people.  William Alexander talked about how men full of “avarice, and ambition” 
did hope to “transferre their ſplene to forraine parts . . . where leaſt harme was feared, and 
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moſt benefit expected.”57  For the promoters, the colonies were potentially a magnet for 
the type of person that was most dangerous to the survival of a community.   
 The result was that the colonial situation in its earliest days did not free up 
economic individualism in the promotional literature, but led instead to an increased 
vigilance against such behavior.  The rejection of self-interest in this early vision of 
English colonization was partly explained by the fervent desire of most English 
promoters to delineate English from Spanish efforts in the New World.
58
  The widespread 
participation of humanist intellectuals and their emphasis on the classical conceptions of 
virtue and the common good was also a contributing factor.
59
  But the opposition to self-
interest also highlights the focus on community in early English colonization.  The 
promoters had to convince potential migrants that a society would form and prosper in 
their respective colonies in order to attract sufficient numbers of migrants.  The 
reputation of the New World as a place of expansive individual opportunities could not 
easily coexist with orthodox thought on community formation.  
*** 
 There would be a few important challenges to this vision of English colonization 
and its deprecation of self-interested actions in the New World.  The fact that colonial 
societies did not exist but needed to be created posed a problem for a colonial promotion 
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intent on opposing self-interest.  The agrarian complaint, for instance, was directed at an 
extant society with an idealized past, which made the proactive and innovative individual 
appear dangerous and disruptive.  The colonial endeavor, in contrast, relied on proactive 
individuals to embrace change, leave home, and travel across the Atlantic.  The colonial 
endeavor, by definition, could not be about stasis.  The main objective of promoters was 
to encourage new activities and project societal development and progress in the 
colonies.  In many ways, these colonial circumstances resembled the economic 
circumstances that were so important to the Scottish Enlightenment in the eighteenth 
century.  David Hume, Sir James Steuart, Adam Smith, and the leading figures of that 
intellectual movement, after the Act of Union in 1707, became "painfully aware" of the 
"backwards, almost barbarous" state of their native society.  In light of this observation, 
"improvement" became the order of the day and eventually led to their important 
reconsideration of the role of self-interest in society.
60
  The same basic economic 
conditions were present in the colonies, and even within the wider colonial literature that 
disparaged self-interest, there was a frequent acknowledgement of how helpful it could 
be in attracting sufficient migration.  In their examination of the Henry Jackman and 
Walter Raleigh's argument in Parliament at the turn of the century, Keith Wrightson and 
Hal McRae have both observed that the supporters of enclosure struggled in their 
arguments because they lacked "an acceptable oppositional language."
61
  The same 
obstacles existed for the few promotional authors who attempted to alter the dominant 
view of the relationship between self-interest and English colonization.  These challenges 
                                                          
60
 For the Scottish Enlightenment and its relationship to economic conditions in Scotland, see, Michael 
Guenther, "A Peculiar Silence: The Scottish Enlightenment, Political Economy, and the Early American 
Debates over Slavery," Atlantic Studies 8 (Dec., 2011), 447-483. 
61
 Wrightson, Earthly Necessities, 209-210 and McRae, God Speed the Plough, 10-12. 
56 
 
would not overturn the prevailing approach to the promotional literature.  Subsequent 
colonial efforts in New England, Maryland, and Providence Island would all promote and 
organize their colonies with similar concerns about the destructive capabilities of self-
interest in America, but these early challenges reflected the pressure inherent in the 
colonial endeavor to push for a more permissive understanding of self-interest and the 
types of behavior that it encouraged.              
 Even within this colonial vision that was so strongly opposed to self-interested 
motivations, there were occasional admissions that selfish motives were indeed 
influencing some to participate in colonization.  Alexander Whitaker in Good News from 
Virginia, a tract dedicated to countering any frustrations about the lack of early profit in 
the colony, admitted as much: “there may be some, that wish their money in their purses; 
it may be so, but for [each] base-thoughted man, I dare say we haue many, that wish a 
great deale more out of their purses.”62  William Crashaw was not so sure.  He 
complained bitterly about the unwillingness of many to support Virginia despite the good 
that the colony would do, but if there was “certaine and present profit” in Virginia, these 
same reluctant investors would “run, and make meanes to get it.”  If private profit was 
possible, he continued, “oh how they bite at it, oh how it stirres them!”63  Robert 
Cushman lamented the same behavior: “even amongst professors of Religion, almost all 
the loue and fauour that is shewed vnto others is with a secret ayme at themselues . . . 
[they] labor hard so as all the profite may come to themselues, else they are harltesse and 
feeble.”  He continued this indictment of human behavior: “men blow the bellowes hard, 
when they haue an Iron of their owne a heating, worke hard whilest their owne house is 
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in building, dig hard whilest their owne garden is in planting, but is it so as the profit 
must goe wholy or partly to others, their handes waxe feeble, their hearts waxe faint.”64  
Robert Gray, in 1609, complained that some “men must be vsed like sponges, they must 
be squeased . . . [or they] will yeeld to nothing, though It concerne the common good 
neuer so greatly.”65  Christopher Levett made a similar complaint in 1624, claiming that 
“most men in this age reſpects their own profit 100 times more then the publicke good” 
and that some would actually restrain from doing “themſelves good” if it meant that 
“others ſhall have ſome [good] by it” as well.66   In these criticisms of people drawn to 
colonization for the wrong reasons, they acknowledged, however reluctantly, the inherent 
attractiveness of self-interest to those promoting colonization.  Throughout the literature, 
the authors constantly used the same phrase—to “stirre up” the people—to describe the 
impact that they hoped their writings would have, and that was exactly the power they 
ceded to private interests.   
 A few authors went beyond bemoaning the inevitable presence of self-interested 
individuals and actually attempted to appeal to that sort of individual.  Two authors, 
Richard Whitbourne and most famously, John Smith, used the demands of colonization 
and the limitations of man as sufficient reasons to call on self-interest in colonial 
promotion.  Both Smith and Whitbourne understood the colonies as beneficial to the 
greater good of England and attempted to attract people to the colonies by virtue, but in 
their texts, they directly confronted the limits of that appeal.  John Smith famously 
proclaimed in his A Description of New England: “I am not so simple, to thinke, that ever 
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any other motive then wealth, will ever erect there a Commonweale.”67  Richard 
Whitbourne’s promotional piece for Newfoundland in 1622 exhibited a similar 
realization.  He dedicated the first part of his work to loftier claims of the colonies, 
arguing that Newfoundland was a “worke both profitable and necessary for his Maiesties 
Kingdomes in generall.”  He concluded his work with a separate, smaller section, 
dedicated to showing the future colonists “what particular profit may redound to 
themselues.”68  As John Smith had done before him, he explained this focus with a 
realistic assessment of man and his shortcomings, recognizing that the more 
magnanimous "affections and resolutions of men, doe sometimes freeze.”  Whitbourne 
and Smith used the attraction of gain in the same way; they both hoped that "gain" would 
"affect that, which Religion, Charity, and the Common good cannot.”69  Importantly, for 
Smith and Whitbourne, religion, charity, and the common good had been their first 
choices.   
       Both Smith and Whitbourne registered significant dissent against the larger vision of 
English colonization that had been adopted by the majority of colonial promoters, but its 
impact was limited.  Historians have focused a great deal, in particular, on Smith's 
isolated comment about appealing to self-interest and its importance to future 
developments in the colonies.  Leo Lemay, for instance, has used that quotation as one 
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piece of evidence in a larger argument about Smith's "proto-American" qualities, 
emphasizing his strident support of individualism in particular.
70
  Smith's writings 
overall, however, indicate a far different and much more conventional understanding of 
self-interest.   Kevin Hayes, for instance, has examined the entirety of Smith's published 
works and has argued that Smith's ideal colonist carried two crucial characteristics: the 
ability to work hard and the willingness to "help his fellow colonists unselfishly."
71
  
Walter Woodward has analyzed Smith's extensive promotional efforts for New England 
and has arrived at a similar conclusion, arguing that Smith consistently emphasized the 
necessity that colonists be willing "to defer the demands of self-interest."
72
  Although 
Smith did anticipate the later promotional literature with his focus on the importance on 
industry and labor, he did not challenge the negative perception of self-interested actions 
and their corrosive effect on a community.  His comment about self-interest is analogous 
to Henry Jackman's objection in the parliamentary debates to the reigning orthodoxy on 
enclosure.  It represented an isolated moment of dissent against prevailing attitudes, but 
not a coherent oppositional position.   
 The most ambitious attempt to re-conceptualize how self-interest should be 
understood in the New World did not come from John Smith, but from the Newfoundland 
promoter, William Vaughan.  Vaughan was a landed aristocrat in England, part-time 
poet, and supporter of colonization, who purchased a piece of land from the 
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Newfoundland Adventurers in 1616 and attempted to start a colony there as an individual 
proprietor.
73
  As a part of his ultimately unsuccessful attempts to build a colony, Vaughan 
published The Golden Fleece in 1626, which dismissed the weighty morality of the 
earlier colonial promotion.  This move was made possible for Vaughan by his willingness 
to reduce the colonies to their economic purposes and fully subordinate colonial society 
to its imperial function.  The earlier writers had understood English colonization as an 
extension of English society and as a powerful symbol of the righteousness of English 
character and religion.  For Vaughan, the colonies were not an extension of English 
society but an entity created and organized to bolster England's financial resources.  The 
primary goal of wealth production changed the rules for the social organization of the 
colonies and allowed Vaughan to embrace self-interest in the New World.   
 Vaughan's Golden Fleece was unique in the promotional genre for its extended 
discussion of England's social problems.  Like many colonial authors, including Hakluyt, 
he highlighted England's problems in an effort to underscore the necessary importance of 
colonization, but unlike many of these authors, Vaughan offered an extended discussion 
on what was causing England's deteriorating state.  Part of the problem was the lack of 
colonization.  England was falling behind other European countries like Spain and 
Portugal, who were extracting wealth from the New World in huge quantities.  The 
bigger problem for Vaughan was internal, however.  England was failing to colonize, but 
at the same time, it was also becoming more fractious and less productive internally.
74
  In 
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his explanation of why this was happening, Vaughan put forth a thoroughly conventional 
diagnosis that focused on the rise of self-interest in England and its social consequences.   
The social hierarchy was fraying, he maintained, because of the “proud affectation of 
men of Inferiour Rankes, who contrary to the Prescriptions of Ciuill Gouerment, 
following the example of Lucifer the Prince of Pride, had perked vp so high, that they 
wore gorgeous Garments, more glorious than Princes."  For Vaughan, no person or 
profession captured the rise of individual ambitions in England better than the legal 
profession.  In former times, lawyers had "endeuoured by all meanes to establish Love 
and Charity among Neighbours, and were glad to heare those good newes of their 
Conuersions, though their Gaine came in the lesse."  Now, however, they put private 
ambitions ahead of public concerns: “All their mind runnes on Gaine.  Gaine is their God 
. . . Gaine is their Iosuah, that governes their battels, and gives them superioritie and 
victory, not over the vncircumcised Philistines, but over their owne Brethren.”  They 
even attacked the most vulnerable members of society as they “polish[ed] their wits, and 
with hired tongues goe about to defeat O[…]phans, Widowes, and other innocents."75  
Lawyers, like so many individuals in England, were choosing selfish interests over the 
larger good of the community and the predictable consequence for Vaughan was a nation 
in decline. 
 Vaughan was clearly a proponent of the classical conception of virtue and its 
importance to society.  In a separate work on Newfoundland, entitled Quodlibets, Robert 
Hayman dedicated a poem to Vaughan in conventional terms: “Your noble humor 
indefatigable, / More vertuous, constant yet, then profitable, / Striuing to doe good, you 
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have lost your part, / Whil’st lesser losse hath broken some Tradesmens heart.”76  
Vaughan's ambitions were greater than just the mere profit of the "Tradesman," and he 
hoped that his fellow countrymen would be similarly inclined.  In a fictional scene from 
the Golden Fleece, a narrator presents to an English audience a persuasive case for how a 
colony in Newfoundland would save England.  The response was dramatic:  “the 
Auditors and standers by shouted for joy . . . [and] there were many Ladies which 
purposed out of hand to imitate Isabella Queen of Castile, in selling their Iewels, Rings, 
and Bracelets, for the furthering of this Plantation and Fishing . . . Great was the zeale, & 
and most hopeful for the Charity like to spring from this zeale, (for euery man prepared 
an auspicious offring for the gratulation of these ioyfull newes).”  This was the 
appropriate response when a virtuous people were presented with an opportunity to assist 
the public good, but like so many other colonial promoters, Vaughan was disappointed 
with the difference between fiction and reality and was dismayed with the reluctance of 
the wealthy in England to support colonization.  Instead of contributing to such a worthy 
endeavor, they remained “besotted with the lullabies of carnall ease, caring more for this 
worlds vanity, then for heauenly Blisse purchased by workes of charity.”  He attacked the 
selfishness of the elite in particular: “What a deale of Plate is there in London, and in rich 
mens houses, which some had rather goe directly into Hell, then to sell it for the common 
good.”  Throughout the Golden Fleece, Vaughan echoed previous sentiments about the 
power of profit to make people act: “There is no other way to draw money out of misers 
hands, but by hope of profit” and “nothing but gaine could moue the careless minds of 
                                                          
76
 Robert Hayman, Quodlibets lately come ouer from New Britaniola, old Newfound-land Epigrams and 
other small parcels, both morall and diuine (London, 1628), 51.  
63 
 
our Islanders to seek abroad for new habitations.”77  For Vaughan, the lack of virtue and 
rising self-interestedness of the English people was responsible for both England's 
internal deterioration and its reluctance to pursue an external solution in colonization.  
Vaughan's criticism and solution for the problems that ailed England and its support of 
colonization focused on the necessary control of self-interest.   
 When Vaughan shifted his attention from England and its support of colonization 
to his colony in Newfoundland, however, his view on the role of self-interest within 
society changed dramatically.  For Vaughan, Newfoundland represented a great potential 
for personal profit, just as all the colonies did, but he did not interpret this as a potential 
threat to the colony.  Vaughan claimed that the profitability of the colony had been 
divinely ordained: “God had reserued the Newfoundland for vs Britaines” and “hath 
allotted Newfoundland, the grand Port of Fishing, to the Professors of the Gospell.”  As 
purveyors of the true "gospel," Vaughan asserted that God wanted a colony in 
Newfoundland to succeed and bring in the much-needed revenues to England, but God 
also, he asserted, took a realistic view of human nature, accepting that "the depraued 
nature of mankinde delighteth in appetite and some appearance of profit."  Vaughan 
claimed then that God had made Newfoundland very profitable to the individual in order 
"to allure [the English people] from our home-bred idlenesse, to this necessary place of 
Plantation.”78  God would not rely on the virtue of the people to create a colony so 
beneficial to England, but would work through sinners, channeling their self-interested 
behavior in Newfoundland towards a greater good. 
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 In Vaughn's vision of empire, the intentions of individual colonists had no bearing 
on the success or failure of the colony.  To this end, he cited a biblical passage from 
Psalms: “Their sound is gone out into all Nations.”79  Vaughan interpreted the passive 
nature of the passage to mean that the deliverer of God's word is unimportant.  He 
contended that the “Word of God should not onely be spread abroad and planted by those 
which ought of zeale and charity to teach it; but by those, which like the frogs out of the 
Dragons mouth, might publish it for termporall ends.”  He provided the example of the 
Spanish, who had colonized the New World out of greed, in the minds of most English, 
but at the same time, had successfully converted many to the Christian religion.  As any 
good Englishman would, however, he added that the Spanish spread the Christian faith 
“not so purely, as wee could wish,” but the results had to be acknowledged.  “Many 
thousand Heathen people,” he reported, “haue receiued the Christian Religion.”  His 
conclusion was powerful: “our Sauiour makes vse of our worlaly desires to serue his 
diuine intentions.”80  To Vaughan, this was an important analogy for colonization.  The 
colonies were not a test of English character and religious fervor as they had been for the 
earlier authors.  One promotional author, Alexander Whitaker, for instance, had worried 
how colonial organizers would be able to distinguish the "faithful giver" from the 
"covetous wretch" if the colonies did turn out to be immediately profitable.
81
  The 
intentions of the colonists were so vital to the colonial vision of the earlier writers that 
some even celebrated colonial hardships as a way to screen out selfish and unfaithful 
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colonists.  Vaughan, in contrast, argued that God was willing to work with both sinners 
and the godly in America.    
 For Vaughan, the colonies were nothing more than a means to an economic end.  
They were not important in and of themselves nor were they an extension of English 
society and a reflection of English character.  With this contention, Vaughan revealed the 
influence of Giovanni Botero, an Italian theorist and important humanist thinker in the 
late sixteenth century, who had challenged Machiavelli's assertion that colonial riches 
would lead to corruption and dissipation at home.  For Botero, the major threat to 
European civilization came from the eastern Turks, not the western colonies.  Worried 
that Europe was newly vulnerable to invasion due to its internal religious dissension, he 
wanted Spain to re-unite Christian Europe under one religious banner and put the 
Christian nations in a better position to fend off any invasions from their eastern 
neighbors, the true infidels.  He admitted the difficult task that he proposed for Spain but 
theorized that the profits from the New World would make it possible.  For Botero, 
colonial revenues would make a necessary contribution to what he anticipated would be a 
positive development for Europe and its safety.
82
  Vaughan took a similar position on the 
salutary benefits of colonial revenues, which he acknowledged immediately in the title of 
his tract: The Golden Fleece . . . under which are discovered . . . the vices and decayes of 
the kingdome, and lastly the ways to get wealth. . ."
83
  He elaborated on this position in 
the text: “This no Eutopia is, nor Common-wealth / Which Plato faign’d.  Wee bring 
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your Kingdomes health / By true receipts.”84  This was a direct attack on the priorities of 
the earlier colonial writers.  The greater good that a colonial promoter needed to worry 
about was not the nature of colonial society and its members, but its production of 
wealth.  In this way, Vaughan laid the intellectual framework for a colonial justification 
of anything that would bolster colonial, and thereby, English revenues.  If Newfoundland 
produced great profits for England and did so in the form of a modern-day Sodom or 
Gomorrah, Vaughan would have called it a success for both England and ultimately 
Protestantism.   
 Vaughan put forth a strikingly amoral vision of the colonizing individual, which 
he justified through the creation of an "invisible hand" of God in Newfoundland.  The 
primary benefit of this move to the promotional author was the increased ability to appeal 
to the self-interested motivations of the individual.  Despite this appeal, Vaughan's 
approach failed to have any significant influence on subsequent colonial planners.  
Colonial promoters and planners of English colonizing efforts in New England, 
Providence Island, and Maryland during the 1630s and 1640s would not adopt Vaughan's 
approach nor reference his promotional tract.
85
  They would continue to prioritize virtue 
in the same manner of the earlier promoters.  Vaughan's attempt to redefine the 
relationship between self-interest and society in the New World was ultimately deemed 
unpersuasive.  In railing against the self-interested actions of individuals in England and 
praising similar behaviors in Newfoundland at the same time, he asked too much of the 
"invisible hand" of God.  Like Henry Jackman, Walter Raleigh, and John Smith before 
him, Vaughan lacked an effective language and ideology that would have allowed him to 
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redefine successfully the role of self-interest in society.  But Vaughan's attempt to 
accommodate self-interest along with the other promoters' anxieties about the same 
characteristic reveal the pressures to appeal to self-interest that existed at the heart of the 
colonial promotion.  The current social orthodoxy about community formation stifled any 
widespread appeal to this incentive in the first decades of English colonization, but 
authors like Vaughan, Whitbourne, and Smith reveal the active search among some 
promoters for an understanding of society that would allow for a direct appeal to self-
interest without undercutting the prospects of community in the New World.
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
"NOTHING MORE PLEASURABLE THAN PROFIT": SELF-INTEREST, 
INDUSTRY, AND A NEW APPROACH TO OLD PROBLEMS IN THE MID-
CENTURY VIRGINIA PROMOTIONAL LITERATURE 
 
 
 For many observers of Virginia at mid-century, the colony had proven to be a 
disappointment.  There were no thriving towns, only dispersed individual settlements, 
and there was little economic diversity.  Settlers produced tobacco to the exclusion of a 
wide variety of other New World commodities that seemed to be both possible and more 
profitable.  And there was scant, if any, stories of successful conversions of the local 
Indians, which offered a searing indictment of the colony's religious and proselytizing 
ambitions.   For colonial promoters, the revolutionary events and new government in 
England offered hope for change in America and a new approach to colonization.  This 
led to a series of promotional pamphlets for the colony, as various writers stepped 
forward to offer their solution to the colony's past struggles.  The promotional literature 
for a colony usually peaked during its first years and then steadily diminished over time, 
but the combination of the perception of Virginia as a failing colony along with the 
instability at home led to an upsurge in the literature on Virginia nearly forty years after 
its first settlement. 
 The mid-century promotional literature for Virginia offers a window into a 
changing approach to empire in England.  The promotional literature of the 1650s was 
different in important ways from the earlier efforts to advertize the colonies and reflected 
important intellectual developments in England.  Steve Pincus has examined the political 
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and economic thought during this period and has identified the 1640s and 1650s as the 
period when England became a "truly self-conscious commercial society."  In his study 
of the pamphlet literature during the interregnum, he has identified the emergence of a 
new economic ideology that understood wealth as an unequivocal good, prioritized labor 
and industry as the engines of wealth, identified the Dutch as exemplars of these new 
economic principles, and developed a new "conception of interest" that was better suited 
for a commercial society.  These authors had not abandoned the humanist concern for the 
common good, but sought a political and economic ideology that interpreted self-interest 
as working towards that ultimate goal.  They put forth a new understanding of self-
interest and created "a newly appropriate vocabulary of interests and rights in defense of 
the common good."
1
  The writers promoting Virginia at mid-century would find this 
language particularly attractive in their efforts to promote the colony. 
 The earlier colonial writers had struggled with the proper role of self-interest in 
colonization.  Most had exhibited great discomfort with assigning any productive role to 
self-interest and advertized the New World by encouraging its complete suppression.  In 
their attempts to promote colonization, they operated within the conventional paradigm 
that posited self-interest as hostile to communal well-being.  A few writers, however, 
tried to accommodate self-interested motivations in their promotion of the colonies.  
William Vaughan, for instance, a Newfoundland promoter, provided the most ambitious 
example.  He argued that self-interested behaviors in America would benefit English 
society but failed to offer a compelling explanation for how those actions would not work 
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against the creation of a community in Newfoundland.
2
  The new economic ideology in 
England would do exactly that, however, and would solve the riddle of early colonial 
promotion by allowing for the dual promises of community and self-advancement in the 
New World.  
 The first section of the chapter examines the static nature of English perceptions 
on the form that a successful colony should take.  Events in the colony had not led to any 
major adjustments in the end goals of the promoters.  Despite the profitability of tobacco 
in Virginia, there were near constant efforts by colonial leaders in Virginia to diversify 
the economy.  And despite numerous conflicts with the neighboring Indians, the colonial 
promoters continued to argue for amicable and beneficial relations with the Native 
Americans.  The section follows the staying power of these two ideas.  Tobacco and its 
many deleterious effects on society prevented most colonial observers from being able to 
accept its economic dominance in the region, and the continuing attractiveness of 
distinguishing English colonization from Spanish efforts in the New World hindered any 
reversal in Indian policy, even after the attack of 1622 and the pressures to adopt a more 
hostile approach.  The result was the goals for Virginia in 1650 were the same as they had 
always been.  The production of a single crop and Indian conflicts did not act as a 
corrective to the dreams of the earlier promoters, but offered clear examples, instead, of 
human error and lost potential.  The second section will examine the new approach in the 
promotional literature of Virginia to meet these expectations.  The promoters' adoption of 
a new economic ideology would have consequences for their political recommendations 
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for the colony.  Supporters of representative government in America would find an ally in 
this new understanding of the economics of empire.       
*** 
 When the mid-century promoters looked to Virginia and its recent history, 
tobacco production and Indian wars were two of its most dominant features.  The original 
promoters for the colony had not anticipated these developments nor would they have 
supported them.  The colony, from its earliest conception, was supposed to produce a 
wide range of valuable commodities and court a friendly relationship with the Indians.  
These two ideals for the colony had not diminished with time.  Tobacco production, long 
criticized in the colony, represented an impoverished society at mid-century, despite its 
evident profitability, and amicable Indian relations, even after 1622, still represented an 
important goal of colonization.  The promotional authors at mid-century maintained these 
expectations and declared Virginia to be seriously flawed and in need of major reforms.   
 The production and consumption of tobacco had many enemies in England, even 
before the first settlers arrived in Virginia.  James I offered the most famous attack on 
tobacco consumption in his A Counterblaste to Tobacco, printed in 1604.  He described 
tobacco consumption as “a custome lothsome to the eye, hatefull to the Nose, harmefull 
to the braine, daungerous to the Lungs and in the blacke stinking fume thereof, neerest 
resembling the horrible Stigian smoke of the pit that is bottomless.”3  He recounted a 
history of tobacco that was tawdry and uncivilized.  For James, tobacco was used in the 
New World to fight the “Pockes, a filthy disease,” making tobacco a “stinking and 
vnsauorie Antidot.”  After closely associating tobacco use with Native American culture, 
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James depicted its use in England as a barbarous regression of a civilized people.  He 
asked rhetorically what was it that could move Englishmen “to imitate the barbarous and 
beastly maners of the wilde, godless, and slauish Indians, especially in so vile and 
stinking a custome.”  James then moved from the individual act of smoking tobacco to its 
effect on the larger community.  He argued that the people of England are “ordeined by 
God to bestowe both [their] persons and goods for the maintenance both of the honour 
and safetie of your King and Common-wealth.”  A “shamefull imbecilitie” attended the 
smoking of tobacco, “disabling” the individual on both charges.  The lasting impression 
of this attack was that any revenues that accrued from tobacco production should be 
measured against the social consequences of its domestic consumption.
4
     
 The moral objections of James I and others did not prevent the establishment of 
tobacco as a vital colonial product, but the Chesapeake region’s growing production and 
dependence on the crop continued to cause concern for colonial leaders and promoters 
throughout the first half of the seventeenth century.  Not only was the social impact of the 
product dubious, the settlement patterns that accompanied tobacco production caused 
concern for numerous colonial promoters.  For many, the dispersed settlement patterns in 
Virginia demonstrated a lack of concern for the community on the part of the colonists.
5
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Lionel Gatford was one of the many critical voices on this point: “The Planters (out of a 
covetous desire to take up great Tracts of land) diſperse themeſelves very far from each 
other in the Country, and uſually take up more land by an hundred parts, than they are 
able to manure or till, or make any use of.”  For Gatford, the consequences were 
threefold.  First, in their large appropriations of land, the planters left large portions 
uncultivated that could be, and would be given the opportunity, utilized productively by 
other planters.  The isolated farmsteads also weakened the security of the colony, making 
many colonists vulnerable to Indian attacks, and lastly, the distance between farms 
prevented many planters from coming to the aid of their neighbors, “rendering themſelves 
thereby both uſeleſs to one another, & the more unſerviceable to the publick.”6  The social 
analysis for Gatford was simple:  the planters in Virginia were choosing individual profit 
over the greater good of the community.  The focus of James I had been on the negative 
effects on society of smoking tobacco.  Gatford attached similarly deleterious effects to 
tobacco, but in Virginia, it was the method of its production that was harming society.   
       The recommendation to diversify Virginia’s economy and create viable towns in the 
Chesapeake was common throughout this period.  The most fervent of these voices was 
arguably Sir William Berkeley, the royally appointed governor of Virginia from 1641 to 
1652 and then again from 1660 to 1677.  Berkeley believed that diversification was vital 
to Virginia’s long-term prospects.  His plans and practices for his own lands were 
indicative of his larger goals for the colony.  Instead of dedicating his Green Spring 
Plantation to tobacco, he made it into what one historian has called a “laboratory of 
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agricultural experiment.”7  Throughout his life in Virginia, he tried various colonial 
commodities, failing in his trials of rice and sugar but having reasonable success with 
exotic goods such as silk, potash, hemp, and wine.
8
  Silk, in particular, had a cadre of 
fervent supporters.  John Bonoeil, silk-master to James I, published a tract in 1620 
specifically intended to promote silk production.
9
  Colonial promoters would continue to 
argue for silk as the best way to break Virginia’s obsession with tobacco throughout this 
period.  Between 1649 and 1655 alone, three tracts aggressively pushed for silk 
production in the colony.
10
  Berkeley published his own tract in 1662, entitled A 
Discourse and View of Virginia, and argued for the benefits of a diversified economy.   
       The good that would come from economic diversification was more often asserted 
than explained by colonial writers.  In Berkeley’s case, for instance, Warren Billings has 
attempted to explain his fervent support by his family’s agrarian background, implying 
that agricultural practices in England led to an appreciation of the merits of crop rotation.  
Billings also points to Berkeley’s probable familiarity with colonial tracts pushing for 
diversified production in the colonies, such as Francis Bacon’s Of Plantations and the 
copious writings of Richard Hakluyt the Younger and Samuel Purchas.  There was a 
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simpler explanation.  Ever since Sandys had come to the realization that potential 
migrants would be more comfortable migrating to a place that resembled England, 
colonial promoters transposed the goals of English society onto the colonies.  A 
dependence on rival empires for goods or necessities rendered a country vulnerable and 
indicated an impoverished state.  For many, the same was true for the colonies.  John 
Hammond, who published a tract about Virginia and Maryland in 1655, complained that 
the colonists were “neglecting diſcoveries, planting of Orchards, providing for the Winter 
preſervation of their ſtocks, or thinking of any thing ſtable or firm; and whileſt Tobacco . . 
. they wholy and eagerly followed that, neglecting their very planting of Corn, and much 
relyed on England for the chiefeſt part of their proviſions.”  Hammond was convinced 
that the potential migrants heard about how the Virginia colonists lived “in ſuch want,” 
causing many of them to change their chosen destination to the “barren and freezing ſoyle 
of New England” rather than “joyn with ſuch an indigent and ſottiſh people” as lived in 
Virginia.
11
  This became yet another way to attack tobacco production in Virginia.  It not 
only wrecked society in Virginia but also destroyed the appeal of the colony to potential 
migrants.  Tobacco culture gave the appearance of poverty, no matter its actual 
profitability, and this would continue to stunt the growth of the colony. 
       By the early decades of the eighteenth century, Virginia would in fact become a 
prosperous colony.  Tobacco production would dominate the landscape, return great 
profits to elite white planters, and constitute a consistent revenue stream for the English 
exchequer, but those results had not occurred by mid-century nor could the colonists or 
colonial promoters of the 1650s see into the future.  At this time, nobody writing about 
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the colonies seemed content with Virginia’s economic organization.  This was partly due 
to the grand expectations of the early promotional literature.  While later colonial writers 
had to temper exaggerations about certain aspects of life in the colonies, they steadfastly 
asserted, as earlier colonial writers had done, the bountifulness and variety of the 
American environment.   The New World held the same potential then as it had in the 
beginning days of colonization.  With these possibilities in mind, a colonial observer at 
mid-century looked at Virginia and saw a dispersed settlement dedicated to a single crop, 
whose social benefit was dubious at best.  Far from being a model for future colonial 
success, Virginia’s economic organization was considered detrimental to a greater 
prosperity possible in the New World.   
       If Virginia’s economy was falling well short of expectations, Anglo-Indian relations 
in the colony were much closer to being judged a total failure.  From the beginning, the 
announced intention of the Virginia Company was to spread Christianity in the New 
World by converting the local Indians.
12
  The Company invested much in this goal of 
colonization, both in monetary terms and in print.  Pocahontas’s visit to London marked 
the high point of this campaign, which presented Pocahontas, or Rebecca, as a powerful 
individual example of an Indian population amenable to English culture and religion.  For 
the Company, the Pocahantas trip provided some much needed positive publicity and also 
indicated a high level of public interest in the conversion narrative of English 
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colonization.  Building off this momentum, the Company increased efforts at conversion 
in the colony, but the surprise attack of 1622 put a quick end to many of these projects.  
In the wake of the rebellion, the Company issued several publications that set out to 
dehumanize the Indians in Virginia and to impugn the earlier religious goals of the 
colony.  For many historians, 1622 was a transformative moment in Anglo-Indian 
relations in the colony, but the larger English colonial literature remained committed to 
the goal of conversion in the New World.  New England and Maryland, for instance, both 
begun in the 1630s well after the attack of 1622, specifically disavowed a hostile 
approach in their promotional materials.  The result by mid-century was that friendly 
relations with the Indians and the accompanying conversions was still a goal of English 
colonization, and Virginia’s history of almost continuous Indian warfare was understood, 
not as an inevitable feature of colonization, but as a failure of that colony. 
       The priority of conversion was built into the founding documents of the Virginia 
colony.  In a publication in 1610, the Virginia Company, pushed by negative rumors of 
the colony, set out to “deliuer roundly and clearely, our endes and Wayes to the hopefull 
Plantations begun in Virginia.”  The Company declared that the “Principall and Maine 
Ends . . . weare first to preach, & baptize into Christian Religion, and by propagation of 
that Gospell, to recouer our of the armes of the Diuell, a number of poore and miserable 
soules, wrapt vpp vnto death, in almost inuincible ignorance.”13  In a separate tract from 
the same year, the company turned its attention to the future, encouraging the colonists 
that would migrate to “let Religion be the first aim of your hopes” so that their names 
“shall be registred to posterity with a glorious title; These are the men, whom God raised 
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to augment the State of their countrey, and to propagate the Gospell of Iesus Christ.”14  
Historians of Virginia have often been too willing to dismiss these religious protestations 
as a false veneer concealing an economic agenda in the New World.
15
  At the very least, 
this religious rhetoric established conversion as a criterion by which to measure colonial 
success or failure.  Robert Johnson reminded company supporters of this in 1612 in New 
Life of Virginea: “This is the worke that we first intended and have published to the world 
to be chiefe in our thoughts.”16  
       The Virginia Company was more than anxious to underscore any moment that 
seemed to offer evidence of Native American conversion and assimilation.  Pocahontas 
and the treatment of her story by the Company offered an example of just how powerful 
and attractive that narrative could be.  At first, the Powhatan Indians, the most powerful 
chiefdom that the English encountered along the Atlantic seaboard in the seventeenth 
century, treated the colonists with a wary ambivalence.
17
  This relationship quickly turned 
hostile as the Powhatan leader, Wahunsonacock, tired of the persistent and increasingly 
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aggressive English demands for food.  The sporadic fighting and raids that followed 
constituted the first Anglo-Powhatan war, lasting five years from 1609-1614.  A key part 
of the treaty negotiation in 1614 was the fate of Pocahontas, Wahunsonacock’s daughter 
and a current hostage of the English.  Her role in the treaty was to stay with the English, 
living among the colonists and adopting their way of life.  Sent upriver from Jamestown, 
Pocahontas was placed under the care of Reverend Whitaker, who took responsibility for 
her religious instruction.  In a short amount of time, Pocahontas publicly renounced her 
former religious beliefs, embraced Western religion, and agreed to marry John Rolfe, 
taking on the new name, Rebecca.  With the consent of Wahunsonacock, Pocahontas and 
Rolfe married on April 5, 1614 in the Jamestown church.  The marriage secured the 
peace between the English and the Indians and symbolized the new accord to live in 
peace and friendship.
18
   
       The perspectives of Pocahontas and Wahunsonacock concerning these decisions 
have been difficult for historians to access.
19
  Due to the existing historical record, 
however, English understandings of these events are much clearer.  John Rolfe, for 
instance, penned a detailed letter to Sir Thomas Dale, then governor of the colony, 
explaining his desire to marry desire to marry Pocahontas.  He acknowledged the “heavie 
displeasure which almightie God conceived against the sonnes of Levie and Israel for 
marrying strange wives” and asked what “should provoke [him] to be in love with one 
whose education hath bin rude, her manners barbarous, her generation accursed , and so 
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discrepant in all nurtriture frome myself.”20  For Rolfe, one possible answer to this 
question was sin, in particular lust, “hatched by him who seeketh and delighteth in mans 
destruction.”  Rolfe understood that this was how the “vulgar sort” would understand his 
actions regardless of any godly intentions.   In a preemptive defense, he asserted that he 
was not “in so desperate an estate” that he was unable to “obtain a mach to my great 
content” in England.  He also claimed that if his intentions were really sordid, and he 
sought only to “gorge [him] self with incontinency,” then he would commit that act with 
“Christians more pleasing to the eie.” For a brief period, Rolfe admitted that he had 
become convinced of the devil’s hand in his interest in Pocahontas but a recurring 
thought kept entering his “holiest and strongest meditations”: “why dost not thou 
indevour to make her a Christian?”  Rolfe interpreted this call as the Holy Spirit 
demanding that he do God’s work on earth.  As he understood it, Pocahontas had 
demonstrated her “great appearance of love to [him]” and “her desire to be taught and 
instructed in the knowledge of God.”  Rolfe drew an equivalency between not marrying 
Pocahontas and a refusal to “leade the blinde into the right way . . . to give bread to the 
hungrie . . . to cover the naked.”  In Rolfe’s personal consternation over his marriage to 
Pocahontas, he did not transcend the ethnocentrism inherent in the Company literature.  
Rolfe’s letter revealed two common English assumptions: the Native Americans were 
savage and, if exposed to “superior” English culture and religion, they would seek 
assimilation.  The only question that remained was whether the colonists would 
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overcome their “base feares of displeasing the world,” as Rolfe had claimed he had done, 
and commit themselves to working with the Indians toward this goal.
21
     
       For the promoters of the Virginia colony, the marriage of Pocahontas to Rolfe was a 
dream scenario.  So inspired by these events, Governor Dale unsuccessfully attempted to 
arrange a marriage between himself and a different daughter of Wahunsonacock.
22
  The 
company had every reason to promote this story as evidence that the American Indians 
were amenable to English culture and religion.  When Pocahontas traveled with Rolfe to 
England in 1616, the Company intended to maximize the promotional possibilities of this 
visit.  Landing in Plymouth, Dale rushed the couple off to London where they 
participated in the heights of court culture, taking in a masque, The Vision of Delight, 
from the royal dais.  The company also commissioned an engraving of Pocahontas to 
further publicize the visit.  In this image, the visage of Pocahontas is non-European but 
her attire is English.  The result was an image that proclaimed her English assimilation 
without undercutting her innate foreignness.  As James Horn has argued, the engraving 
communicated the idea that the Indians could be converted and “made” English.  The 
inscription reaffirmed this message: “Matoaks als Rebecka daughter of the mighty Prince 
Powhatan Emperour of Attanoughskomouck als virginia converted and baptized in the 
Christian faith, and wife to the worshipfull  Mr. John Rolff.”  News of their arrival in 
London spread quickly, and as one historian has remarked, “caused a sensation.”23  The 
Virginia Company could not have been more pleased about the public interest in the story 
or its ostensible control over how that story was presented. 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., 241, 243, 242 
22
 Horn, A Land as God Made It, 220. 
23
 Ibid., 227-228. 
82 
 
       The Pocahontas trip had its desired effect and there followed a renewed commitment 
to converting Native Americans in Virginia.  In 1616, James I ordered the archbishops of 
Canterbury and York to organize collections for the religious education of the Indians.  
By 1620, the Company had received in total over 3000 pounds to put to religious uses in 
the colony, and in 1619, the assembly required planters across the colony to adopt native 
children and raise them in English homes.  There were plans for an Indian college as 
well.  These efforts were led in the colony by George Thorpe, a high-ranking gentleman, 
who had arrived in the colony in 1620 convinced that the blame for the lack of Indian 
conversions rested with the English colonists.  The colonists simply needed to show the 
Indians more “love and hartie affection.”24  These increased efforts to proselytize in 
Virginia were important part of the Great Charter of 1618.  Edwin Sandys believed that it 
was important and still possible to improve relations with the Indians.  Thorpe and his 
insights into the Indian reception of English ways, for instance, were influential in 
Company discussions in London for the overall management of the colony.  As Rolfe had 
done in his letter, Sandys, Thorpe, and others understood the Indians to be desirous of 
and amenable to English culture.  Any failure of assimilation on the part of the Indians, 
then, had to lie with settler behavior and an unwillingness on their part to welcome and 
instruct the Natives in English ways.  In this view, the colonists could improve Indian 
relations by improving their own behavior.  If they ramped up their own efforts at 
conversion, positive results would certainly follow.  After 1616, a Company supporter 
could survey the colony, noting the recent Indian legislation in the colony and increasing 
donations, and conclude that Indian discord would no longer be a problem for the colony. 
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       The English perspective, of course, demonstrated an Anglo-centrism that left a blind 
spot in the handling of Indian relations, which would be exposed with the massive Indian 
attack of 1622.  From the Powhatan perspective, the peace treaty of 1614 had come to be 
viewed as destructive and dismissive of Indian concerns.  Opechancanough, who had 
succeeded Wahunsonacock as leader of the Powhatan confederation after his death in 
1618, saw little advantage in the current relationship with the English.  The English 
treated the Powahatans as a subjugated nation instead of as equals, enforced the payment 
of tribute from surrounding Indians, and allowed a settler expansion that forced groups 
like the Chickahominies, Paspaheghs, and Weyanocks off their lands.  These Indian 
groups were then forced to become dependent on the settlers’ provisions.  For 
Opechancanough, the peace settlement was a thin veil that attempted to conceal a 
relationship between the English and Indians that remained antagonistic.  The Powhatan 
nation was losing land and being weakened by white encroachment while the English 
were getting stronger in both resources and population by the day.  Opechancanough’s 
earlier experience in Anglo-Indian warfare had taught him that direct and foreseeable 
assaults against the English were ineffective.  A surprise attack, on the other hand, would 
minimize the armament advantages of the English and ensure that most fighting was 
hand-to-hand, a style of combat more favorable to the Indians.  To set up the surprise 
attack, Opechancanough played off the credulity of the English leaders.  He continually 
dismissed the problems that accompanied settler expansion onto Indian lands and 
professed his perpetual amity with the English.  The level of surprise on the part of the 
English was best demonstrated by George Thorpe, who ignored the warnings of the 
attack, walked out to greet the Indians, and was promptly killed.  For Thorpe and others, 
84 
 
the idea that the English could bring the “correct” religion to Virginia and that it would 
be refused was unimaginable.  Thorpe walked out to meet the Indians that day confident 
in his sincerity to convert and better the Indians in Virginia.  He could not understand 
how he had come to be classified as an enemy.
25
 
       The attack of 1622 devastated the colony.  The death toll for the well-coordinated 
attack was 347, almost one-third of the colony’s population.  The colonists rallied at 
Jamestown and in a few other fortified settlements, but the damage was overwhelming.
26
  
The Virginia colony had been set back to its earliest days.    News of the attack spread 
quickly in England.
27
  Edward Waterhouse, the Virginia Company’s secretary, penned 
the company’s first official response to the attack and referred to the fact that  “THE fame 
of our late vnhappy accident in Virginia, hath spread it selfe, I doubt not, into all parts 
abroad.”28  Starting with Waterhouse’s text, the Company was quick to offer its rendering 
of events.  Thorpe’s death became a powerful symbol for Company propaganda.  For 
Waterhouse, Thorpe’s earnest dedication to converting the Indians was unmatched and 
“so tender ouer them, that whosoeuer vnder his authority had giuen them but the least 
displeasure or discontent, he punished them seuerely.”  He included details of how 
Thorpe had killed mastiff dogs, much to the displeasure of their English owners, if they 
had threatened any nearby Indians, and how he had constructed an English style house 
for Opechancanough much to the Powhatan leader's delight.  At his death, Waterhouse 
depicted a man “void of all suspition, and so full of confidence.”  Waterhouse did not 
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stop with the death scene and included the treatment of Thorpe’s body after death: “they 
not only wlfully murdered him, but cruelly and felly, out of deuillish malice, did so many 
barbarous despights and foule scornes after to his dead corpes, as are vnbefitting to be 
heard by any ciuill eare.”29  The engraving by Theodore de Bry of the same year followed 
the same theme.  De bry depicted the English colonists in the midst of a normal day’s 
labor and activity.  The bucolic scene is then overrun by bloodthirsty natives, who are 
seen attacking men, women, and children indiscriminately.  Women cry for mercy 
unsuccessfully, and in the center of the engraving, lies a murdered and prostrate child.
30
  
The message the Virginia Company wanted to deliver was that the colonists had lived up 
to their end of the bargain in Virginia.  They had sought the conversion of the Indians, as 
the story of George Thorpe indicated, and had sought only a peaceful life, as pictured in 
the de Bry piece.  The colonists had not brought on this attack through their own actions, 
as Thorpe had written about earlier conflicts, but instead, had been innocent and well-
meaning victims of “the perfidious treachery of a false-hearted people.”31 
       The attack by the Indians in Virginia opened up a golden opportunity for the Virginia 
Company to alter the tenor of its promotional writings.  Up until this point, the Company 
literature had been consistent about the amenability of the Indians and importance of 
conversion and peaceful trade.  This method of colonization was attractive to an English 
audience because it offered a powerful contrast to Spanish efforts in the New World.  
With the publication of Brevisima Relacion de la destruccion de las Indias in 1552 by las 
Casas, Spain’s efforts in the New World had come to be associated in England with greed 
                                                          
29
 Ibid., 15, 17.  
30
 On English versions and interpretations of the massacre, see Karen Kupperman, Indians and English: 
Facing Off in Early America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 223-226; Horn, A Land, 252-262. 
31
 Waterhouse, A declaration, 2. 
86 
 
and violence.  The English colonial writers further propagated this depiction of the 
Spanish empire and portrayed English colonization as inherently different.  The English 
would colonize through a just treatment of the Indians and a subordination of economic 
motives.  This approach would lead to successful colonies, but more importantly for 
many, would symbolize to the world the gulf that existed between the true nature of 
Spanish Catholicism and English Protestantism.
32
  The treatment of natives offered a 
clear marker that would delineate national differences and help to secure a unique and 
powerful English identity.  This colonial approach was also better suited for the North 
American environment.  North America offered no gold or silver mines nor did it have 
centralized and populous Indian nations that could be conquered and enslaved.
33
  The 
Spanish model of colonization, regardless of its moral dimension, seemed inapplicable in 
North America.   
       The attack of 1622, however, provided an opportunity for English colonizers to 
rethink their methods, and for many, to push for a more violent, and “Spanish,” treatment 
of the natives.  Many in the colony celebrated the opportunity for more aggressive tactics.  
Sir Francis Wyatt, governor of the colony, wrote: “Our first work is expulsion of the 
Salvages to gain the free range of the countrey for encrease of Cattle, swine, &c . . . for it 
is infinitely better to have no heathen among us, who at best were but thornes in our 
sides, than to be at peace and league with them.”   In England, John Smith described the 
disaster as “good for the plantation because now we have just cause to destroy them by 
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all means possible.”34  The most explicit, however, in encouraging a change in Indian 
policy was Waterhouse himself.   
       Waterhouse listed several reasons why an aggressive Indian policy would make the 
colony safer and more successful.  Waterhouse pointed to efforts at conversion as 
weakening the defenses of the colony.  Colonists who believed the warnings of an 
imminent Indian attack were able to survive, he wrote, but too many, like George Thorpe, 
were “euer stupid, and auerted from beleeuing any thing that might weaken their hopes of 
speedy winning the Sauages to Ciuilitie and Religion.”  The desire to convert the Indians 
left the colonists open to duplicity and vulnerable to attack.  It was, Waterhouse declared, 
the desire of the colonists “to draw those people to Religion by the carelesse neglect of 
their owne safeties [that has] beene the greatest cause of their own ensuing destruction.”  
For Waterhouse, increased security was only one of many positive results of a new, more 
aggressive Indian policy.  He offered a long list, but two of the more striking comments, 
relative to the earlier promotional literature, involved land and labor.  “By right of 
Warre,” he wrote, the colonists could invade Indian lands and acquire their fields and 
other “cultivated places.”  The colonists, he continued, could seize “cleared grounds in all 
the villages” and benefit by “possessing the fruits of others labours.”  In a later section in 
the tract, he applied the general benefit of conquest to Indian labor: “the Indians . . . may 
now most iustly be compelled to seruitude and drudgery, and supply the roome of men 
that labour, whereby euen the meanest of the Plantation may imploy themselues more 
entirely in their Arts and Occupations, which are more generous, whilest Sauages 
performe their inferiour workes of digging in mynes, and the like.”  Waterhouse’s 
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solution would have been understood by his readers as adopting the Spanish model of 
colonization.  He made that influence explicit in his text by reminding the reader that the 
“Spaniard,” by employing many of the tactics that he recommended, had “got two the 
greatest Kingdomes of the West Indies, Peru and Mexico.”  This was more than an 
indictment of the Virginia Indians and the possibility of their Christian conversion. It was 
larger argument, using 1622 as a defining example, to remold the idea and methods of 
English colonization.  For Waterhouse, conquest was quick, decisive, and final while the 
process of “civility [was] . . . slow, the effect of a long time, and great industry.”  He 
argued that civilizing the Indians was an ambition that worked against the larger 
economic goals of society.  Conquest and subjugation was for Waterhouse the clear and 
proven solution.
35
  
       At the heart of Waterhouse’s argument was an attempt to reclassify the Indians as 
subhuman and thus incapable of civility or conversion.  In one passage, Waterhouse 
detailed how the massacre, and more specifically the treatment of Thorpe, revealed the 
core inhumanity of the Indians:  
Neither did yet these beasts spare those amongst the rest well 
knowne vnto them, from whom they had daily receiued many 
benefits and favours, but spitefully also massacred them, without 
remorse or pitty, being in this more fell then Lyons and Dragons, 
which . . . haue beene so farre from hurting, as they haue both 
acknowledged, and gratefully requited their Benefactors; such is 
the force of good deeds, though done to cruell beasts, as to make 
them put off the very nature of beasts, and to put on humanity vpon 
them.  But these miscreants, contrariwise in this kinde, put not off 
onely all humanity, but put on a worse and more then vnnaturall 
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brutishness.  One instance of it, amongst too many, shall serue for 
all.
36
  
 
Christopher Brooke, another individual like Waterhouse who was heavily interested in 
Company affairs, published his A Poem on the late Massacre in Virginia in 1622.  The 
publication bore on the title page a reproduction of the company’s official seal and 
offered more rhetoric on Indian inhumanity: “For, but consider what those creatures are, / 
(I cannot call them men) no Character / Of God in them: Soules drown’d in flesh and 
blood; / Rooted in Euill, and oppos’d in Good; / Errors of Nature, of inhumane Birth, / 
The very dregs, garbage and spawne of Earth . . . .”37  This change in rhetoric has been 
noted by historians and has led to the argument that 1622 marked a shift in Indian/settler 
relations.  Warren Billings has noted in his history of early Virginia that after 1622, the 
colonists “dropped all pretense of friendship for the original Virginians” and “henceforth 
the natives were seen as nothing more than a barbaric impediment to settlement.”38  In 
Virginia, this view is well supported.  Colonists and Indian relations deteriorated after the 
attack, and from 1622 to 1632, the region was ravaged by brutal fighting.  Another war 
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erupted in 1644 and ended with the capture and unceremonious murder of 
Opechancanough in 1646.  By the 1660s, the population of the Virginia Algonquians had 
fallen from 24,000 in 1607 to around 2,000, most of their lands had been lost, and many 
ended up on small reservations or headed north after making peace with the Iroquois.
39
  
 In the promotional literature for Virginia and the other English colonies 
throughout the seventeenth century, however, 1622 does not serve as a major shift in 
English colonial ideology.  Even immediately following the attack, some colonial writers 
were not willing to revise their religious hopes for the colonies.
40
  One example was John 
Donne’s sermon, delivered to the Virginia Company members in St. Michael’s, Cornhill 
on November 13, 1622, well after news of the massacre had spread and almost two 
months after the entry for publication of Brooke’s poem and Waterhouse’s pamphlet.  
Although the sermon gave no positive indication that Donne had read the recent company 
publications, it is hardly likely that he was unaware of the change in tone regarding the 
Indians.
41
  Donne signaled his intentions with the sermon in his selection of a New 
Testament text, Acts I.8.  He would focus his attention, not on just, godly vengeance, but 
on the workings of the Holy Spirit, drawing attention to the common humanity of the 
Indians and the duty of conversion.   Brooke had refused to grant the Indians a shred of 
humanity (“I cannot call them men”), but Donne pointedly used the appellation 
throughout his sermon: “before al things ſhal be ſubued to Christ, his kingdome perfected 
. . . the Goſpell muſt be preached to thoſe men to whom ye ſend; to all men . . . haſten you 
this . . . glorious conſummation of all, and happie revnion of all bodies to their Soules, by 
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preaching the Goſpell to thoſe men.”42   For Donne, the Indians had innate knowledge 
that identified them as humans, or “men,” and it was the duty of the colonist to transform 
this natural understanding to a “saving” knowledge of Christianity.  With a passing 
reference to the new vulnerability of the colony exposed by the attack, he asked the 
colonists to continue the work of God and of men like George Thorpe in Virginia: 
“Preach to them Doctrinally, preach to the Practically, Enamore [to inspire with love] 
them with your Justice, and, (as farre as may conſiſt with your ſecurity) your Civilitie; but 
inflame them with your godlineſſe, and your Religion.”43  For Donne, the attack had not 
altered his view of the Indians nor had it diminished for him the importance of the 
religious dimension to colonization. 
       Donne and Waterhouse disagreed specifically on how the colony of Virginia should 
manage its affairs, but their argument was relevant beyond the Chesapeake.  Donne, in 
his earlier writings as well as in his sermon for the Company, had demonstrated the 
influence of counter-reformation philosophers, most noticeably the works of Francisco de 
Vitoria.  In the larger European debates over the treatment of the natives in America, 
Vitoria had been an influential voice, along with Las Casas and others, on the side of 
Indian humanity and their corresponding legal rights.  On the other side of this argument 
stood voices like that of the Aristotelian Juan Gines de Sepulveda, who argued that the 
Indians were barbarians without rights and “slaves by nature.”44  The earlier rhetoric of 
the Company had tended more towards the Vitoria end of this argument.  Victoria, for 
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instance, had asserted that “Nature has decreed a kinship between all men.”  Alexander 
Whitaker, a preacher in Virginia, could be found echoing that sentiment in his 
promotional tract: “One God created us, they reasonable souls and intellectual faculties as 
well as wee; we all have Adam for our common parent.”45  Waterhouse and Brooke may 
have been less versed in this intellectual history than Donne, but they clearly pushed for a 
colonial policy in Virginia that moved away from Vitoria and towards many of the tenets 
supported by Sepulveda and his followers.  This was the move that Donne rejected in 
1622, but the argument was not limited in its applicability to Virginia.  Waterhouse and 
Brooke did not restrain their comments on Native Americans specifically to the Virginia 
Powhatans; they were offering an understanding of the Indians that should apply 
throughout North America.  For other colonial planners and supporters, this larger 
European debate had been given an English face with the debates of 1622.  Subsequent 
promoters now had accessible, English precedents for both colonial approaches.  
       If Donne’s sermon revealed the limitation of the attack’s impact even on Company 
supporters, the resistance to embrace Waterhouse’s position in the promotional rhetoric 
of Massachusetts and Maryland, both colonies beginning in the early 1630s and 
anticipating interactions with local natives, demonstrates its total rejection as a larger 
English, colonial ideology.   In 1630, a conforming Puritan minister named John White 
sought ways in which to support English colonization.  In the 1620s, White became 
involved in various fishing ventures, which sought to create a profitable fishing station in 
the New World.  These endeavors proved unsuccessful but did not dissipate his interest in 
supporting colonial projects.  He became an important supporter of the Massachusetts 
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Bay Company, which received its royal charter on March 4, 1629, and helped to recruit 
migrants for various voyages and even funded some individual migrations.   
       In line with these efforts, White published a promotional tract in 1630, entitled The 
planters plea Or The grounds of plantations examined.  For White, the discovery of the 
New World was a miraculous, world-changing event.  White’s God controlled even the 
smallest things in this world, so God’s guiding hand had to be “directing one of the most 
difficult and observeable workes of this age.”  With God’s hand clearly at play in the 
discovery of these new lands, anything approaching Waterhouse’s view that the colonies 
were places of war and economic exploitation was so ludicrous to White as to approach 
blasphemy.  White wrote that it was “impietie” to miss God’s influence in the discovery 
and “great folly” to think that all of this had occurred with “no other scope but the 
satisfying of mens greedy appetites.”  White understood colonial history in stages: the 
first stage witnessed the “Conqeurors cruelty” as punishment for the atheism of the 
“heathan and bruitish Nations,” and the subsequent phase involved a “mixture” of 
civilized people with the Indians, which would “cause at length the glorious Gospell of 
Iesus Christ to shine out onto them.”  For White, this was the same process that had 
occurred with their English ancestors “after those sharpe times of the bitter desolations of 
our Nation, betweene the Romanes and the Picts.
46
  This comparison had a history in the 
colonial literature, dating back to the watercolors of a different John White made famous 
(and altered) in Theodore de Bry’s The Great Voyages.  In these paintings, the earlier 
John White had assigned the Indians a common humanity through the same comparison 
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to ancient Britons.
47
  After asserting their common humanity in The Planters Plea, the 
later John White then, as the Virginia Company had done before him, called out the 
future colonists to make religion “the principall scope whereat the Colonie aimes.”  In the 
farewell sermon to John Winthrop’s fleet, another Puritan clergyman, John Cotton, sent 
the Puritans off with a similar message.  In his Gods Promise to his Plantation, published 
the same year it was delivered, Cotton called the colonists to “offend not the poore 
Natives, but as you partake in their land, ſo make them partakers of your precious faith . . 
. They never yet refuſed the Goſpell, and therefore more hope they will now receive it.”48  
For White and Cotton, a colony had to earn the approval and support of God to be 
successful, and a real commitment to converting the Indians was crucial to making it a 
godly endeavor first and an economic one second. 
       If any colony would be most tempted to adopt Waterhouse’s position on the Indians, 
Lord Baltimore’s colony in the Chesapeake seemed the best candidate.  Baltimore 
received the royal charter in 1632 while the Virginia colonists were still at war with the 
Indians, and the colony’s first capital, St. Mary’s, would take on a similar location to 
Jamestown, just farther north up the Chesapeake Bay.  If anyone had reason to heed the 
warnings of the 1622 disaster and potentially profit from joining the ongoing Indian war, 
it would be Lord Baltimore and his settlers.  The colony’s first substantial promotional 
tract, however, took direct aim at those who recommended violence as the only proper 
Indian policy.  The tract, A relation of Maryland, was penned by Andrew White, a 
London born Jesuit sent to found a mission in the Chesapeake.  This document had the 
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support of the proprietor.  The title page mentions William Peaseley, Baltimore’s brother-
in-law, for anyone seeking more information on the colony.  Baltimore’s approval or at 
least acceptance of the missionary priest as a suitable promotional author indicates much 
about his position on the optimal English/Indian relations.
49
  In the text, however, White 
made explicit any implications that arose with his authorship.  White references Captain 
Smith and other colonial writers who had described the Indians as “War-licke . . . and 
made very terrible” or “base and cowardly People . . . to be contemned.”  For White, the 
result of these erroneous opinions was that, in a possible reference to Waterhouse, “it is 
thought by some who would be esteemed Statesmen, that the only point of pollicie that 
the English can use, is, to destroy the Indians, or to drive them out of the Countrey, 
without which, it is not hoped that they can be secure.”   White argued that the Indians 
only resisted when they were mistreated and that English weaponry was always capable 
of keeping the Indians in “awe” if need be.  The Indians responded differently to “kind 
and faire usage,” becoming “peaceable” and “friendly” with the colonists.  This, for 
White, was a more “just and reasonable” interaction with the Indians that carried 
economic benefits as well.  The Indians if “induced” to civility would learn husbandry 
and “Mechanick trades,” which would enrich the “Planters themselves . . . by the 
trafficke and commerce which may be had with them.”  White concluded that “it is much 
more Prudence, and Charity, to Civilize, and make them Christians, then to kill, robbe, 
and hunt them from place to place, as you would doe a wolfe.”50   
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       In the founding documents of Maryland and New England, colonial writers shared 
much common ground on Indian issues.  Andrew White in Maryland paid more attention 
to the economic benefits of conversion than John White and Cotton did for New England, 
but there was complete agreement on the humanity of the Indians and the importance of 
conversion to the colonial project.  English colonial writers in the preceding decades had 
seized any opportunity to further demonize the Spanish, and reports of their cruel 
behavior in America provided a continuing opportunity to caricature the Spanish and to 
demarcate differences between the two nations.     The appeal of this narrative and the 
logistical problems with applying the Spanish model in North America made for a 
colonial vision difficult to dislodge.  The attack of 1622 produced both fear and rage for 
many Virginia colonists close to the situation and argued to many for a policy of Indian 
war and enslavement.  The rhetoric of Waterhouse and Brooke represented only a 
flashpoint, however.  The memory of 1622 and the heated rhetoric it induced barely made 
a dent in the future colonial promotion.  In subsequent English colonies of New England 
and Maryland, the colonial promoters, ever aware that they were advertizing a colony and 
always sensitive to what might attract people to migrate, aggressively distanced 
themselves and their colonies from the Waterhouse, and ultimately, the Sepulveda model.  
By mid-century, peaceful and productive relations with the Indians remained a goal of a 
successful colony, one that would serve both religious and economic ends.  In the 
colonial literature at mid-century, unfriendly or hostile relations with the surrounding 
Indians were viewed as a colonial failure, the same as it had been before 1622.  
Waterhouse and others had failed to offer a compelling alternative vision of English 
97 
 
colonization within which Indian war and destruction could be interpreted as effective 
colonial policy. 
       At mid-century, the idea that a colony should strive to be economically diverse and 
to have harmonious relations with the surrounding Indians was still dominant. and 
Virginia was struggling in both areas.  It was producing a single crop, neglecting the 
production of necessities, and living in disparate communities ever vulnerable to Indian 
attack.   On the Indian front, it had suffered a second dramatic surprise attack in 1644 and 
soon after participated in its third Anglo-Powhatan war.  Despite these contemporary 
concerns, historians have granted the colony a high level of success during this period.  
Karen Kupperman has argued, for instance, that Virginia had discovered the model for 
colonial success in the reforms of 1618.
51
  In his recent study of the American colonies, 
Alan Taylor has also offered a positive account of Virginia during this period.  By mid-
century, he argues, what had once been a “tenuous beachhead had become two thriving 
provinces and dynamo for further expansion.”52  Just as the original promoters of 
colonization had hoped, Taylor continues, Virginia colonists were consuming 
manufactures and producing a staple agricultural crop.  But the early promoters had 
hoped for much more than that and those expectations carried into the 1650s.  Colonial 
realities in Virginia had not altered the goals for the colony, which remained a diversified 
economy and a peaceful cohabitation with the Indians.  For those writing about the 
colony at this time, Virginia had great potential but a flawed present, making it an 
appealing target for the reforming spirit.  
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*** 
 With the perception of Virginia as a failing colony, the turbulent times of the 
1640s and 1650s in England offered some hope that change was possible in the colony as 
well.  From 1645 to 1660, several works appeared in England treating the Chesapeake 
area and its two sister colonies, Virginia and Maryland.  These authors pursued the same 
goals in Virginia of a diversified economy and improved relations with the Indians, but 
they would develop an approach to those ends that differed significantly from their 
predecessors.  The section will examine the promotional literature of Virginia in the 
context of the ideological conflicts that were occurring in England at the same time.  In 
England, there were many supporters of the English Commonwealth desperate to create 
space in the current social thought for the self-interested individual.  They attacked the 
traditional assumptions of humanist thought that considered interest to be the primary 
threat to community.  These authors argued that wealth was the source of national power 
and that industry and labor, often propelled by self-interest, were the mechanisms of 
economic growth.  They began to create and propagate an ideology where self-interest 
and the public good worked together instead of at cross-purposes.  The majority of the 
promotional literature would embrace these ideas about society and political economy as 
a solution to Virginia's problems.  The section will focus on two works published during 
this period.  The first was authored by Lionel Gatford, entitled Public Good over Private 
Interest, which resisted this new ideology and closely resembled the approach to colonial 
promotion that had dominated the 1620s and 1630s.
53
  The second work, written by 
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William Bullock and entitled Virginia Impartially Examined, represented the new and 
now majority approach to addressing the colony's past problems.
54
  Both approaches had 
clear and widely differing consequences for the ideal type of colonial government.    
 In England during the 1650s, classical republicanism, as J. G. A. Pocock has 
famously argued, was "given an English face."
55
  The major figures of the republican 
revival were Harrington and Milton, who both focused on the necessary virtue of the 
people and their leaders.  The crucial characteristic of a citizen in their mind was to act 
“as conscience dictates in the name of the common good.”56  In Oceana, Harrington, like 
the early colonial promoters, specifically targeted covetousness as the key threat to one’s 
virtue, calling it “the root of all evil.”  The preferred ancient model for both Harrington 
and Milton was Sparta, not commercial Athens, and they registered a constant dismay at 
the inability of the people to live up to these virtuous dictates.
57
  As Harrington and 
Milton increasingly lost faith in the abilities of the people, they became increasingly 
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committed to aristocratic notions of government and made clear their disdain for any sort 
of powerful and deliberative popular assemblies.  Their ideal political organization was 
based on virtue and the ability of those in power to resist self-interested desires for the 
sake of the common good. 
       Through a wider reading of the political literature during the interregnum, Steve 
Pincus has argued, however, that many supports of the English Commonwealth rejected 
Machiavellian economic thought and significantly tweaked his celebration of civic virtue 
as they tried to come to terms with the increasingly commercial nature of society.  On the 
heels of the two military conflicts, the English civil wars and the first Anglo-Dutch War, 
that demanded the ability to mobilize economic resources quickly, these authors began to 
see wealth, as opposed to virtuous citizen soldiers, as the key to military victory.   They 
focused on wealth creation as an unequivocal good and emphasized the importance of an 
industrious population.  They minimized the importance of a state’s natural endowments 
and focused instead on the work habits of the people.  In Henry Parker’s Of Free Trade 
(1648), for instance, he noted that cities “having little of their own, being industrious, 
flow with more abundance, and swim in greater superfluity, than some other slothful 
cities that naturally want nothing.”58  These writers had given up on the ideal of civic 
virtue as an organizing principle of government.  They accepted, and even embraced, 
self-interested behavior instead.  As Pincus has pointed out, these writers “began to 
espouse a politics based on recognizing, deploying, and taming interest.”59  They 
naturalized interest, instead of treating it as a moral shortcoming, and emphasized its 
importance in the creation of national wealth, which was now understood as crucial to the 
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common good.  This economic ideology fully re-defined self-interest in positive terms.  
Merchants, for instance, who traditionally had been treated very skeptically by humanist 
thinkers such as Milton because of the self-interested nature of their profession, were 
fully redeemed in this new ideology.  One author praised merchants as the "most 
honourable profession and principal fountain from whose industrious streams floweth in 
the riches of a Common-wealth."
60
  Far from being anathema to the well-being of society, 
personal interest, for these writers, actually had to be protected through governmental 
participation.  These mid-century authors embraced a “more inclusive and varied political 
culture” as a way to protect self-interest, encourage industry, and bolster the nation's 
finances and thereby the larger public good.
61
  
 The group of Virginia publications published during the 1650s should be 
understood as the transatlantic extension of this ideological debate.  The majority of these 
texts embraced the new ideology and its focus on industry and national wealth.  The 
longest of these tracts was John Ferrar’s A Perfect Description of Virginia (1649).  Ferrar 
was a long-time and erstwhile supporter of the Virginia Company and was one of the 
most informed individuals at this time on Virginia affairs and its history.  Edward 
Williams, with the help of Ferrar, published Virgo triumphans, or Virginia in generall, 
but the south part thereof in particular (1650).  Other than his probable affiliation with 
Ferrar, Williams’s background and why he came to be interested in Virginia is largely 
unknown.
62
  John Hammond, who published Bullock’s tract in 1649, penned his own 
promotional piece in 1655, entitled Leah and Rachel, or, the Two Fruitfull Siſters 
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Virginia and Maryland.
63
  Hammond was a long-time colonist in the Chesapeake, 
claiming to have lived there for 21 years from 1635-1656.  So fond of Maryland, he 
wrote, that “it is that Country in which I desire to ſpend the remnant of my dayes, in 
which I covet to make my grave.”64  His intention in writing the tract was to remove 
“thoſe Foggy Miſts” that clouded a true understanding of the colony.  In their descriptions 
of Virginia and Maryland, all of these authors, along with William Bullock, demonstrated 
a clear shift to a focus on the importance of labor to any future success in the colonies.  
Gatford was the lone exception to this trend.  He did not embrace the tenets of the new 
economic ideology and focused instead on the importance of virtue in the colonial setting 
in much the same way as the earlier promotional writers had done.   
  As a whole, the authors of these tracts demonstrated a clear familiarity with each 
other and a similar approach to publication.  Ferrar provided Edward Williams with much 
of the details for his tract, which he acknowledged in his opening dedication to the 
reader.  References between authors were common but it did not indicate that they were 
always of one accord.  Williams, for instance, took issue with Bullock’s valuation of 
colonial wheat but praised his Indian commentary.
65
  When Hammond attacked the 
writings of people who had never ventured to the colonies themselves, calling them 
“infamous lyars,” Bullock was the only one that he mentioned by name.66  Writing in 
1649, Bullock could not respond to these future criticisms, but made it clear in his text 
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that his work had been informed by the earlier colonial writers, “M. Heriot, M. Laine, and 
Captaine Smith.”67  Gatford was the exception in this group, not mentioning other writers 
by name, but having never been to the colonies, he admitted his sources came from 
secondary materials.
68
  Beyond their awareness of each other, the tracts also took similar 
forms.  They were all relatively short, ranging from 19 to 76 pages, and the styles of their 
writing indicated an ambition for a wide circulation.  Hammond and Williams made 
explicit appeals to poorer people throughout their tracts, and the forms of these texts 
supported that goal.  In all the texts, Latin phrases and esoteric allusions were rare.   
 The result was a group of accessible texts arguing in print over the past and future 
of Virginia.  In Publick Good without Private Interest, Gatford began his appraisal of the 
colony with a withering attack on Virginia's recent history.  To convey the “preſent ſad 
condition of the Engliſh Colonie in Virginea,” Gatford pointed to both economic and 
religious failures.  For Gatford, Virginia’s history had been one of failed expectations: 
“That a Colonie, Planted in ſuch a Country 60 yeares ſince or more . . . ſhould in all this 
time make ſo little, very little profit or benefit of ſuch a land, in reſpect of what it would 
yield, if well-husbanded . . . and (which is a grand ſhame and diſhonour both to our 
Nation  and to our Religion) inſtead fo converting or civilizing any one of the Natives . . . 
they give them all too juſt occaſion to be ſcandalized at the very name of Christianity.”69  
For Gatford, the colony was failing because of a lack of virtuous colonists.  Virginia 
settlers at all levels of society were behaving badly.  The governors in the colony, for 
instance, were often “inexperienced, indiscreet, careleſs, [and] covetous” while ministers 
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sent to the colony often lived “looſe lives” and took part in “un-Gospel-becoming 
conversation.”  Gatford saved maximum vitriol for the average colonist.  They were “the 
very ſcum and off-ſcouring of our Nation, vagrants, or condemned perſons, or ſuch others, 
as by the looſness and viciouſneſs of their lives have diſabled themſelves to subſiſt any 
longer in this Nation.”  These complaints recall the Company literature and the constant 
concern about the disposition of those migrating to the colony.
70
  So rampant was the 
misbehavior in Virginia, Gatford asserted that good acts were overturned and well-
meaning individuals were discouraged.  A governor who did enact a positive reform in 
the colony had his good works “pulled down, or ſuffered to ruine” by subsequent 
governors.  The rare ministers, who were “ſhining lights before the people in their holy 
exemplaire lives,” were so “diſhonoured and deſpised” by the population that they were 
discouraged from staying in the colony.  The only people behaving virtuously in Virginia 
were the Indians.  Gatford recalled the massacre of 1622 and asserted that the Indians, 
instead of acting in a bloodthirsty rage as displayed in the de Bry print, exercised restraint 
during the attack.  The Indians had refused to attack any colonist that had dealt honestly 
with them concerning the purchase of land.  Anybody who had “covenanted” with 
Indians was safe because, unlike the colonists, the Indians “made good their convenants.”  
There were few shades of gray in Gatford’s depiction of Virginia.  The New World 
environment, including the native groups, was hospitable to English colonization.  
Virginia was a “Languishing and dying Colonie” because of the shortcomings and 
misbehavior of the English colonists.
71
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 Like Milton, Harrington, and the colonial writers before him, Gatford explained 
these misbehaviors through the sin of self-interest.  The governor of the colony, for 
instance, should be, and in most cases was not, a man “of more than ordinary publick 
Spirits, preferring the publick good of the Plantation before [his] own gain or privat 
intereſt.”  The tobacco planters who had spread out instead of living in towns, which had 
hurt the overall economy of the colony as well as weakened her defenses, had done so 
“out of covetous deſire to take up great Tracts of land.”  In relating a recent skirmish 
between settlers in Maryland and Virginia, he blamed the Virginian colonists for 
“thirsting after their brethrens blood, and a ſordid coveting of their eſtates.”  The 
phenomenon of migrants arriving in the colony in ill-health and susceptible to an early 
death, he continued, arose “from the wretched covetouſneſs of thoſe that ſet forth ſhips for 
the tranſport of paſſengers, merely for gain.”72  Echoing the title of his tract, Gatford’s 
solution for Virginia was to make colonists put the common good above private interest.  
If Virginia became a place of virtue, then colonists would be able to resist the quick 
profits that accompanied tobacco production and would reside in towns, build 
communities, and in the long run, produce a much wider variety of colonial goods.  A 
virtuous colonist would also be willing to resist the temptation of exploiting or 
mistreating an Indian in the short term, knowing the damage such an action would have 
on the colony’s long-term safety and wider reputation. 
       In his solutions for Virginia’s current state, he first went through each category – 
Governors, ministers, and planters – and requested that the colony simply choose or 
attract better men.  The ministers needed to be of better quality and to be encouraged and 
                                                          
72
 Ibid., 3, 9, 11. 
106 
 
compensated appropriately.  The governors had to be willing to stay in the colony longer, 
had to be more familiar with commodities and trade of the region, and had to be paid 
more so that they “may ſpend [their] time wholly . . . in and for the publick good of the 
Colonie.”  The migrating colonists should have “better manners” and “more honeſty and 
piety.”  The ships that trade there, Gatford argued, should “be well victualled” so that 
migrants arrive in good health.
73
  He also recommended that “head townes” be built in 
each county and that each town in turn should build a church and that forts should be 
constructed throughout the colony and be better maintained in case of outside invasion.  
Gatford wanted to infuse Virginia with virtuous leaders and to build towns, churches, and 
forts in the colony by fiat, not at the behest of the colonists themselves.  Gatford’s plan 
was to superimpose onto Virginia the structure of a virtuous society. 
 Many of the early promoters in Virginia and New England had attacked self-
interest with a similar fervor as Gatford, but they had often chosen a different solution.  
In several early sermons dedicated to English colonization, the authors had dedicated 
themselves to the task of inflaming virtue in the individual colonist or potential migrant.  
Gatford did this when he called out to his reader in the epistle: “look not every man on 
his own things, but every man alſo on the things of others.”74  Whole sermons in the 
earlier literature were dedicated to this theme, but Gatford’s approach was different.75  
Although he motioned to this type of personal reformation in his opening, his actual 
recommendations for the colony registered a more static view of the individual.  He did 
not allot much space in his text to encouraging the individual colonist to behave better.   
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Instead, he sought the creation of a legitimate, external power that could coerce such 
behavior, revealing the same skepticism about the virtue of the broader population that 
had also developed in the political thought of Milton and Harrington. 
 In his vision for the colony, Gatford sought increased political power for the now 
more virtuous governmental officials.  He called for governors to be “armed with ſuch 
power and authority, as is meet, for the reclaiming and regulating ſuch a plantation.”  He 
admitted the governor would need the consent of elected representatives, but was 
adamant that the governor needed the power to “make and constitute” laws that were 
“agreeable with the temper of the place and people, and the good and benefit of the whole 
plantation.”  Magistrates and officers in the colony should be wholly accountable to the 
governor in all manners, Gatford continued, “the supream power of this Nation.”  Law 
and punishment needed to be toughened in the colony as well.  The planters who attacked 
the Maryland colonists needed to be “ſeverely and ſpeedily puniſhed” in order to deter 
future “wicked perſons from the like barbarous practiſes.”  Laws in general, Gatford 
continued, needed to be “more ſharp and ſevere, and more strictly executed.”  Planter 
behavior also needed to be restricted by force.  In both “ſettling themſelves, and in 
planting of Tobacco,” their behavior needed to be “more regulated and ordered.”  And 
finally, for traders who did drop off mistreated passengers in the colony, the governor 
should have the power to impose a “ſevere mulct [fine] or other puniſhment.”76  For 
Gatford, his focus on virtue coupled with a misbehaving colonial population led to his 
recommendation of an exclusive and severe political authority. 
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 Bullock offered a different solution to Virginia's problems.  As much as his 
recommendations would ultimately diverge from Gatford's, there was much common 
ground between the two authors in both their claim to virtuous motives and in their 
critical descriptions of Virginia.  Gatford asserted his intentions in writing about Virginia 
by declaring his lack of a personal agenda: “I do not in this work ſeek myself, but the 
glory of God, and the good of ſo many ſoules.”  Bullock made the same move, justifying 
his work in similar terms on the title page: “Looke not upon this BOOKE, as those that 
are set out by private men, for private ends; for being read, you’l find, the publick good is 
the Authors onely aime.”  Also like Gatford, Bullock’s evaluation of the Virginia was 
highly critical, pointing to the “slight esteem this place hath amongst the generality of the 
people.”  He pointed to his own past experience in the colony, having “in this place lost 
some thousands of pounds,” and avowed that his intention was, through his experience in 
the colony, to find the “impediments" to colonial success in Virginia, both for the 
individual and the colony as a whole.
77
   
 Bullock viewed Virginia as a place of lost opportunity, and many of the same 
features of Virginia, which would come to bother Gatford, disturbed him as well.  
Bullock believed that Virginia should have constituted, at the moment he was writing his 
tract, a “great and flourishing people.”  Like Gatford, Bullock described a colony that had 
fallen woefully short of those ambitions.  Like so many Virginia observers and colonists 
before him, he pointed to the settlement patterns in Virginia.  The people were “disperst 
abroad in severall small numbers, at great distances from each other, which is very 
uncomfortable and disccusolate.”  The reason for this behavior in particular and the 
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struggles of the colony more generally was the familiar scapegoat of private interests.  
Bullock bemoaned early in the pamphlet: “Ambition . . . hat been none the least 
hinderance: Therefore he doth advise all such as intend to be labourers in this Harvest, to 
study meeknesse, and the generall good.”  Dealing specifically with the settlement 
patterns, he was more specific, describing many settlers as harboring only “a desire to 
better their fortunes in remote places” and are “liberall to abuse all other places but their 
own.” 78   But Bullock, unlike Gatford, was looking to eradicate self-interest from 
Virginia society, but to limit it abuses.  He targeted political officials in the colony in 
particular.  The governors, for instance, were “strangers” to Virginia and often pursued 
their “owne Worke,” instead of the good of the colony.  Political leaders in the colony 
were often persons “being bound to pay Mony-Debts,” who had supported acts only if 
they provided some personal benefit.  Their self-interested agenda was attacked in 
conventional terms, but the real problem was that they had the power to exploit others.  
The result, Bullock concluded, was that “Justice [was] stifled” in Virginia.   
 Bullock contended that these domineering officials would jeopardize the colony 
by threatening the self-interested ambitions of the wider population.  He offered his story 
as evidence of the necessary role of self-interest in colonization and how the current 
regime would bring about the ruin of the colony.  Bullock’s initial interest in the colony 
had been to enlarge his father’s estate and invest in the colony, but those profit-seeking 
efforts had been thwarted, unjustly in his opinion, by corrupt colonial officials.  He had 
refused any further involvement in the colony, as others would do in a similar situation, 
he argued, because he would have only a tenuous hold on any profits that he accrued 
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through his estate.  If governmental officials remained unchecked, he predicted an 
inevitable decline for the colony: “no wise man will either transport himself, or send his 
estate to such a place where [there] is no setled Government, and wholesome Lawes to 
preserve mens lives and estates, and to maintaine honest commerce.”79  Bullock's agenda 
was unabashedly economic and it required political rights and "wholesome laws" as the 
necessary security to the pursuit of New World profits.  The problem in Virginia was not 
a self-interested population, as it had been for Gatford, but a lack of protection for self-
interested ambitions. 
 Where Gatford had recommended more centralized authority, Bullock sought a 
greater diffusion of political power.   Bullock focused on the role and responsibilities of 
the assembly, which he argued had to be elected by the freeholders and had to have real 
power.  Bullock, for instance, gave lawmaking powers to the assembly in his proposed 
government while Gatford had delegated that power solely to the governor.  The 
assembly was so important to Bullock because he wanted the government to be “drawn 
from the quintessence of the people.”  Using the metaphor of a stone building, he 
described the role of the people: “the common people fitting and chusing the stones for 
this strong and sumptuous building.”80  Gatford’s rhetoric, on the other hand, on an 
empowered populace was almost wholly negative: “such is the inſeparable unhaippineſs 
and miſchief that conſtantly attends both the Governours and Governed, where the power 
of the Governors depends upon the favour and pleaſure of the people, or is manacled and 
fettered by Plebeian Tribunes, or over-awed by any inſulting Ephori.”81  Gatford did not 
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go so far as to recommend an autocracy in Virginia nor did Bullock advise something 
even nearing a democracy, but their views on a representative arm in government were 
nearly incompatible.
82
   
 This type of government and the political influence of a wider portion of the 
population was vital to provide the necessary protections of property and self-
advancement, which to Bullock was crucial to encouraging migration, investment, and 
labor.  The main problem with the former organization of the colony had been that 
“industrie was discouraged.”  Industry, as the Commonwealth authors were beginning to 
emphasize, was the key to societal wealth and prosperity.  Bullock used New England as 
an example.  That colony, “begun thirteen yeares since Virginia,” had no “Sugar, Indigo, 
Ginger, or any other of the rich Commodities.”  Despite the comparatively barren 
landscape, that colony had “become a flourishing people . . . and drive a trade with all the 
world.”83  It was the industriousness of the population that determined colonial success, 
not the availability of natural resources, and Bullock's governmental recommendations 
would ensure that “labour” in Virginia would be “sweetly recompensed” and that the 
colony would begin to thrive.  The new ideas about political economy, if brought to 
Virginia, would solve the colony's past problems and, Bullock argued, lead to a brighter 
future.  
 The subsequent promotional authors in Virginia during the 1650s, with the 
exception of Gatford, would give the same priority to the importance of the 
industriousness of the settlers.  Edward Williams published Virgo triumphans, one year 
after Bullock’s tract on Virginia.  In advertizing southern Virginia, he averred that “no 
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part of this Country may bee ungratefull to the Industrious.”  In talking about salt 
production as a potential staple commodity, he asserted that “there wants nothing but 
industrious spirits and incouragement.”  “Let him apply himself with his greatest industry 
and ability,” he continued, and reap the certain benefits because “God rewards the sweat 
of Industry.”  Barbados offered a powerful example to Williams of the power of human 
labor.  He marveled at how an island “so little in circumference of Ground should be able 
to vent the value of two hundred and fifty thousand pound yearly.”  As Bullock had 
pointed to the success of New England despite its lack of a profitable staple commodity, 
Williams used Barbados to highlight the power of human endeavor.  Williams gave full 
credit to the Barbadian colonists and “their industry and unwearied constancy.”  Their 
success on the island gave hope to “all lovers of industry, that had a larger proportion of 
ground to improve upon,” as was the case in Virginia.  Eyeing the fertile and expansive 
territory in southern Virginia, the only thing that could halt an “equal or greater” profit 
was, not surprisingly, if “an invincible sloth,” industry’s opposite, overtook Virginia's 
colonists.
84
 
 John Hammond, writing six years after Bullock in 1655, also embraced the move 
toward a focus on industry and elaborated more explicitly on the connections between 
industry, political rights, and self-interest.  Unlike Bullock and Gatford, Hammond 
acknowledged the past struggles of the colony but argued that it had fully recovered.  He 
first acknowledged Virginia’s reputation as “an unhealthy place, a neſt of Rogues, 
whores, deſolute and rooking perſons; a place of intolerable labour, bad uſage and hard 
Diet, etc.”  He admitted that this had been true in the early years of the colony.  The early 
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years in Virginia had been marked by all that “tyranny could inflict or act.”  Hammond 
posited a change, however, and alluded to the reforms of 1618, when the people had been 
“set free.”  The colonists had allowed to “live of themſelves, and enjoy the benefit of their 
own induſtry; men then began to call what they laboured for their own.”  The improved 
Virginia was a place where “induſry may as much improve it ſelf in, as in any habitable 
part of the World.”  He pointed to the abundant wildlife of Virginia, but made sure to 
point to “how eaſie with induſtry to be had.”  These changes had led to a transformation 
in Virginia’s reputation.  Hammond claimed that instead of a place a death and poverty, 
the colony was now known by the great “preferment” with which it “rewarded the 
industrious.”  “If men,” he continued, “cannot gaine (by diligence) [e]ſtates in thoſe parts) 
. . .  it will hardly be done.”85 Bullock prescribed a cure for the colony, while Hammond 
asserted that one had already occurred, but their solutions, whether past or future, were 
similar.  Virginia’s needed transformation had come, or would come, when industry was 
encouraged and rewarded. 
 The Virginia authors were espousing a political economy that worked through 
self-interest, not against it.  In his plans for vineyards, for instance, Williams proposed 
attracting skilled tradesmen from other countries to teach the colonists the “mysterie” of 
their profession.  Worried that these men may be reluctant to reveal the secrets of the 
trade, Williams planned to offer them a “share of the profits of every mans Vintage.”  
This would ensure that they would be “faithfull in their instructions . . . since a publick 
advance of this designe cannot miscarry without a sensible losse to their particular 
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interest.”86  Bullock offered the same solution to maximize the industry of servants in the 
colony.  He advised landowners in the colony to determine a satisfactory output on any 
given day for a servant and then provide additional payment for any effort that exceeded 
those expectations or, even better, “let him have a remainder of the day to plant a little 
Tobacco for himself, or any other thing.” The servants then, driven by the appeal of 
personal profit, would work harder for their masters because it allowed for additional 
benefits to themselves.  This worked for both parties, Bullock asserted, because all 
servants “will work more to get themselves a Shilling, then to get [their master] ten.” The 
appeal of personal profit would make servants “shew the best of their abilities.”87  For 
these authors, private interests could be channeled towards positive social ends.  Private 
interest for Bullock, Hammond, and Williams was something to be directed, not stifled, 
and would result in the industrious population so crucial to colonial success. 
 This new approach to self-interest was most conspicuous in Bullock’s plan to 
improve relations with the surrounding Indians.  Gatford, not surprisingly, had posited 
virtue as the key to converting and civilizing the Indians.  He frequently bemoaned the 
lack of virtue on the part of the colonists as ruining any chance of converting the 
surrounding Indians.  The colonists depraved lifestyles gave the Indians “all too just 
occaſion to be ſcandalized at the very name of Chriſtianity, to abhor and deteſt [the 
English] Government, as well as manners.”88  The Indians would be persuaded of the 
merits of English society and culture by the colonists setting the appropriate example.  
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The virtuousness of Virginia society was the determinative factor, to Gatford, in the 
colony's ability to convert the Indians to English ways.  
 Bullock offered a dramatically different path to this goal.   For Bullock, “love 
alone” would not work with the Indians because they were too “subtill and treacherous.”  
Force was not a great option either because it was expensive and time consuming, but 
Bullock promised to have found a “third way.”  He would rely on nature, since the 
Indians, he asserted, were “endued with naturall reason.”  Bullock asked the question of 
“what predomminates in nature” and concluded “ambition to be the princpall marke that 
nature aymes at.”  Ambition would be the “net” by which the colonists could “take these 
men.”  In describing how ambition could be used with the Indians, Bullock offered 
several observations about the Indians.  First, he asserted that they had little knowledge of 
worldly things besides what they needed for self-preservation, and because nature was so 
plentiful in the New World, they took little heed of preparing for the future.  This lifestyle 
allowed the Indians an independence that freed them from any pressing need to trade with 
other nations.  His solution set out to change this and 1) make them “sensible of their 
nakednesse,” 2) make them care about the future, “by taking them off from their 
confidence in nature,” 3) make them desire commerce, and 4) make them ‘be brought to 
depend.”89  Instead of reigning in the self-interested pursuits of the colonists, as Gatford 
had argued for, Bullock’s plan was to awaken ambition in the Indians and to establish 
their dependency on English goods and culture.   
       Bullock’s solution required a good bit of deception on the part of the colonists.  They 
would have to give certain Indians, starting with the “Werowances” and other great men, 
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jewels and clothing.  Accepted as gifts, this material goods would be enjoyed and start to 
distinguish one Indian from another.  This, Bullock argued, “will kindle the fire of 
ambition” in others to be so recognized and for many indicate that it “is the time to 
work.”  If some Indians were clothed, then many would realize their own nakedness, and 
when their “sight [was] cleared,” the English colonists will have them “in the snare.”  
The planters would then offer some work to the Indians, but not work that was too 
difficult.  Bullock was careful about advising the planter to ease them into a life of labor.  
He asserted that the planters would soon find a less intransigent workforce, because as he 
had recommended with English servants, the Indians “for themselves they will work, but 
not for you.”  Bullock projected the growing dependence of the Indians on material goods 
and an accompanying acceptance of the labor as a means to an end.  The planters should 
have no concerns about the Indians falling back to their old ways with this plan because 
“their own ends shall keepe them” to labor.  “Thus by degrees,” Bullock continued, 
“(God assisting) you shall make them conquer themselves.”  He concluded his 
recommendations for the Indian relations: “And now have you opened their eyes, made 
them care for the future, drawn them to commerce, and made them depend.  And in the 
end, by Gods mercy to them, make them good Christians.”90  Williams approved of 
Bullock’s plan in Virgo Triumphans: “to fasten Cloaths upon them, which if once it were 
effected, that which Mr. Bullocke excellent patly calls, The Universal [k]not of Nature.  
Ambition would cement them to a more orderly course of life.”91  Ambition, or self-
interest, was no longer a threat to amicable Anglo-Indian relations but was the key to 
directing the behavior of both the Indians and the English.  A population free of ambition, 
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as the natives had been described by English writers in the past, was no longer a virtuous 
ideal, but represented a population dangerously independent and difficult to control.
92
   
 This new understanding of self-interest in the promotional literature for Virginia 
and its many ramifications for how these authors envisioned colonial success represented 
an extension of the economic thought emerging in England in the 1650s, but was also a 
near total revision of the earlier colonial promotion.  The earlier colonial writers had 
opposed the pursuit of self-interest in the New World and focused on the importance of 
virtue to the survival of colonial communities.  A few authors, like John Smith and 
William Vaughan, diverged from this pattern and pointed to the importance of labor in 
the New World, the possibility of individual wealth, and the importance of colonial 
revenues, but they never succeeded in re-conceptualizing self-interest and its relationship 
to society.  Smith and Vaughan praised the importance of labor and the possibilities of 
self-advancement without ever explaining satisfactorily how this would not destabilize 
and ultimately ruin the creation of settler communities.
93
  This changed in the 1650s 
because there was now an available ideology that posited self-interest and the actions that 
it encouraged as working towards the common good.   
 The promotional authors of the 1650s now had the language by which they could 
appeal to self-interested individuals while promising the same types of virtuous societies 
that the earlier writers had aimed for.  Industry was the key.  Self-interested motivations 
were now transformed into industrious acts, which would lead to prosperous 
communities.  Hammond elaborated on the logic of this process: “The inhabitants now 
                                                          
92
 For an example of a promotional author praising the Indians for their lack of worldly desires, see 
Relation of Maryland, 90. 
93
 See Chapter 1. 
118 
 
finding the benefit of their indu-ſtries, began to look with delight on their increaſing 
ſtocks: as nothing more pleaſurable then profit, to take pride in their plentifully furniſhed 
Tables, to grow not onely civil, but great obſervers of the Sabbath, to ſtand on their 
reputations, and to be aſhamed of that notorious manner of life they had formerly lived 
and wallowed in.”  In other words, colonial industry and the accompanying prosperity 
would lead to a reformed, prosperous, and religious community.  After this 
transformation, Hammond claimed: the colonists sent “home for Goſpel Miniſters, and 
largely contributed to their maintenance” and began to search out better “Teachers” for 
the colony.  The result was a religiously devout and economically diverse colony: “the 
Goſpel began to flourish . . . famous buildings went forward, Orchards innumerable were 
planted and preſerved . . . ſtaple Commodities, as Silk, Flax, Pot-aſhes, etch . . . attempted 
on, and with good ſucceſſe brought to perfection.”94  Industry created everything that 
Gatford had sought to impose on the colony.  These authors offered a different path to 
colonial success, but the end destination had not changed.  Bullock, Williams, and 
Hammond wanted a stable community, a religious society, a diverse economy, and 
improved relations with the Indians, but they contended that self-interest, labor, and 
wealth, not virtue, would be the mechanisms of positive social change in the colony.   
 The ideas on political economy espoused by the Commonwealth writers was 
attractive to colonial promoters, but not simply because it allowed for a direct appeal to 
the self-interest of potential migrants.  That had been tried before in the 1620s by William 
Vaughan and had little appeal to subsequent promoters.  It was also not because the mid-
century authors were any more willing to accept an atomistic and thoroughly 
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individualistic society.  The new political economy was so appealing to the colonial 
promoter because it could contain the appeal to self-interest within a larger claim to 
societal prosperity.  As the Commonwealth writers were coming to terms with a more 
commercial society in England and its implications for the role of self-interest in society, 
so too were the colonial promoters, who could not ignore the power of self-interest in the 
individual decision to migrate.  After the 1650s, this commercial ideology would become 
the dominant language of the colonial promotion and would promulgate a clear economic 
justification for political rights and representative government within the English empire. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
"ANY WHO WILL BE INDUSTRIOUS, MAY LIVE COMFORTABLY HERE": THE 
LIBERAL LANGUAGE OF EMPIRE IN THE LATE STUART PERIOD 
 
 
 To help finance colonization in the late Stuart period, colonial proprietors often 
granted large tracts of land to joint stock companies, who would then take charge of 
settling the land and populating the area.  In Pennsylvania, one such joint stock company 
was the Free Society of Traders.  In 1682, they published their articles of incorporation, 
detailing the organization of the company and their interest in colonization.  In the 
preface, they outlined the unique character of the company: “It is a very Unusual Society, 
for it is an Absolute Free One, and in a free Country: A Society without Oppression: 
wherein all may be concerned that will; and yet have the same Liberty of private 
Traffique, as though there was no society at all. . . it is such a society, as can do harm to 
none; but may do good to all.”1  The Free Traders put forth the idea, still rare in the 
seventeenth century, that unfettered self-interest was the engine of commerce.
2
  They had 
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no grand political ambitions in the colony, only to improve and profit from the colony’s 
trade.  The society’s promise of total freedom, intended to attract investors and to 
encourage trade, should have nevertheless served as a warning to colonial proprietors of 
the economic pressures at play in the English colonies.   
 Unlike the Free Traders, the English colonies of the late seventeenth century 
represented a combination of political, religious, and economic ambitions, but by the 
1680s, colonial promoters had gravitated towards a more commercial approach to 
colonization than had existed earlier in the century.  They no longer worried about the 
corrupting possibilities of colonial wealth and pursued labor and production in the 
colonies with few reservations.  The promotional authors of the 1680s embraced and 
expanded on the positive links between labor, self-interest, and representative 
government that had been first explored in the promotional literature during the 1650s.  
Almost without exception, these promoters emphasized the importance of industrious 
pursuits in America and the political liberties that would encourage those activities.    
 The English colonies begun during the Restoration, however, all took the form of 
proprietary colonies.  The proprietors owned all the land in the colony and, through their 
individual charters, were granted wide-ranging powers in the organization and 
management of their colonies.  The economic goals of colonization, however, worked 
against any great pretensions of political power.  This chapter investigates the tension that 
existed between the dual pursuits of colonial prosperity and personal political power.  
The promotional literature of the period grappled with the difficult task of advertizing the 
colonies while asserting the proprietors' political authority.   
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  From 1680 to 1685, three colonies—Carolina, East Jersey, and Pennsylvania—
were the subject of extensive promotional campaigns.  The first section of the chapter 
will follow the early history of the colonies and the reasons for the convergence of their 
promotional efforts.  The second section will investigate the continuing move in the 
promotional literature towards a focus on industry, the attendant embrace of self-interest 
as a potentially positive force in society, and the political ramifications of this colonial 
vision.   
*** 
 Carolina, East Jersey, and Pennsylvania were proprietary colonies: Pennsylvania 
was under the control of a single proprietor, while political control in Carolina and East 
Jersey rested with small groups of individuals.  They competed with one another for 
colonists, frequently offered criticisms of each other, and established independent 
methods of promotion.  A uniting characteristic of their early histories was the tension 
between the expansive grant of power in the colonial charters and the constant pressure to 
give most of that power away in order to attract people to the colonies.  The early history 
of these colonies reveals the political compromises of the various proprietors and why the 
promotional materials for the three colonies, begun at different times, peaked at the same 
time.   
      The original proprietors of Carolina formed a formidable political group, but none 
were primarily colonial entrepreneurs.  They were all men of affairs and politicians who 
sought to make money from landed estates in the New World as they maintained their 
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focus on more important domestic matters.
3
   The original mover in the pursuit of the 
charter was Sir John Colleton, the least politically powerful of what would become the 
eight Carolina proprietors.  Colleton had fought for Charles I and had fled to Barbados 
upon the King’s execution.  Upon the Restoration, he was back in England seeking his 
just rewards for services rendered and received a knighthood.  With his experience during 
the interregnum, he understood current circumstances in Barbados and how attractive a 
new settlement in Carolina would be for many planters on the island.  In 1661, as 
Colleton began his pursuit of the Carolina charter, Barbados was nearing the end of its 
transformation from a tobacco to a sugar economy.  The rapid development of African 
slavery accompanied the move to sugar production with the result being a social and 
economic revolution with far-reaching effects for the future of the Island.
4
  During the 
1650s and 1660s, servants who reached the end of their indenture were presented with 
scarce opportunities for either land or employment.  Many chose to leave the island in 
1650 to participate in the English planting of Surinam in Guiana and in 1655 to populate 
the newly conquered island of Jamaica.  After 1650, the total number of colonists leaving 
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Barbados exceeded 10,000 people.  When Colleton started to pursue the Carolina charter, 
he understood that the push factors for the settlers of Barbados were as strong as ever.
5
  
      Charles II issued the Carolina charter on March 24, 1663.
6
  As was the case with the 
Maryland charter from earlier in the century, the grantees were explicitly granted rights 
on par with those enjoyed by the bishops of Durham.  The references to the Bishops of 
Durham signaled the intention of the crown to bestow onto the grantees similar territorial 
and governmental powers, which would make a colony into a great fief, an imperium in 
imperio.  The charter granted the proprietors the rights to “have, use, exercise and enjoy, 
and in as ample manner as any bishop of Durham in our kingdom of England, ever 
heretofore have held, used or enjoyed, or of right ought or could have, use, or enjoy.”  
There were two provisions that provided some limits on the rights of the Proprietors to 
manage their colony as they saw fit.  One was the customary stipulation that the laws be 
“consonant to reason, and as near as may be conveniently, agreeable to the laws and 
customs of this our kingdom of England.”  The second was that the Proprietors had to 
govern “with the advice, assent, and approbation of the freemen . . . or of the greater part 
of them, or of their delegates or deputies.”7   Exactly what the second provision meant 
was a source of continual tension for English proprietors and their colonists.   
      The Proprietors targeted New Englanders and Barbadians for the first wave of 
migration and concentrated on two locations, one on the Cape Fear River, near current 
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day Wilmington, NC, and the other near Port Royal, an inlet located north of the 
Savannah River.  After negotiations with the prospective settlers, the proprietors issued 
the “Concessions and Agreement” in January 1665.  This document, referred to by one 
South Carolina historian as “extraordinarily generous,” promised all prospective settlers 
an elected assembly with the sole authority to tax the colonists, an expansive freedom of 
conscience in matters of religion, and a headright system promising early colonists up to 
150 acres per person.
8
  For the proprietors, the expansive powers made possible in the 
Carolina charter were absent from the “Concessions.”  The proprietors retained only the 
right to veto legislation and to collect a quitrent of a halfpenny per acre per year.  Despite 
these appealing terms of settlement, early efforts to colonize both areas ended in failure.  
Due to bad luck and bad policy, including the proprietors’ insistence on charging the 
same quitrent for swamplands as they did fertile areas, both Cape Fear and Port Royal 
remained unsettled by the fall of 1667, wasting much of the initial enthusiasm for the 
project.  While there was still a small, struggling settlement in Albemarle Sound region, 
that area seemed to be forever stymied by a treacherous coastline.
9
  These setbacks 
combined with events in England (a recurrence of the plague in 1665, the Great Fire of 
1666, and war with the Dutch and French that dragged on until 1667) could have put an 
end to the Carolina proprietorship and its colony, an endeavor too meager in 
accomplishment for many to notice its failure.  
       Into this vacuum stepped a reinvigorated Earl of Shaftesbury.  Shaftesbury convinced 
the other proprietors that they would have to take more direct control over the promotion 
and settlement of the colony.   Each proprietor agreed to contribute 500 pounds sterling 
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apiece, and by August of 1669, three ships (the Albemarle, Port Royal, and Carolina) and 
over 100 colonists were set to sail directly from England to the Carolina coast.  
Shaftesbury at this time, with the help of John Locke, also drafted the Fundamental 
Constitutions of Carolina.  The document, heavily indebted to the work of James 
Harrington, attempted to align political power in the colony to underlying social realities.  
The colony would be broken up into seigniories and baronies, a heritable nobility 
composed of landgraves and caciques would be established, and leetmen bound to the 
soil would populate the colony.  With its elaborate attempt to create an aristocracy in 
New World, the Constitutions holds a unique place in the history of colonial promotion.
10
  
The Carolina promoters made every effort to highlight the more liberal aspects of 
Shaftesbury’s plan.  They pointed to how the Carolina parliament, for instance, included 
representatives elected by the freeholders and that the property requirements for voting 
were consistent with other colonies.  The feudal aspects were an easy target for rival 
promoters, however, who accused the Carolina proprietors of being above the law in their 
colony.
11
  The overall effectiveness of the constitutions as a promotional tract was 
dubious.  Migration into Carolina remained sluggish throughout the 1680s and the 
Carolina colonists consistently refused to ratify it.
12
  In the competition for migrants, the 
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Carolina charter demonstrated the danger that accompanied any perceived hostility to 
assembly rights. 
       The colonists who did make it to Carolina in March of 1670 started a settlement 
along the Ashley River, near modern day Charleston instead of their planned location at 
Port Royal.  Despite the fact that this settlement would become permanent and slowly 
grow into a thriving colony, the 1670s were filled with disappointment for the 
proprietors.  A high proportion of the original settlers came from Barbados, most notably 
the powerful Sir John Yeamans, who seized local control of the government.  Coming 
from Barbados, they recognized the lucrative possibilities of the slave trade and began to 
build a business that relied on the sale of captured Indians into slavery.  This practice 
could not have been more antithetical to the proprietors’ hopes for the colonies, but 
Yeamans and his associates continued their business throughout the decade, either 
ignoring or impeding proprietary efforts to check the trade.   Carolina traders at one point 
even precipitated a local war with the Westos to obstruct proprietary efforts to erode their 
influence.  The proprietors understood this as self-interest run amok in the colony.  Like 
the Virginia Company fifty years earlier, they pointed to a lack of virtue among the 
colonial leaders and specific circumstances of individuals choosing self-gain over the 
good of their community.  Yeamans was an easy mark in this regard; at one point, he sold 
his own produce to Barbados for more money while the Carolina colony was still short 
on food.  In his indictment of Yeamans, Shaftesbury spoke for the proprietors and 
captured the sentiment that could as easily have been applied colony-wide: “If to convert 
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all things to his private profitt be the marke of able parts, Sir John is without a doubt a 
very judicious man.”13  
      Earlier promoters often responded to colonial misbehavior by attempting to limit the 
powers of colonial assemblies.  Shaftesbury employed a more circuitous route, and 
instead of restricting local government, sought to control it through the introduction of 
new colonists.  Beginning in 1680, the proprietors embarked on a promotional campaign 
to attract settlers to the colony, targeting Scots, Huguenots, and English dissenters.  They 
hoped the influx of settlers would undercut the local control of the Goose Creek Men, 
resulting in a government less hostile to proprietary goals.
14
  The complex plan to check 
the power of the Goose Creek faction through the local assembly rather than trying to 
limit the power of the assembly itself, reveals how essential the institution had become 
for colonial promoters.  Despite the charter being issued in 1663 and settlement 
beginning in earnest in 1670, these colonial tensions resulted in the first concerted effort 
on the part of the proprietors to promote their colony in print.  The influx of promotional 
material that usually accompanied a colony’s first years of settlement came, in the case of 
Carolina, occurred almost two decades after its start.
15
 
      Unlike Carolina, the history of Jersey began with the conquest of a European 
colony.
16
  The Delaware Valley, bound to the west by the Delaware River and to the east 
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by the Hudson River, had attracted interest from English adventurers since the turn of the 
century.  Despite this early English activity in the area, Dutch and Swedish adventurers 
accomplished the early European settlement of the region.  The Swedes established New 
Sweden along the Delaware in 1638 and held the upper hand in the region until 1655.  
The Dutch had established two profitable settlements in the region, New Amsterdam on 
Manhattan Island and the trading outpost Fort Orange farther up the Hudson, and were 
strong enough in 1655 to seize control of their Swedish neighbors.  The conquest gave 
the Dutch control of an important sliver of the American coastline, but its power in the 
region was tenuous.   With expanding English colonies to its north and south, the Dutch 
colony lived under the ever encroaching presence of its imperial rival.
17
 
      In 1664, England finally looked to take advantage of Dutch vulnerability in the 
Delaware Valley.  Encouraged by the Duke of York, a powerful supporter of the anti-
Dutch faction in London, a plan was put into place that required three ships and a small 
armed force.  The expedition, led by Colonel Richard Nicolls, easily conquered the Dutch 
settlement and established English control in the area.  Just before the conquest, Charles 
II drew up a charter for his brother that conveyed to York all the lands between the 
Connecticut and Delaware rivers.
18
  The charter gave York full proprietary rights and 
made no provision for an elected assembly.  Once England had gained control of the area, 
Nicolls took over as governor and began encouraging York to focus on the New Jersey 
region as the most favorable for a future settlement.  Nicolls had started, with some 
success, to attract New England colonists to the area by promising extensive local rights 
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for new settlements.  Much to Nicolls’s disappointment, York soon deeded away all of 
New Jersey.  The two new proprietors of New Jersey were Lord John Berkeley and Sir 
George Carteret, both of whom had been heavily involved in the military planning of the 
conquest.  Berkeley’s interest in the project waned from the start so Carteret took the lead 
in naming the region and in attracting settlers to the region.  Like Nicolls, he focused on 
attracting colonists from New England and published a slightly altered version of the 
“Concessions and Agreement” of 1665 that the Carolina proprietors had published that 
year.   As with Carolina, the New Jersey concessions offered generous headrights, the 
freedom for each community to make its own provision for religious worship, and a 
representative arm of government.   The Jersey proprietors were also insistent about the 
payment of quitrents, even if suspended for a short period of time in the initial stages of 
the colony’s development.  The first years of the colony attracted a smattering of New 
England colonists (about 2500 by 1673) and saw the creation of seven towns along the 
western bank of the Hudson.  Politically, these years were dominated by settler discord 
over the collection of quitrents.
19
 
         Although most of the settlement was taking place in eastern New Jersey, the colony 
itself remained a single entity.  After the brief reconquest of New York by the Dutch in 
1673/4, the Duke of York sought and received confirmation of the original charter.  In the 
same way, the New Jersey proprietors needed to secure confirmation of their grant from 
York.  By this time, Lord Berkley had lost interest in the enterprise entirely and sold his 
share in March of 1674 to two Quakers, John Fenwick and Edward Byllynge.  In 1676, 
Carteret agreed to split the colony in two, a partition which left him the territory east of a 
                                                          
19
 Pomfret, Colonial New Jersey, 22-48; Craven, New Jersey, 28-59. 
131 
 
diagonal line extending from the upper Delaware to Little Egg Harbor.  New Jersey had 
been split into East and West Jersey, a separation that would last until 1702.  West Jersey 
quickly became the first Quaker colony in the New World and brought William Penn, the 
most famous Quaker colonizer, to the forefront of English efforts in America.  Upon 
purchase, Fenwick and Byllynge began to haggle over their respective shares of West 
Jersey.  Unable to reach an agreement, William Penn, a fellow Friend, was called in to 
arbitrate in the hopes that the matter could be resolved without going to court.   The two 
West Jersey Proprietors eventually resolved their differences, but more importantly for 
the history of the colony, Penn became one of three trustees responsible for handling 
Byllynge’s troubled estate.  Alongside Fenwick’s own efforts to start a colony, the 
Byllynge’s trustees formed a joint stock company with 100 shares, valued at 350 pounds 
each, and issued the West Jersey Concessions of March 3, 1677.  The West Jersey 
concessions had many similarities with New Jersey and Carolina Concessions.  It offered 
easy access to land, freedom of conscience, and participation in local and provincial 
government, although the West Jersey concessions were even more explicit in spelling 
out the many powers of the assembly.  Penn published a promotional tract for the colony 
in September of 1676, and by 1681 over 1400 Quakers had migrated to the Quaker 
settlement of Burlington.
20
   
      Of course, Penn had larger American ambitions than the eastern bank of the 
Delaware.  Sir George Carteret died in 1680 and his share in the Jersey proprietorship 
came up for sale in 1682.  Penn joined a group of twelve, made up almost entirely of 
Quakers, and purchased the Carteret share of Jersey, bringing all of Jersey under the 
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control of Quakers.  At the same time, however, Penn was seeking his own grant for land 
west of the Delaware.  Leveraging a sizeable debt owed to his father by the crown, Penn 
acquired a charter on March 4, 1681 for lands north of Maryland, south of New York, 
and extending five longitudinal degrees westward from the Delaware River.  
Pennsylvania received Penn’s full attention after 1681, even though he remained a 
member of both proprietary groups in East and West Jersey.  When Penn received the 
charter, he had a long publication history, having written several religious tracts in 
England as well as a few promotional tracts for West Jersey.  He utilized this experience 
to launch an intensive promotional campaign for Pennsylvania that met with resounding 
success.  By April 1682, he had sold 500,000 acres of Pennsylvania land, primarily to 
“weighty” Friends, and by 1685, nearly eight thousand people, the vast majority Quakers, 
had migrated to his colony.
21
  
      Pennsylvania became a magnet for Quaker migration at the expense of its neighbor, 
New Jersey.  The proprietors of New Jersey, like Penn, increasingly shifted their attention 
to Pennsylvania.  The twelve East Jersey proprietors agreed in 1682, for instance, to take 
in twelve new associates, six of whom were Scots.  A Scottish Quaker, Robert Barclay, 
would become a central figure as the original twelve proprietors ceded control of the 
direction of the colony to their new Scottish associates.  A Scottish group was also active 
at this time in attempting to create a settlement in Carolina.  The Carolina venture was 
dominated by southwestern merchants, motivated primarily by religious motives.  In the 
                                                          
21
 For early Pennsylvania history and William Penn, see Joseph E. Illick, Colonial Pennsylvania (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976); Taylor, American Colonies, 245-272; Mary K. Geitner, William Penn 
(Harlow, England: Longman, 2000); and John A. Moretta, William Penn and the Quaker Legacy (New York: 
Pearson, 2007); Edwin P. Bronner, William Penn’s Holy Experiment: The Founding of Pennsylvania, 1681-
1701 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1962). 
133 
 
early 1680s, religious persecution in the southwestern Scotland had become increasingly 
aggressive, and the Carolina venture was intended as a religious haven for religious 
dissenters.  In the promotion of Carolina, the promises of religious freedom were 
especially explicit in part to attract this persecuted population.  For the East Jersey 
proprietors, however, religious motivations were secondary.  They mostly derived from 
the East or Northeast of Scotland.  The proprietors belonged to Quaker or Episcopal 
communions and many were on good terms with the Stuarts; three ultimately became 
Jacobites after the Glorious Revolution.  While many of the promoters of the Carolina 
venture had personally experienced religious persecution, the East Jersey proprietors 
were well protected and had little reason to flee Scotland on religious grounds.  They 
would allow a degree of religious diversity in the colony, but their focus was on 
economic development and expansion.  The proprietors wanted a Scottish colony and 
prioritized nationality over religious affiliation.  East Jersey was to be a Scottish, not a 
Quaker, colony.
22
        
      The upshot of all of this –Penn’s charter for Pennsylvania in 1681, Shaftesbury’s 
machinations to check the political power of the Goose Creek Men, and the newly 
empowered Scottish leadership of East Jersey—was a vast increase in the production of 
promotional materials from 1680 to 1685.  During this period, each colony launched 
significant promotional campaigns that sought to encourage migration from the British 
Isles and increasingly from Europe as well.  Taken together, the 1680s marked a high 
point in the English production of promotional literature during the seventeenth century.  
The proprietors of each colony established complex networks to spread their message, 
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selecting agents to circulate the promotional materials and to meet with potential settlers 
in person.  The agents were chosen with care.  Wealthy merchants with experience 
overseas were attractive, for instance, because they could add credibility to the colonial 
message.  Leading members of dissenting sects were also favored agents because of their 
influence with persecuted populations potentially seeking more accommodating locales.   
The key promoters of Carolina, for instance, beyond Shaftesbury himself, included 
Thomas Modyford, the former governor of Barbados; John Lord Cardross and William 
Dunlop, both Scottish Covenanters; and Rene Petit, Jacob Guerard, and Arnald Bruneau, 
all French Huguenots.  Penn’s agents included the prominent Quakers, Benjamin Furly 
and Philip Ford, while the agents for East Jersey included Robert Barclay, a Quaker 
apologist, but also George Scot, a vehement Calvinist.  Barclay, the honorary governor 
and proprietor of East Jersey, established an especially impressive network of agents in 
Scotland, including twelve in Edinburgh alone.  During this period, the geographic scope 
expanded beyond England as well.  Carolina and East Jersey targeted Scotland 
specifically with their tracts.  The Carolina proprietors published promotional tracts in 
French, while Penn did so in both Dutch and German.  In all, between 1680 and 1685, ten 
promotional tracts were published for Carolina, ten for East/West Jersey, and nineteen for 
Pennsylvania.  Colonial agents carried this literature throughout England and into 
Europe. The message of the various colonies was delivered in print and in person.  The 
Carolina proprietors even established the Carolina Coffee House in Birching Lane near 
the Royal Exchange as an entrepot for colonial materials and information.
23
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      The Proprietors of Carolina, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—the men who approved 
or commissioned much of this literature and established the networks to disseminate 
those materials—were in many ways very different.  Religiously, the individuals 
involved covered the spectrum, from fervent dissenters to devout Anglicans.  Even those 
with similar religious backgrounds often disagreed on the extent to which a particular 
religious persuasion should define the colony.  The political differences were significant 
as well.  When the Scot proprietors seized control of the East Jersey, the colony came 
under the control of Stuart supporters and a few future Jacobites.  Meanwhile, their 
competitor for Scottish immigrants from Carolina was the leading Whig in London 
seeking to exclude the Duke of York from the throne.  They had some broad similarities 
as well, however.  Most conspicuously, they were all British elites, well educated and 
wealthy.  But beyond their wealth and status, the most salient, common characteristic was 
their involvement in colonization.  During the early 1680s, the leading figures from each 
colony (Shaftesbury, Barclay, and Penn) were keenly aware of colonial efforts, both past 
and present.  They would have been familiar with the generous “Concessions” in New 
Jersey and Carolina and would have understood the pressures on colonial promoters to 
offer local control to settlers and how that could work against the expansive powers 
granted to the proprietors by Charles II.   The promotional literature of the 1680s would 
bring to light the underlying issues that created this tension between colonial prosperity 
and proprietary power.     
*** 
 The promotional literature in the 1680s continued and extended many of the 
developments that had begun in the 1650s.  The mid-century promoters had employed a 
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new ideology that had been created to better fit a commercial society and was particularly 
attractive to the colonial promoter.  This ideology had embraced wealth, redefined self-
interest, and prioritized the individual characteristic of industriousness.  The colonial 
promoters of Carolina, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania all embraced this ideology and its 
political implications in their advertisements of America.  They pointed to the bountiful 
environment in America, as the earliest colonial promoters had done, but now the focus 
was on its encouragement of industry, not its potential challenge to virtue.  William Penn 
even elaborated on the non-economic benefits of colonial labor, arguing that the work 
itself, encouraged by New World possibilities, would help to restore the English character 
that he argued was in decline.  With labor so important to colonial success, self-interest 
continued to be redefined as a productive force in society, with Penn asserting that 
desires for personal gain were a particular and positive characteristic of the English 
people.  With this reconsideration of self-interest, representative government in America 
gained an economic justification, with the result being that almost every colonial 
promoter in the 1680s, despite their varied backgrounds and their different target 
audiences, embraced assembly government as a necessary feature of a successful empire.   
 As their predecessors had done before them, the colonial promoters of the 1680s 
included lengthy descriptions of the American environment.  For the Carolina pamphlets, 
Robert Ferguson’s The Present State of Carolina published in 1682 was the most 
extensive in its praise of the ecology of Carolina.  He first tackled the climate of the 
region, which for many in England had acquired a poor, even deadly, reputation.  
Ferguson reached for the other extreme: “the Heavens shine upon this famous Country 
the soveraign Ray of health; and has blest it with a serene Air, and a lofty skie, that 
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defends it from Infection.”24  Winter in Carolina compared to “March in England” and 
was so mild and short that it acted as a “surprizal of an approaching spring.”25  Ferguson 
and the other promoters of Carolina had to be careful in overemphasizing the mild winter 
in that it implied a sweltering summer as well.  Samuel Wilson presented an extended 
discussion of the Carolina climate, admitting that despite its “Degree of Latitude of thirty 
nine and forty” and it being some “ſix hundred Miles nearer the Sun than England,” the 
temperature was “many Degrees colder in the Winter.”26  He reported stories of coastal 
rivers freezing “ſix inches thick” and noted that it was rare for a winter to go by that does 
not produce “ſome ice.”  His convoluted explanation for the cold weather was based on 
Northwest winds that traveled over the frozen lakes of Canada and some “nitrous 
Vapours” produced by the uncultivated earth.  The upshot of this admission of colder 
than expected winters came two paragraphs later: “The summer is not near ſo hot as in 
Virginia, or the other Northern American English Collonys.”27  For this claim, he again 
relied on “North-wind” and adds a breeze from the “Tropicks,” which cooled the region.  
A temperate climate with its close association to good health and longevity was a key 
potential selling point for all the colonies.
28
   
 New Jersey and Pennsylvania were quick to trumpet their respective climates as 
well.  An author of a West Jersey tract, published in 1681, used the shortcomings of other 
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colonies to highlight the advantages of the Delaware Valley: “The Air of this Province is 
very Serene, Sweet, and Wholsome, which renders the Clime much more agreeable to 
European Bodies, than the severe Colds of New-England or the sulphurous Heat in 
Virginia; where, I say, the Bogs, Marshes, and corrupt Standing-Waters, have ever been 
very Noxious to the Planter.”29  In what was a common move for many promotional 
writers, this author included letters from colonists in the publication.  The presentation of 
information through “private” correspondence was one way in which the promotional 
authors tried to increase the credibility of their message.  In one such letter, John Crips 
claimed that the West Jersey “Country, and Air, seems […]o be very agreeable to our 
Bodies.”30  William Penn claimed the same advantages for Pennsylvania: “The country it 
self in its Soyl, Air, Water, Seasons and Produce both Natural and Artificial is not to be 
despised.”  He admitted “sharp Frosty Weather” in the winter,” but argued that it offered 
a pleasant contrast to the “foul, thick, black Weather” of England.  For an appropriate 
comparison for his colony, he had to look outside of his home country: “The Air is sweet 
and clear, the Heavens serene, like the South-parts of France, rarely Overcast.”31  A 
healthy environment was an important attraction for a new settlement and the promoters 
of each colony, often at the expense of their neighbor colonies, laid claim to a uniquely 
beneficial climate.  
       The colonists echoed each other in numerous other ecological claims as well.  The 
promoters of each colony praised the coastal waterways and interior rivers of the eastern 
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coastline.  Carolina, for instance, contained “Rivulets, whose christaline streams are 
clear, and transparent.”32  Robert Ferguson’s admittedly partial list of the many species 
that made their home in the Carolina streams included over thirty-six animals.  The 
fertility of the soil was another common thread that united the promotion of the colonies.  
A tract for West Jersey provided a typical claim: “The Soyl of this Province is very Rich 
and Fruitful . . . And where it is any whit Mountainous or Rocky, there are also Valleys 
extream Rich and Fertile.”  The author went on to offer lists of the various animals that 
lived in the area and the multiple goods that could be produced in the country, a long list 
that included honey, silk, flax and hops.  His depiction of the various fruits that grew in 
the countryside offered a good example of how expansive they considered the 
possibilities of the New World to be: “The Fruits of your Province are all sorts of 
Delicate Melons, Apples, Pears, Damsons; and all other sorts of Plumbs, Apricocks, 
Peaches, and Malagotoons, Cherries of several kinds, Quinces, Marucas, Grapes of Six 
sorts I have seen, Puchamines, Walnuts, Chesnuts, Strawberries, Rasberries, Currans 
Red and White, Gooseberries, and a great many other Wild-Fruits.”33  For Pennsylvania, 
Penn also pointed to “Artificial Produce,” which necessitated husbandry, such as “Wheat, 
Barley, Oats, Rye, Pease, Beans, Squashes, Water-Melons, Mus-Melons.”34  Penn and his 
rival colonial promoters hoped to convey the expansive potentialities of the colonial 
environment, and as a result, long lists of commodities, animals, and trees appear 
throughout the colonial literature.   
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      The authors transformed almost every aspect of the American landscape into a 
merchantable commodity.  Each ecosystem was broken down into the extractable units.
35
  
The extensive lists of plants and animals signaled to readers the profit that was possible 
and also the varied skill sets that would be applicable in the new environment.  They 
wanted to attract those seeking great wealth as well as those seeking employment in a 
specific trade.  Each colony announced its superiority.  In Carolina, Ferguson, the most 
flamboyant of the Carolina promoters, declared Carolina to be “the most hopeful 
Settlement the King of England has in America.”36  An East Jersey tract announced, in 
contrast, that it was “the most proper ſeat for a Collony of this Nation.”37  After his 
description of the Pennsylvania, William Penn, once again expanding the basis of 
comparison, wrote: “Having given this general account of Lands in those parts of 
America, which for Variety of Earth, and Number of Fountains, falls not short, in my 
Opinion, of any Country I have seen in Europe.”38  After such high praise of the 
environment, any failure in America had to become the sole responsibility of the settler.  
In a published letter from a West Jersey tract, the colonist reached this conclusion, 
writing “if a Man cannot Live here, I do believe he can hardly live any Place in the 
World.”39  After nearly a century of settlement, colonial authors could not plausibly argue 
that things worked out for everyone, but by assigning complete culpability to the 
individual, they could continue advertizing the colonies as places of ample opportunity.  
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Descriptions of the America were as detailed and optimistic in 1680 as they had been half 
a century earlier.   
      A notable shift had occurred, however, in how these authors responded to their own 
descriptions of American bountifulness.  The earliest colonial promoters of English 
colonization had followed their descriptions of America with healthy doses of fear and 
anxiety.  Their perspective had been grounded in the conventional belief that virtue was 
defined by an individual’s willingness to place the needs of the community, the common 
good, before any private aspirations or desires.  Virtue and the virtuous sustained a city or 
a society just as those seeking private interest crippled it.  There was a great risk then for 
these writers in the infinite opportunities for profit in America.  In their effort to build 
new communities, they worried that the colonial opportunities would attract the wrong 
sort of people.  In their analysis of past colonial failures, a lack of virtue among the 
colonists was the culprit, and in their forecasts of future success, a renewed commitment 
to virtuous behavior was always the answer.  Virtue was a dominant feature of these 
earlier tracts and the key determinant of colonial success.
40
  
        By the 1680s, the focus had shifted almost entirely to industry.  Colonial success, 
both collectively and individually, depended on industry instead of virtue.  Promoting 
East Jersey, George Scot explained why: “we are here ſure that a ſober and induſtrious 
People might make this a rich Countrey.”41  The enemy to colonial success was now the 
idle and the lazy.  The tracts posted warnings for those considering migration that this 
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was “not a Countrey for idle people but ſuch as will be at pains.42  A letter from an East 
Jersey colonist included in Scot’s work reported the same: “any who will be Induſtrous, 
may live very comfortably here . . . as for idle men who will neither work nor trade, need 
never come here, for there are none idle here.”43  Those who achieved success in the 
colonies did so by their own industry.  In a Carolina tract, the author pointed to 
“industrious” servants who had finished their indenture and acquired “good Stocks of 
Cattle, and Servants of their own.”44  William Penn presented in several of his 
publications a list of “These Perſons that Providence ſeems to have moſt fitted for 
Plantations.”  The ordering of his categories was telling.  First on the list was 
“Induſtrious Husbandmen” and second were “Laborious” craftsmen, like carpenters, 
masons, and weavers.  The third category was “Ingenious Spirits,” who without the stable 
employment in the England that they would find in the colonies, had no opportunity to 
“improve Science and help Nurſeries of People.”  The fourth category was the familiar 
appeal to “younger brothers” with “ſmall inheritances,” who could procure great estates 
in the new world.  Penn labeled the fifth and final category as “men of univerſal Spirits, 
that have an eye to the good of Poſterity.”45  This was the closest Penn got to the old 
definition of virtue so important to the early promoters.  That sort of colonist would be 
important for the “good Counſel” that they could provide.  For Penn, however, they were 
fifth on his list, and he allowed little space in his promotional tracts to target that type of 
colonists. 
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 Colonial planners had always intended to exploit the many saleable products of 
the New World, but with the shift to industry away from virtue, that exploitation became 
far less morally ambiguous.  The most dramatic example of this shifting approach to the 
American environment is evident in the changing treatment of Native Americans in the 
colonial literature.  The promoters in first few decades of colonization had emphasized 
the importance of converting and assimilating Native Americans.  The influence of 
classical humanism on these authors along with a desire to delineate English from 
Spanish imperialism both played a role in the importance of a magnanimous element to 
English colonization.  It also would help to indicate the virtue of the endeavors and the 
colonists, which constituted the most important indication for the promoter of future 
societal success.  The Indians were a constant and important presence in the promotional 
literature of the first decades of English colonization.  William Loddington’s promotional 
tract, Plantation Work The Work of this Generation (1682), represented the only major 
exception to the promoters' embrace of the economic ideology during this period and 
recalled the language of the earlier literature: “be very wary and wiſe in the mannaging 
all Affairs, leſt the Indians have as little regard to the Light of Christ in them when they 
are told of it, as they had to the Spaniards Heaven.”46  Loddington was unique in the 
1680s literature for the emphasis that he put on Indian conversion, but also in his methods 
for achieving this end.  The colonist would work through virtue by setting an appealing 
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example and attracting Indians to English ways and religion.  This had been a common 
strategy in the earlier colonial literature.
47
   
 By the 1680s, however, despite Loddington's allusion, English colonial efforts no 
longer existed in the shadow of Spanish America, and the conversion of natives 
accordingly lost much of its symbolic significance.  There was still an anthropological 
interest in the culture and behavior of the Indians, but their economic services now 
warranted more mention than their possible conversion.  The author of a West Jersey 
tract stated the new emphasis most succinctly, asking “what Advantage might be made of 
those Innocent, Good-natur’d Creatures, in point of Trade, &c.”48  The promotion of 
each colony emphasized how helpful the local Indians could be.  A Carolina tract claimed 
that in that region the “Natives dwell peacably and friend’y among them, and are very 
ſerviceable to the Engliſh in Hunting, Fiſhing, Gunning, and otherwiſe.”49  A later work 
about Carolina listed the price of hiring an “Indian ſervant” to assist a colonial family.50  
In a tract for East Jersey, Penn made a similar claim: “they are really serviceable and 
advantagious to English, not only in Hunting and taking the Deer, and other wilde 
Creatures; and catching of Fish and Fowl fit for food in their Seasons, but, in the killing 
and destroying of Bears, Woolves, Foxes, and other Vermine and Peltry, whose Skins and 
Furrs they bring the English, and sell at less the price than the value of time an 
Englishman must spend to take them.”51  Thomas Budd, in his tract for both Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey, made a nearly identical claim for the Indians living west of the Delaware 
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as well.
52
  The focus of the early promoters had been on what the colonists could do for 
the Indians.  The question in the 1680s had become what could the Indians do for them.  
The American environment, its inhabitants along with is natural commodities, were 
evaluated and presented as encouragements to individual industry with little regard, in 
comparison to the earlier literature, to any communal or religious considerations. 
 For William Penn, in particular, the labor and industriousness encouraged by New 
World environment would lead to successful colonial communities, but would also 
restore English character to its former glories.  Penn's argument began as a rebuttal to a 
criticism of colonization during the Stuart period that the colonies were actually drawing 
too many people away from England.  By the second half of the century, population 
growth in England had slowed, undercutting what had been an important impetus for 
colonization.  Early English colonizers, most famously Richard Hakluyt, envisioned the 
colonies as landing points for England’s excess population.  The poor would be put to 
work in the colonies, becoming productive subjects in America as opposed to remaining 
beggars in England.
53
  As the population growth in England dwindled, social 
commentators began to fear that England was losing too much of its workforce abroad.
54
  
The colonies, they feared, were growing stronger and more populous at the expense of 
the mother country.   
  Penn responded to these concerns, which he referred to alternately as a “common 
objection” and “the vulgar Opinion,” and admitted that England did have a dwindling 
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population.  He referenced past nations that had achieved great power, including the 
possession of colonies, only to fall into decay, but for these nations, Penn argued, their 
colonies had not been the problem:  
the cauſe of the decay . . . was not their Plantations, but their 
luxury and corruption of Manners: For when they grew to neglect 
their ancient Diſcipline, that maintained and rewarded Virtue and 
Industry, and addicted themselves to Pleasure and Effeminacy, 
they debas’d their Spirits and debauch’d their Morals, from 
whence Ruine did never fail to follow any People.
55
 
   
This domestic decline through luxury was for many, including Machiavelli, the main 
problem with colonization and the wealth that it would bring home.  In the same 
paragraph, however, Penn defended the English colonies for bringing wealth into 
England, which had “manifestly inrich’d, and ſo ſtreghthned her.”56  For Penn, the riches 
streaming in from the New World were not connected to the luxurious living that was 
causing England’s decline.   
 Penn blamed England’s decreasing population, not on thousands leaving for 
America or on colonial riches, but on the increasing appeal of urban living.  For Penn, 
agricultural pursuits had fallen out of fashion: “The Country being thus neglected, and no 
due Ballance kept between Trade and Husbandry, City and Country.”  He went through 
various causes of this recent phenomenon.  The first was that the “Country-People” were 
“ſo extremely addicted to put their Children into Gentlemens Service, or ſend them to 
Towns to learn Trades.”  The second reason was the increased demand for those services 
that were tempting people away from the countryside.  He pointed to the “Pride of the 
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Age in its Attendance and Retinue” and bemoaned the modern needs of a gentleman.  The 
list of necessary attendees was long; a gentleman of one thousand pounds a year needed 
“a Gentleman to wait on upon him in his Chambers, a Coach-man, a Groom or two, a 
Butler, a Man-Cook, a Gardner, two or three Lacques [Lackies], it may be an Huntſman, 
and a Faulkner, the Wife of a Gentlewoman, and Maids accordingly.”  In contrast, a 
gentleman of equal income in earlier days “kept but four or five Servants.”  The demand 
for servants in the city combined with the “addiction” of the “Country-People” to create a 
continual drain on the rural population.  A third cause was that the great men of England, 
“too much loving the Town and reſorting to London,” no longer “spent their Eſtates in the 
Country.”57  The expenditures of the rich were an important part of the rural economy, 
and their discontinuance further impoverished the countryside and forced more people to 
relocate to towns.  The result of these three developments was a population centered in 
towns and dedicated to non-agricultural livelihoods. 
 Penn then argued for a deteriorating population on the basis of his evaluation of 
rural and urban lifestyles, assigning each with inherently masculine or feminine 
characteristics.  Each of the developments that Penn had alluded to culminated in the loss 
of “manliness” in the English population.  The children who had left their families to 
learn trades in the towns had been affected by their “ſoft and delicate Uſage there” and 
were now “for ever unfitted for the Labour of a Farming Life.”  The individuals that 
became servants to gentleman were “effeminated by a lazy and luxurious Living” instead 
of keeping to their former “Manly-labour.”  Once ensconced in this lifestyle, they “rarely 
marry.”  The urban lifestyle was too expensive for many to be able to support “a Family 
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at their own Charge,” so that if they did get married, they often were forced to do so only 
later in life.  A dangerous pattern in light of the deteriorating life expectancy, which Penn 
claimed current lifestyles had cut in half.  Penn offered the bleakest of consequences for 
most people in this situation.  The men “vend their Lusts at an evil Ordinary” and “turn 
either Souldiers, or Gameſters, or Highway-men.”  The women fared little better; they 
“too frequently dreſt themſelves for a bad market, rather than know the Dairy again.”   
The consequences for England as a whole were equally dire.  All these developments, 
Penn claimed, “obſtructs the increase of our people.”  In one case, Penn even argued that 
the emasculation of the English population was literal.  “The great Debauchery in this 
Kingdom,” he claimed, had “rendered many unfruitful when married.”58  Penn admitted, 
then, in his tract that England did have a population problem and offered much evidence 
in support of the concern that England was “not ſo populous . . . as formerly.”59  Penn had 
replaced, however, the common scapegoat of colonization with the rise of urbane living.  
For Penn, rural labor had come to symbolize male virility, and the depopulation of the 
countryside portended an impotent population.   The result was a people unmanned and 
the declining population to prove it. 
      The English colonies, however, could restore to England the proper balance between 
labor and luxury.  The expanding populations in America were not explained by English 
emigration, but by natural increase.  In England, industry and rural labor were becoming 
less appealing, even for those who chose to undertake it.  The “poor Country-man,” Penn 
observed, could take “double toil,” but because of the lack of available laborers, could 
not “dreſs and manure his Land to the Advantage it formerly yielded him.”  In America, 
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the situation had flipped.  In a common claim of colonial promoters, Penn declared: “their 
industry there is worth more than if they stay’d at home, the Product of their Labour 
being in a ſuperior Nature to thoſe of [England].”60  Penn made the same point in a tract 
for East Jersey and this time drew out its consequence as it related to colonial families: 
“it’s proper for all Industrious Husband-men, and such who by hard Labour here [in 
England] on Rack Rents, are scarce able to maintain themselves; much less to raise any 
Estate for their Children, may, with God’s blessing on their Labours, there [in the 
colonies] live comfortably, and provide well for their Families.”61  A letter in a West 
Jersey tract made a similar claim about the opportunities found in the colonies: “All our 
People are very well, and in Hopeful way to Live much better, than ever they did; and not 
only so, but to provide well for their Posterities.
62
  And for East Jersey, George Scot 
extended the point to include the poorer sort, claiming that servants “work not ſo much by 
a third as they do in England” but still “feed much better.”63  Colonial circumstances 
would also allow for the creation of new families, Penn contended: “Such as could not 
marry here [in England], but hardly live and allow themſelves Cloaths, do marry there [in 
the colonies].”64  Colonial society, full of “manly” labors and expanding families, would 
correct the imbalance between city and country that had developed in the English nation.  
As it had with the promotional pamphlets at mid-century, industry would lead, not simply 
to individual profits, but to a larger good and a more stable society.  Penn expanded the 
impact colonial labor to include England as well.  
                                                          
60
 Penn, Some Account, 3-4. 
61
 Penn, A Brief Account of the Province of East-Jersey, 4. 
62
 An Abstract, 24. 
63
 Scot, The Model of Government, 169. 
64
 Penn, Some Account, 2.  
150 
 
 Embedded in Penn's description of the importance of labor was an acceptance of 
economic self-interest.  Individuals would work in America and not in England, after all, 
because the rewards to their labor were so much greater.  The promoters of the 1680s 
continued, almost unanimously, to treat self-interest as the engine of labor.  The lone 
exception was again Loddington, who warned of the corrupting influence of interest in 
colonization.  Loddington wanted men “whoſe Hearts I do believe are upright before him, 
aiming in the firſt place at his Glory, and then the good of all men, even as their own,” 
but worried that some colonists “may have too much an Eye to Self in tranſplanting 
themſelves.”65  In this passage, Loddington repeated almost verbatim the concerns and 
desires of an earlier generation of colonial promoter.  In the closing paragraph of his 
pamphlet, Loddington claimed that sort of elevated motivation, proclaiming to his 
readers: “Let none think I write this for any self end.”66  Almost every promotional writer 
of the earlier period made a similar assertion.   
 The promoters of the 1680s were hesitant, however, to lambaste the pursuit of 
self-interest because of its ability to spur industry and investment.  They also expressed 
skepticism about the idea that an individual could rise above his own personal interest.  
Outside of Loddington, there was only an occasional gesture in the later promotional 
tracts to the claim of pure intentions.  Penn, for instance, claimed in one of his tracts that 
he had “not ſought to ſpeak my Interest, but my Judgment.”67  Much more common was 
the attempt to align colonial opportunity with the particular interest of colonial planners.  
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In a Carolina tract, the author located the “principal Power” in the assembly so that the 
proprietors were incapable “to do the meanest Setler any wrong.”  The author, Robert 
Ferguson, admitted that this seemed to be a surrender of many of the “Rites” and 
“Powers” conferred to them in their “Patent Royal.”  Such a concession implied that the 
proprietors had ignored “their own interest” in the colony.  This is what the earlier 
literature would have claimed was in fact the intentions of the proprietors.  Ferguson did 
the opposite and claimed this concession of power in the colony, despite first 
appearances, was in the interest of the proprietors.  It was actually in “their own interest, 
and preservation,” he claimed, to make the government “as easie as possible” on the 
“people of Carolina.”68  An earlier tract from Carolina published soon after the original 
charter was issued followed the promise of assembly rights with the same explanation.  
To an English audience rightly skeptical of any voluntary surrender of political power, 
the author asserted that this was perfectly rational.  Not only had the proprietors already 
promised liberal powers to colonists, but they also were prepared to offer “what other 
Privileges may be found advantageous for the good, of the Colony.”  The reason was not 
a virtuous disposition, however, but because it was in “their Interest so to do.”69   
 In his promotion of East Jersey, George Scot also acknowledged that interest 
played a role in individual depictions of the New World.  In his tract, he included several 
letters from individual colonists, who not surprisingly offered consistent praise of the 
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colony.  He admitted the risk that these letters, “being written by Gentlemen,” may be 
dismissed by some readers because “it may be preſumed, intereſt may oblidge them to 
repreſent things otherwiſe then they are.”  Scot did not follow that observation with any 
sort of rebuttal.  There were no testimonials of the virtue of the Jersey colonists and their 
ability to put a concern for the common good above their own interest.  Instead, he 
included a letter from “a Maſſon, ſent over as a Servant, by Captain Hamiltoun, he being 
a plain Countrey-man, it is not very probable he can have any deſign.”70  The class 
condescension notwithstanding, Scot’s move to include a different perspective was an 
admission of the skepticism that accompanied any claims to impartiality.  In the 
promotion of the 1680s, interest was an accepted force in life and maximal persuasion 
occurred when the promoter could align colonial promises with the interest of colonial 
leaders.  Self-interest for these writers was no longer the great threat to their credibility, 
but when utilized correctly, was a force that could increase the plausibility of colonial 
promises. 
 The promoters used interest to bolster the credibility of their colonial promises, 
but also to explain labor, or the lack thereof, in the New World.  In an East Jersey tract, 
the author included a letter from a settler who had traveled through Maryland.  At this 
time, Maryland was not a particularly successful colony.  It had nearly been destroyed in 
the 1640s by infighting connected with the Civil War and had had to rebuild its 
population.  The colony’s population was still low by the 1680s, and it boasted no towns 
or populous settlements comparable to its northern neighbors nor did it rival Virginia in 
production of tobacco.  The Jersey settler was not impressed: “I cannot but ſay it is a 
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good Countrey, but its poſſeſſed with a Debauched, Idle, Laſie People . . . I believe it is 
the worſt improwed Countrey in the World.”  He explained the state of Maryland through 
a lack a desire by the colonists to produce more than their basic needs.  They only labor 
for “as much Bread as ſerves them for one Seaſon, and als much Tobacco as may furnish 
them with Cloaths.”71  Penn made a similar point when he described the history of the 
Dutch people in the Delaware Bay, who like the Marylanders had not accomplished much 
in the way of establishing towns and erecting a populous colony.  He admitted that the 
Dutch were normally a “plain, strong, industrious People”, but the colonists’ behavior 
had cut against that reputation.  To Penn’s surprise they had “made no great progress in 
Culture or propagation of fruit-Trees”.  The only explanation offered by Penn was that 
these colonists “desired rather to have enough, than Plenty or Traffick.”72  Like the Jersey 
settler, Penn connected the desire for "plenty" on the part of the colonists as crucial to 
industrious behavior and colonial development. 
      The behavior of the Indians in relationship to the American environment was 
potentially the most puzzling to the promoters.  The colonial promoters had great hopes 
for the colonies made possible, they argued, by the bountiful American environment.  
They aspired for their colonies to become populous, secure, and permanent settlements.  
Key indicators of this achievement would be the presence of towns and an improved 
landscape.  The promoters carried their English, colonial expectations into their accounts 
of the Indians, and what they observed was a people surrounded by the same plentiful 
opportunities but lacking in the English measurements of social progress.  The promoters 
repeatedly pointed to the lack of population growth among the Indians, hoping in part to 
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mitigate fears among prospective settlers of the possibility of Indian attacks. With 
Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia and King Philips War in New England, the 1670s had been 
a particularly bloody decade of Anglo-Indian relations.
73
  Each colony made its separate 
claims.  In Carolina, the Indians were variously reported to “have not ſuffered any 
increaſe of People,” were “inconsiderable in number,” and were “few in number.”74  In 
1682 tract for East Jersey, later repeated verbatim in a 1685 tract for West Jersey, the 
author made the same claim: “The Indian Natives in this Countrey are but few.”75  And 
for Pennsylvania, a promotional author echoed the same claim for that particular region: 
“The Indians are but few in Number.”76  The Indians were not a people who were 
growing in number and power.  Their populations were also described as highly mobile 
and rarely settled.  One Carolina promoter pointed to the fact that they do not “dwell . . .  
in Towns, but in straggling Plantations.”77  And if industry or hard work was 
demonstrated by improvements to the land, they came up short in that regard as well, as 
the English often missed the impact of the Indians on the land because it did not take an 
English form.
78
  One promoter summarized what all these individual failings portended 
about the Indians: they were “effeminate people, and inconsiderable as to number . . . 
                                                          
73
 On King Philip's War and its many ramifications for New England society, see Jill Lepore, The Name of 
War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Knopf, 1998); James D. Drake, King 
Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999); 
and Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest of Authority in 
Colonial New England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).  On Bacon's Rebellion, see 
Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1957). 
74
 An Account 14; Ferguson, The present state of Carolina, 13; Carolina Described More Fully, A4. 
75
 Penn, A Brief Account, 4; Scot, The Model of Government, 71. 
76
 Budd, Good Order established, 29. 
77
 Ferguson, The Present State, 14. 
78
 On the inability of the English to understand the impact of the Indians on the American ecology, see 
Cronon, Changes in the Land, Chapter 4. 
155 
 
supine, and of a soft Nature.”79  The promoters portrayed the Indians as a failing people.  
They were growing weaker, not stronger, despite the fact that the American environment 
offered the same opportunities to the Indians as it did to the English colonists.      
 William Penn confronted the puzzle of the declining American Indians and 
offered an explanation that centered on their lack of material desires.  About the Indians, 
he wrote: “They care for little, because they want but little; and the Reason is, a little 
contents them . . . they are ignorant of our Pleasures . . . [and] free from our Pains. . . We 
sweat and toil to live; their pleasure feeds them, I mean, their Hunting, Fishing and 
Fowling . . . their Seats and Table are the Ground.”80  In this passage, Penn elaborated on 
his observation that a willingness to work was directly connected to a desire for wealth or 
worldly things.
81
  Penn did not declare the incessant desire for more to be a universal 
characteristic, as Adam Smith would later do, but the specific characteristic of the 
English people, which would lead to their success in the New World.  More than any 
other moment in the promotional tracts of the 1680s, Penn's distinction between the 
Indians and the English captured the ideological transformation that had occurred in the 
promotional literature.  In the first decades of permanent English colonization in the New 
World, the colonial promoters had promised successful English colonies in America, 
whose prosperity, amicability with the Indians, and religious purpose would depend on 
and thereby demonstrate to the wider world the virtue of the English people.  The virtue 
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so important to all of these achievements would be defined by the willingness of the 
individual to suppress self-interest in all situations for the sake of the larger goals of 
colonization.  The promoters of the 1680s imagined prosperous colonies in the New 
World as well, but it would now be self-interested individuals and their collective labor 
that would lead to this result.  In their vision of English colonization, successful colonies 
in America would signal to the world a particular English characteristic, but it would be 
the opposite of what the earlier writers had hoped for. 
 With the full embrace of self-interest and labor in the New World, the promoters 
of the 1680s all supported the political corollary of this economic thought.  This 
connection had been explored by earlier colonial authors.  In the 1650s, William Bullock 
published a promotional tract in 1649 and described the necessary circumstances for his 
future participation in the colony.  Bullock argued that individuals like him would not 
take on the risks of colonial investment or migration without the hope of bettering their 
condition.  This aspiration demanded political rights.  The opportunity for gain in the 
colonies was meaningless without financial security, which could only be guaranteed 
through representative government.  Political power for the colonists was justified by the 
necessary protection of individual interests.
82
  Bullock offered his personal experience as 
support for this sort approach to political economy in the colonies but this position was 
supported by the larger history of English colonization.  Anything approaching autocracy 
had repeatedly proven over the course of the seventeenth century to be inimical to the 
goal of a prosperous colony.  The experiment in military rule in early Virginia, the 
manorial dreams of Lord Baltimore in Maryland, and the lack of any assembly rights in 
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Providence Island had all failed in the first half of the century in attracting migrants to the 
colonies and in getting them to work upon arrival.
83
  
 By the 1680s, the vast majority of promoters were committed to this political 
economy and the importance of promising a powerful assembly in America.  Each colony 
repeatedly made clear its commitment to an element of participatory government.  In a 
Carolina tract from 1682, the author claimed that it was “out of their Power (meaning the 
Proprietors) to do the meanest Setler any wrong, for the principal Power is lodged in the 
Assembly.”84   A different tract from the same year repeated a similar claim but applied it 
specifically to wealth: “no Money can be raiſed or Law made, without the conſent of the 
Inhabitants or their Repreſentatives.”85  New Jersey proponents promised the same 
protections.  In Scot’s Model of Government, he asserted that no “Fears” in the colony 
“of any incroachment upon their properties or liberties” because the proprietors were as 
“ſubject to the Law” as the “meaneſt Inhabitants.”86  Again, the specific application of 
these rights concerned wealth: the government of New Jersey was “not to impoſe, nor 
suffer to be imposed, any tax, cuſtome, ſubſidie, talladg, aſſeſmant . . . other then what 
ſhall be impoſed by the Authority and conſent of the Generall Assembly.”87  The same 
promise appeared in an earlier tract for West Jersey: “And not any, the least Tax, either in 
Money or Goods, or any other Services, upon any Pretence whatsoever, to be imposed on 
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the People, but by the consent of these their Representatives in the General-Assembly.”88  
Penn was only keeping up with his fellow promoters when he described the functioning 
of the Pennsylvania government: “The Governour and Free-men, have the power of 
making Laws, ſo that no Law can be made, nor Money raiſed, but by the People’s 
conſent.”89  Penn even dedicated an entire promotional tract to a detailed description of 
the Pennsylvania government.  Laws would be passed only with the approval of the 
assembly, and if anyone should enact a law or “shall Leavy, Collect or Pay any Money or 
Goods” outside of that process, they “shall be held a publick Enemy to the Province, and 
a Betrayer of the Liberty of the People thereof.”90  Regardless of the expansive powers 
granted the proprietors in their respective charters, the business of colonization required 
the promise of participatory government in the colonies.  
  As rhetorically powerful as these promises were, they left much up to 
interpretation.   Colonists and colonial leaders frequently debated the specifics of 
assembly power.  One issue was who should create the legislation.  Should it originate in 
the assembly, as it did in the Carolina Concessions of 1665, or should the assembly 
simply receive and approve legislation passed down from above, as was proposed in 
Penn’s Frame of Government?  Other issues included suffrage restrictions, the property 
requirements for assemblymen, and the number of representatives.  As long as there was 
an assembly of some form, no matter how weakened, the proprietors could claim the 
fulfillment of their promotional promises.  And the proprietors of each colony were all 
interested in maintaining significant control over the colony.  None gave away powers to 
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the assembly easily.  In Shaftesbury’s opening to the Fundamental Constitutions of 
Carolina, he made clear his intention to “avoid erecting a numerous Democracy.”91  He 
then set out to create a constitution full of feudal holdovers, including a heritable nobility.  
Shaftesbury’s plan for South Carolina was harshly criticized by many, including East 
Jersey’s George Scot who accused Shaftesbury of establishing arbitrary power on behalf 
of the proprietors and for limiting the possibility of upward social mobility in the colony.  
Even in Pennsylvania, Penn’s Frame of Government, published in 1682 and altered in 
1683, steadily diminished the power of the assembly as Penn went through multiple 
drafts.  The original constitution of the colony, described in the Fundamental 
Constitutions of Pennsylvania, empowered an annually elected 384-member assembly to 
create and pass legislation.  With the publication of the Frame of Government in 1683, 
the government of Pennsylvania had been transformed.  The governor was now fully 
under the control of the proprietor, the 72-member council was chosen from among the 
colony’s wealthy and elite, and the lower house, consisting of 500 members, played only 
an advisory role, approving or rejecting legislation passed down to them by the governor 
and council.  Many of Penn’s political associates back in England were sorely 
disappointed in these developments.  Algernon Sidney labeled the document some of “the 
basest laws in the world” and added that “the Turk was not more absolute” than William 
Penn in Pennsylvania.
92
  Despite Sidney’s criticism, the proposed governments of both 
Pennsylvania and South Carolina fell well within the powers granted to them by their 
respective charters. 
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  For the various proprietors during this period, having legitimate and defensible 
claims to the sovereignty of a colony only meant something if the colony itself existed.  
With the language of the charters often referencing the Bishops of Durham, these 
proprietors possessed paper claims to expansive powers in the New World that in 
important ways were rendered meaningless.  What becomes clear from comparing the 
promises of the promotional tracts to proprietary actions in the colonies is the 
increasingly liberal language of empire.  The colonial promoters, in their projection of 
colonial success and in their efforts to attract migration, promulgated a vision of empire 
that emphasized the importance of individual labor and necessitated political rights.  By 
the 1680s, the volume and circulation of the promotional tracts had increased, as these 
publications were being circulated to potential migrants in England, Scotland, and across 
Europe.  And unlike the 1650s, when a small groups of authors embraced this ideology in 
their promotion of a single colony, the number and diversity of the various authors 
increased as well.  The proprietors of New Jersey, Carolina, and Pennsylvania were 
religiously and politically very different and so were their chosen scribes.  The one thing 
these authors had in common was their intention to advertize the New World, a goal that 
propelled these authors to embrace an economic ideology focused on industry and self-
interest. 
   By the 1680s, this ideology was squarely in the public sphere and could be 
mobilized by colonists to attack the proprietors' efforts to consolidate political power in 
the colonies.  The political economy supported by the promotional writers demanded 
decentralized power abroad.  Self-interest, labor, and political rights worked together in 
this colonial vision.  When the proprietors moved to consolidate their own power, they 
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would have to counter a population empowered by this vision of empire, which could be 
equally useful in challenging imperial power.  James II ascended the throne in 1685, just 
as the majority of these writings were being put into circulation, and he immediately 
sought to centralize imperial rule by eliminating assembly rights in the colonies.  
Colonists could resist these changes through a claim to "English rights," but also on the 
basis of this emergent colonial ideology.  The colonial literature presented a coherent 
understanding of empire where colonial liberties worked towards a growing and 
prosperous empire.   During the late seventeenth century, the English empire itself could 
offer the key justification for the political rights of the colonists.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
"WEE ADVENTURED OWR LIVES FOR IT": MIGRATORY AMBITIONS AND 
THE POLARIZATION OF COLONIAL POLITICS IN EARLY MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 In a spirited defense of his charter in 1653, Lord Baltimore proclaimed that no 
individual “that is well in his wits” would participate in colonization without the promise 
of political empowerment.
1
  With this observation, Baltimore captured the central 
dilemma of English politics in early America.  In the zero-sum world of political power, 
someone had to lose for another to gain, yet in Maryland, every colonist, not just 
Baltimore, was equally capable of demanding the political rights that attended the 
colonial experience.  This dynamic was on display throughout Maryland’s many political 
conflicts.  As proprietor of the colony, Baltimore pursued his own governing authority 
through the establishment of a ruling elite, but was challenged at every step by colonists 
who sought their own political empowerment through more democratic institutions.
2
  
Both sides used their colonial participation to justify their political ambitions.  At the 
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heart of these colonial disputes was the shared experience of colonization, its political 
possibilities, and the unwillingness of opponents to acknowledge that experience in each 
other.  The result was a polarized politics in America.  Local political disputes in England 
at this time often pitted aristocratic and democratic forces against each other, but the 
colonial experience widened the parameters of this discourse.  The political tensions in 
Maryland are best understood not through the static search by many for English rights 
abroad, but through the dynamic pursuit of increased power in America.
3
   
The political fragmentation caused by the colonial experience first became evident in the 
promotional literature for the colony.   Baltimore’s governing philosophy and his broad 
claims to authority were evident in his advertisements for the colony, but so were the 
contradictory promises of political participation for the average colonist.  He was never 
able to describe the colony as he actually intended to govern it.  These promises, forced 
upon leaders like Baltimore for the sake of effective promotion, reflected the democratic 
ambitions of English colonists before many even set foot in America.  The promotional 
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literature was an early indication of an acknowledged link between migration and 
political empowerment and first captured its conflicting possibilities.  
 As Maryland’s population increased during the second half of the century, the 
unresolved tension in the promotional literature eventually began to play a more 
prominent role in the politics of the colony.  Unlike colonial promotion, where 
paradoxical promises could more easily coexist, the promised benefits of colonization 
had to be denied to someone in the actual governance of the colony.  Both sides 
responded by highlighting their own contributions to colonization, justifying the 
prioritization of their political demands.   The colonists who opposed Baltimore would 
put forth the same vision of colonization that had been emerging in the promotional 
literature for the English colonies.  They emphasized the importance of the settlers and 
their labor to colonization.  Lord Baltimore, on the other hand, pointed to the importance 
of his virtuous leadership and his substantial financial investment in the colony.  Both the 
dissident colonists and Baltimore argued that their vital involvement in colonization was 
contingent on their political empowerment.  In this way, colonization nurtured a liberal 
political argument from all sides that openly pursued personal aggrandizement, but was 
defended on the basis of the larger good of colonization.  This early American liberalism, 
born out of the colonial experience, offered support for two opposing political agendas 
and enflamed political tensions in Maryland.   
 The basis of these disruptive liberal demands was the colonial motivation that 
Baltimore had already identified.  The problem for Baltimore was not the accuracy of his 
observation but in his insistence on limiting its applicability.  If he had extended his 
analysis of his own motivations to the wider population, he would have been in a better 
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position to understand the political turmoil in Maryland.   His struggles were not due to 
an incorrigible colonial population, as he so often claimed, but to the internal logic of 
early colonization.
4
  As long as migration proceeded in liberty, the task of populating a 
colony would always work against the authority of colonial leaders.  Only when 
Maryland’s migrating population shifted from English settlers to African slaves did the 
colony begin to establish some measure of political stability.  Baltimore’s preferred 
solution to Maryland’s struggles throughout the seventeenth century had always been to 
try and attract higher quality colonists, who he believed would be more amenable to his 
rightful claims of authority.  In reality, however, that sort of development would have 
only exacerbated tensions in the colony.  The real answer existed in the move to a 
subjugated migrating population who were unable to seek political advantage through the 
colonial experience.  Once migration to the colony became dominated by individuals 
preemptively excluded from the body politic, the colonial experience took on a muted 
role in colonial politics, setting the stage for the emergent political stability at the turn of 
the century.
5
  
*** 
 With the Maryland charter of 1632, the crown incorporated the prospective 
colony into the English polity, as it had done with towns and cities for centuries.  As with 
England’s urban communities, the colonies were often conceptualized during this period 
as commonwealths.  In his influential early modern political text, De Republica 
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Anglorum, Thomas Smith provided a definition of the term: a commonwealth was “a 
society or common doing of a multitude of free men collected together and united by 
common accord and covenauntes among themselves, for the conservation of themselves 
as well in peace as in warre.”6  With such a broad definition, which could easily include 
universities, companies, hospitals, parishes, boroughs, and cities, commonwealths and 
their politics were omnipresent in early modern England.
7
  The ideological tensions that 
dominated the commonwealth discourse in England would provide the linguistic and 
intellectual framework for early American politics. 
      The question of how and by whom a commonwealth should be governed was an open 
question in England, but the vocabulary was consistently Aristotelian.  Government had 
its basic categories (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) and their degenerate forms 
(tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy).  In explicating these categories for the English public, 
Thomas Smith noted the unlikelihood that a commonwealth would be exclusively one or 
the other.  Commonwealths were more often a mixture of all three and could easily 
transform, for better or worse, from one category into another.  Thomas More’s Utopia 
(1516) and Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis (1621) offer helpful bookends for the variety of 
political thought that existed on the issue of the governing commonwealths.  More 
famously envisioned an ordered commonwealth with diffuse political power.  In Utopia, 
the virtue of its citizens was the fundamental building block of the commonwealth and its 
achievement of communal justice.  Bacon rejected this template in favor of a monarchical 
state.  Governors and local leaders did not represent the people, nor were they motivated 
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by virtue, but instead were empowered and compensated by the state.  Individual 
subjects, including the “middle sort,” had an important societal role to play, but it was 
purely economic.  They had no business in the larger matters of state and empire.
8
  Both 
positions were vulnerable to particular and predictable criticisms.  Supporters of active 
citizenry and diffuse political power akin to Thomas More were vulnerable to the charge 
of anarchy and excessive “popularity.”  Supporters of aristocracy, on the other hand, were 
open to the critique of oligarchy.  In More’s Utopia, for instance, Hythloday offered just 
such an attack: “When I consider and weigh in my mind all these commonwealths . . . 
God help me, I can perceive nothing but a certain conspiracy of rich men, procuring their 
own commodities under the name and title of the common wealth.”9  In early modern 
England, this ideological division framed and encouraged political debate across 
England’s many commonwealths.  
      Two chartered communities, Exeter and Norwich, demonstrate the diversity in 
English political practice.  The common council was the key institution in the governance 
of cities and towns, so its makeup and authority was central to local political debate.  In 
the town of Exeter, all political offices, including the mayor, justices and sheriff, were 
reserved for members of the common council, or the “twenty four.”  If a member of the 
council died or departed the town, the then “twenty-three” had the sole power to select 
his replacement.  With such a powerful council, a ruling faction, either aristocratic or 
oligarchic depending on your perspective, could quickly emerge.  A few interrelated 
families could maintain control of the government within their own ranks with little 
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accountability to the freemen of the town.  In Norwich, the much larger common council 
of sixty members was elected by the freemen of the city, as were one of the two sheriffs 
and twenty-four aldermen.  The power of the council in Norwich was much more limited 
as were the opportunities for the consolidation of power by an elite faction.  In Exeter, for 
instance, an estimated twenty families dominated the office holding in the last half of the 
sixteenth century, whereas in Norwich in the seventeenth century, family and friendship 
connections among magistrates was much more attenuated.  The form of civic 
governance in Norwich did not on its own prevent the rise of ruling families (in the 
sixteenth century, Norwich has been categorized by one historian as oligarchic), but it 
certainly made the power of a ruling elite more tenuous and more difficult to sustain in 
the face of any widespread freeman dissatisfaction.
10
   
      In 1598, the town of Ludlow provided a specific example of this sort of ideological 
debate.  If Exeter and Norwich offered two differing models of civic governance, then in 
1598 there was an effort by some in Ludlow to move more towards the Exeter model.  In 
Phil Withington’s recent study of English towns in the early modern period, he provides a 
close analysis of the political friction in Ludlow as some of its citizens pursued a new 
charter. An elite group in the city, comprised of a group of friends and allies connected to 
two prominent citizens, Walter Rogers and William Langford, moved for more political 
power in the city through a new, revised charter.  They negotiated and purchased the new 
charter from the Court of Exchequer in 1598, which officially endowed the Common 
Council, the “twelve and twenty-five,” with expansive powers.  Similar to what existed in 
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Exeter, the Common Council in Ludlow would elect the civic officeholders for the town, 
control all of the town lands, and have full power to replace any council member who 
vacated his office.  This move to purchase a new charter did not go unnoticed by the 
townspeople, some of whom had already grown critical of the civil government and its 
control by the Rogers/Langford alliance.  The purchase of the new charter had nullified a 
quo warranto that a weaver in the city, John Bradford, had already brought against the 
government.  The two factions in Ludlow would debate the town’s past and argue about 
its future, one on the side of a democratic organization for the town and the other in 
pursuit of aristocratic powers.
11
   
      The tactics of both parties offer a blueprint of the language and strategies employed 
by political actors throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  One tactic, 
attempted by both sides, was to offer their own version of town history in an attempt to 
corral the power of custom to their particular agenda.  In the Rogers/Langford version, 
the town, from its earliest beginnings, had been governed by the “better, wiser, and 
worthier sort,” and the “twelve and twenty-five” had always had expansive authority.  
Bradford, on the other hand, offered a more democratic account, where a powerful 
council did exist but not in complete isolation from the rest of the town.  He specified that 
the burgesses had only granted certain powers to the council, pointing specifically to the 
fact that the burgesses had never abdicated their right to general elections, especially in 
regards to council membership.  Bradford wanted the new charter understood as an 
innovation in town government, orchestrated by a power-hungry faction.  He specifically 
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targeted their ability to select their own replacements as crucial to breaking their hold on 
power.
12
 
      A second tactic was the use of pejorative language to attack the civic credentials of 
their opponents.  These were not simply ad hominem attacks against each other, but 
attempted character assassinations with a particular political goal.  The audience for both 
sides was not their local government, but the Privy Council, House of Commons, and 
Court of Exchequer.  The goal was to discredit their enemies individually along with the 
governmental structure that would allow them power.  The “aristocrats” described their 
opponents as factional and self-interested.  Their resistance to authority was not 
explained by any misbehavior on the part of the elite but by their inveterate unwillingness 
to accept any authority, no matter how just.  They were “men impatient of good rule and 
government” and were willing “without any good cause of worthiness [to] seek to intrude 
themselves in rule and authority.” They were also more than willing to court the “meaner 
sort” in pursuit of their own goals.  The aristocrats labeled them “troublesome and 
mutinous,” “light and disordered,” and “ignorant and simple people.”  The fact that they 
wanted to elect their own leaders, in both the Common Council and in Parliament, would 
bring anarchy and confusion, not democracy.  The accusation, which was omnipresent in 
the debates of this period, was that the democrats were willing to dismiss the common 
good of the town for their own selfish interests.  John Bradford and his cohort were not 
exceptions to an otherwise virtuous citizenry but emblematic of the ability and behaviors 
of their social class.  The “twelve and twenty five” were the “better, wiser, and worthier 
sort” that stood in sharp contrast to men like John Bradford, whom they termed a 
                                                          
12
 Withington, Politics of Commonwealth, 66-75, quotation on 70. 
171 
 
“common barrattor.”13  The aristocratic position, fueled by the increasing popularity of 
Ciceronian humanism, which posited a close association between wealth and virtue, was 
more than an attack on an individual in one place and time, but promulgated an 
understanding of society that justified an aristocratic government in any commonwealth, 
not just Ludlow. 
      The “democrats” launched similar attacks on their rivals.  For Bradford, the 
unjustness of the new charter had required the aristocrats to work in secrecy and through 
deception.  The Queen never would have approved the charter had she known the true 
intentions of Rogers/Langford alliance, so he set out to expose the oligarchic nature of 
their ambitions.  As the “democrats” had been accused of pursuing self-interest over the 
common good, the “aristocrats” now stood charged with the same offense.  They were 
“greedily coveting to enrich themselves” and pursued “their own private wealth and the 
wealth of their friends before the common wealth.”  As with any corrupt oligarchy, the 
powerful exploited governmental power to attain personal aims.  The “aristocrats” 
surrounded themselves on the Common Council with sons and kinsmen, so that their 
ambitions would go unchecked.  The approbation of the Common Council, which in 
theory represented the best interest of the community at large, was only a cover for the 
selfish actions of a few.  By stacking the council with family and close associates, the 
“aristocrats” were able to pursue their own personal agenda with the ostensible support of 
the town.  They appropriated town lands at “small fines and rent,” misused the treasury, 
abused the law to persecute innocent burgesses, refused to abide by previous laws, and 
sought the abridgement of “privileges, liberties, and freedoms” lawfully granted to the 
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burgesses by the previous charter.  They pursued aristocratic government, not because it 
was the best civil organization for the town, but because it offered a social justification 
for their corrupt consolidation of power.
14
  These personal attacks again served a clear 
political purpose.  An attack on their motivations undercut the legitimacy of their 
preferred governmental organization.  A more democratic government would limit the 
power of the Rogers/Langford alliance presently and also limit the possibility of an 
oligarchic power emerging in the future.   As personal as these debates were, they 
manifested and were empowered by the ideological schism between aristocracy and 
democracy that was prominent in English political thought.   
      When Englishmen set out to colonize the New World, the tense politics of 
commonwealths, charters, and incorporation would follow them across the Atlantic.  
Royal charters, as in England, would often be targeted by disaffected colonists in an 
effort to alter political institutions in America.  And locally, when transplanted 
Englishmen pushed for political power within the colony, they could utilize the example 
of urban governance as justification for their pursuits of power. When the first elected 
assembly met in Maryland on February 25, 1638/9, it approved an inaugural piece of 
legislation, entitled “An Act for Establishing the house of Assembly and the Laws to be 
made therein,” and attempted to define its role in government.  They called for elections 
in Maryland by the freemen “in the same manner and to all the same intents and purposes 
as the Burgesses of any burrough in England.”15  In 1669, when Chancellor Phillip 
Calvert bristled over the assembly’s willingness to compare itself to Parliament, he put to 
different use a reference to urban politics, arguing that the assembly’s power was more 
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limited than its pretensions and was “but like the common Council of the City of 
London.”16   Whatever purpose was served by the allusions to corporations in England, 
the various references only underscored the importance of urban precedents to colonial 
governance.  There were certainly unique aspects to establishing a community on a new 
continent, but the colonists carried their English experiences with them to America.  
        The large majority of English colonists would have had some experience with urban 
life and government.  Recent studies have underscored the fact that migration was a 
fundamental feature of English life and that any transatlantic journey was often preceded 
by several smaller migrations, first to larger towns, and if not successful there, to a major 
city like London.  Only after those two smaller migrations had taken place and failed to 
meet expectations did the individual, generally speaking, then proceed to try his/her luck 
in the colonies.
17
  Studies in the social origins of migrants have also revealed that they 
did not come from the lowest orders of English society, but included many from the 
middle sort, even if tending towards its poorer members.
18
  In light of the increasing 
evidence of middling participation in local politics and office-holding in early modern 
England, the general migration patterns of American colonists have an important 
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implication.
19
 The typical English colonists came to the New World with some urban 
experience and had every opportunity to observe and even possibly participate in the 
politics of commonwealth.  The humanist terms used by colonial promoters, like 
commonwealth, virtue, and self-interest, and their many political applications would 
likely have been familiar to the average colonist through their use in urban politics.
20
  
Alison Games has underscored the commonness of migration in early modern England, 
noting that even transatlantic migration did “not necessarily herald a new worldview.”21  
The Maryland colonists brought with them English expectations of government and 
society.  This would have included a familiarity with the term commonwealth and an 
understanding that there was room for debate concerning its governance.  The challenges 
of erecting a commonwealth in the America would exacerbate the inherent tension 
between aristocracy and democracy that existed in English political thought, but the 
language and the typology of the political debate would stay the same.  Aristocrats and 
democrats would do battle in Maryland for political control just like they did in towns 
like Ludlow, but colonial circumstances would offer both sides new rationales for their 
claims to political power.  
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*** 
 Maryland’s beginnings were heavily influenced by the political struggles of its 
southern neighbor.  The Virginia Company had failed in its leadership responsibilities so 
conspicuously that the king had little choice but to revoke the charter of the struggling 
colony in 1624.   Charles placed the blame for the disaster in Virginia in large part on the 
democratic organization of the company.  The new form of a proprietary charter, instead 
of a company charter, offered a potential solution.  As opposed to the democratic 
organization of a company, the proprietor alone would offer the kind of virtuous and 
steady leadership that had been lacking in Virginia.  The English experience in Virginia 
had highlighted the dangers of too much democracy, and the crown reasoned that a more 
exclusive colonial government would work better.  To this end, the Maryland charter 
granted Baltimore vast powers in the colony, but did little to extinguish the democratic 
pressures that attended colonization, ensuring that the politics of commonwealth would 
be as problematic in Maryland as they had been in Virginia. 
 By 1620s, the colony of Virginia had come to be defined by Indian conflict, 
economic failure, and factional discord.   Sir Edwin Sandys and Sir Thomas Smith were 
the leaders of the two opposing factions that had battled for control of the faltering 
colony.  Sandys replaced Smith as Treasurer in 1618 and initiated various reforms that 
dramatically altered the governance of the colony.  The commercial and military 
characteristics, which Sandys had blamed for the early struggles of the colony, were 
replaced with a political organization that more closely resembled English institutions.  
The Virginia Company retained a strong prerogative element in the colony with a 
governor and council appointed by the company, but would now include the Virginia 
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House of Burgesses, which gave colonists at least a limited voice in government.  In his 
criticism of the earlier management of the colony, Sandys had pointed to Smith’s martial 
and autocratic rule of the colony.  The result was that few colonists had any real intention 
of remaining in the colony and pursued only short-term goals.  The colonists acted 
without “assurance of wives and servants . . . Without assurance of their estates . . . 
Without assurance of their Libties,” and accordingly, intended not “to settle . . . but to 
gett a little wealth by Tobacco . . . and to return to Englande.”  The reforms led by 
Sandys attempted to establish a government in Virginia more familiar to migrating 
colonists and more attractive to those considering a permanent relocation.  This would 
lead, Sandys reasoned, to the creation of a stable community in Virginia, one that would 
not only survive but eventually turn a profit.
22
   
      Any successes that may have resulted from the company reorganization took a major 
hit with the Indian attack of 1622.  The colony was nearly destroyed and its population 
was decimated.  With the colony in dire straits, the crown issued a writ of quo warranto 
challenging the charter, which was officially vacated in 1624.  The resulting debate over 
what form the government should take revealed both the predisposition of the king and 
the realities of colonization.  Sandys wanted the colony returned to the Virginia 
Company.  The king, however, had turned against company management of the colony 
and its “popular government.”  With the onset of the Thirty Years War in 1618, James 
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had faced significant pressure to abandon his pro-Spanish policies and to enter the war in 
support of the Protestant Dutch.  Despite James’s fervent belief that matters of war were 
the prerogative of the king and should be closed off to any outside interference or input, 
certain members of Parliament, with the support of Prince Charles and the duke of 
Buckingham, used the funds provided to the king by Parliament as leverage to exert 
influence over his foreign policy decisions.  Increasingly irritated by these invasions of 
his prerogative, James nourished the support of an anti-puritan faction, strongly in favor 
of a powerful prerogative and always aware of the inherent dangers of too much 
“popularity.”  A key member of the Parliamentary “popular” faction that was agitating 
for war with Spain was the Virginia Company’s Edwin Sandys.23  While James was king, 
Sandys’s prospects for regaining control of the colony were bleak. 
    James’s death in 1625, however, gave Sandys renewed hope as the crown had yet to 
reach a final resolution on the status of the Virginia Company.  Unlike James, Charles 
had friendly ties with many associates of Sandys, which Sandys was confident would 
work in his favor.  Charles appointed a committee of three in the Privy Council, including 
two supporters of Sandys, the Earl of Dorset and Lord Cavendish, to advise him on what 
to do with the old company.  Sandys hoped that the company would maintain control 
over the colony and be “incorporated as before into a Legall Companie,” even if he did 
allow for the possibility that a royal advisory council would be a beneficial addition to 
the colony’s political organization.  Sandys did not get the response that he had hoped 
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for.  Despite his optimism, Charles repeated his father’s concerns with popular 
government, which he felt the Virginia Company represented.  If historians still debate 
the role of political ideology in the revocation of the company charter, it had a clear role 
to play in the debate over Virginia’s future.  For Charles, the company was a “multitude 
of persons of severall dispositions, amongst whom the affaires of greatest moment were, 
and must be ruled by the greater number of Votes and Voyces.”   The company’s 
struggles had been evidence of how poorly this type of government functioned.  The 
“Great Charter,” after all, which had been instituted by the Company, had failed to revive 
the colony’s fortunes.  By 1624, the company was in bankruptcy, the colony had suffered 
dearly in the Indian attack, and those empowered by the reforms had seemingly exploited 
their political power for private gain at every turn.  For Charles, this outcome was a 
foregone conclusion because the company form of government empowered persons unfit 
to rule.  In objecting to company management, he explained that in the future “the 
Government of the Colonie of Virginia shall . . . not be committed to any Companie or 
Corporation, to whom it may be proper to trust matters of Trade and Commerce, but 
cannot bee fit or safe to communicate the ordering of State-affaires, be they never so 
meane consequence.”24  For Charles, the Virginia Company had failed because of a 
flawed political organization, a mistake that he wanted to avoid going forward. 
     Sandys had a counter-argument on behalf of the company, however.  Sandys’s years 
of experience leading the Virginia Company had left him well attuned to the realities of 
colonization.  He did not defend the Company's actions on ideological grounds, an 
argument he would have surely lost, but instead pointed to the necessary building blocks 
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of colonization: migration and investment.  No man would invest or adventure in any 
great undertaking, he argued, if “in the ordering of which they have no voice or 
interest.”25  In other words, if the king refused colonists a voice in government, then the 
colony itself would never come into being.  The economic goals of prospective investors 
and colonists had to have political protection for the colony to attact support.  As Wesley 
Craven has argued, the reforms led by Sandys were not motivated by an ideological 
desire to give the assembly in Virginia more power than Parliament had in England.  It 
was part of the much more mundane process of trying to make a colony economically 
viable.
26
  Any ideological preference for more autocratic control in the colonies had to be 
considered alongside the difficult realities, which Sandys understood well, of enticing 
people to migrate to America.  As long as financial ambitions were understood as crucial 
to attracting support for the colonies, then there would always be pressure to put a 
government in place that protected any economic gains.  For Sandys, only a voice in 
government would offer the necessary assurance to potential colonists and investors. 
      In many ways, the proprietary charter for Maryland offered a defiant riposte to 
Sandys's position on colonization.  Baltimore and his heirs were granted a power on par 
with the bishops of Durham.  Those powers, which had been common in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, had grown obsolete by the seventeenth century.  The original 
justification for such expansive powers had been the bishop’s location on the Northern 
Border and the tough task of keeping the peace in less settled areas.  The charter was 
specific, however, making Baltimore and his heirs the “true and absolute lords and 
proprietaries” of Maryland and giving them all of the “ample rights, jurisdictions, and 
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immunities . . . as any bishop of Durham.”27  Although antiquated in England, such a 
powerful grant of authority had renewed applicability in colonial circumstances that went 
beyond its analogous frontier geography.  In an endeavor that had trended popular in its 
earlier attempts in Virginia and also in Massachusetts, which too would hear criticism in 
the 1630s from many of its supporters for having become too democratic, these powers 
appeared perfectly appropriate.
28
  If colonization did in fact carry with it some democratic 
tendencies that had impaired early colonial efforts, then an especially powerful proprietor 
would constitute a sensible corrective to these popular pressures. 
         Despite the extensive prerogative powers granted to Baltimore, there were some 
limits to his authority.  Baltimore was granted expansive legal powers by the charter, but 
only if “the said Lawes be consonant to reason, and be not repugnant or contrary, but as 
neere as conveniently may be, agreeable to the Lawes, Statutes, Customes, and Rights of 
this our Kingdome of England.”29  A similar check existed for Baltimore’s legislative 
powers.  Baltimore had the “free, full, and absolute power . . . to ordaine, make, enact . . . 
any lawes whatsoever,” but he was to exercise this power with “the advise assent and 
approbation of the Free-men of the said Province, or the greater part of them, or of their 
delegates or deputies.”  Both these caveats to Baltimore’s “absolute” authority were 
vague, but they gave the charter a degree of ambiguity on issues of colonial governance 
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that could be exploited.  Baltimore would use the charter to defend his prerogative, but 
many colonists would also find it useful in challenging his authority.   
       The ambiguities were only exacerbated by the dual purposes of a colonial charter.   
The charter was an official claim of prerogative by the grantee, formally sanctioning his 
power by direct grant of the king, but it also had a promotional role to play.  It was often 
included in advertisements for the colonies, including A Relation to Maryland (1635), the 
most important promotional pamphlet for early Maryland.
30
  The published charter 
functioned both as a claim of power by the proprietor and as a public promise of the 
privileges due to the colonists.  Despite the expansive grant of authority to Baltimore, the 
logic of colonization articulated by Sandys manifested itself in the charter.  The 
democratic pressures of promotion had not been stifled.  To promote the colony, the 
charter included a promise to colonists of political power through an elected assembly, 
just as Sandys had argued it had to.  Instead of ignoring or denying the democratic 
pressures that attended colonization, the Maryland charter proposed to overcome them by 
making Baltimore an “absolute Lord” of the colony.  The proprietary charter only 
increased the gulf between the democratic and aristocratic positions that already existed 
in the English politics of commonwealth.  In his study of the English colonies in the 
seventeenth century, Robert Bliss has noted that the “proprietary nicely married the 
realities of colonization with the political prejudices of the day.”31  He is right that the 
proprietary charter was an effort to deal with two forces that worked against each other, 
but wrong to conclude that it formed a nice marriage.   The charter expanded the range of 
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political debate and increased the likelihood of political conflict in the colony.  The 
colonists would read the document for their liberties and the proprietor for his own 
power.  The language of the charter legitimated the political claims of both sides, while it 
simultaneously pushed them farther apart.  
*** 
            With the landing of the Ark and the Dove in 1634, Baltimore began his leadership 
of the colony and immediately began to put his governing philosophy into practice.  He 
constantly referred to the charter for a justification of his authority and hoped that a loyal 
group of elite colonists would emerge to help him govern the colony. This did not 
materialize as quickly as he had hoped, and leadership positions in the colony, including 
members of the assembly, had to be filled by poor and uneducated colonists.  Despite the 
humble origins of many of its members, the assembly was not shy in challenging 
Baltimore’s authority.  With the numerous challenges to his authority throughout the first 
decades of settlement, Baltimore was forced to articulate his political philosophy.  He 
attacked the democratic agenda of many in his colony in conventional humanist terms, 
questioning their virtue, challenging their intentions, and criticizing their methods.   The 
population in Maryland or in any colony for that matter, he argued, was particularly 
unsuited for political power.  Despite this clear governing philosophy, in 1666 a 
Maryland promotional document was published that reiterated the mixed message that 
had been present in the charter and suggested that, alongside Baltimore’s absolute 
authority, there existed a powerful and independent assembly in the colony.  As long as a 
colony relied heavily on English migration for its survival, Sandys’s original observation 
would continue to pose a challenge to any efforts to consolidate political power in the 
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colonies.  A proprietary colony and its promotion offer a clear example of this central 
colonial tension.  
      The early history of the colony was filled will governing frustrations for Baltimore.  
He had envisioned an early migration of the well-educated to help oversee the colony, 
and the first wave of migration met these expectations.  The migrant flow of the wealthy 
and educated quickly dried up, however, and Baltimore was left with important offices to 
fill with few qualified candidates.  Modest freeman began to fill important posts in the 
colony.  Men like Robert Philpott, William Coxe, and Thomas Allen, all commissioners 
of Kent County, would never have qualified for analogous positions in England.  Thomas 
Baldridge was a former servant who became sheriff in St. Mary’s in the late 1630s, and 
Daniel Clocker, a justice of the peace in St. Mary’s country, was illiterate. In these early 
years, freemanship alone established eligibility for participation in the political process.  
The members of the assembly during this period were most often of modest social 
origins, poorly educated, and sometimes landless.  The members of the Maryland 
assembly also proved difficult to control.  There was significant turnover in the assembly 
with a small percentage of members sitting in repeated assemblies, which gave Baltimore 
little to work with in terms of patronage and influence.  Instead of a loyal and aristocratic 
assembly, the Maryland assemblymen had few ties to the Proprietor and even fewer 
claims to elite status.
32
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      Not surprisingly, the assembly was a source of continual frustration for Baltimore in 
the early decades of settlement.  During this period, the Maryland assembly persistently 
drew parallels between their powers and the privileges of Parliament, and through the 
comparison, justified their assertions of power on a range of issues, including, for 
instance, the frequency and duration of meetings.  Baltimore and his subordinates just as 
frequently challenged this comparison.  The word, “Parliament,” they claimed, never 
actually appeared in the charter, and they consciously chose throughout their debates with 
the assembly to use less suggestive language, preferring the term “general assembly.”33   
The boldest assertion of assembly power in the colony occurred at the end of the 
interregnum.  A Maryland assembly, meeting in February and March of 1660, declared 
that they “judge themselves to be a lawfull Assembly without the dependence on any 
other power in the Province.”  The proprietor’s governor, Josiah Fendall, could sit in the 
now unicameral assembly, but had no additional powers outside of the right of a double 
vote.
34
  Lord Baltimore soon recovered power in the colony, but Fendall’s rebellion, even 
if in exaggerated form, gave clear evidence to the “democratic” spirit that seemed to exist 
in his colony and had caused Baltimore so many frustrations throughout his leadership of 
the colony.   
      The assembly made few official gains in this period, outside of the right of the lower 
house to meet separately.  Throughout this period, Baltimore consistently resisted any 
claim of legislative initiative by the assembly and asserted that all sessions were called 
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and could be revoked at the pleasure of the proprietor.
35
  All the discord, however, forced 
Baltimore to articulate his governing philosophy in the colony, the fullest statement of 
which came in his proclamation to the colony on August 26, 1649.  Baltimore began by 
citing the legal rights granted to him in the charter, recalling its specific language and 
claiming that he had the same powers in Maryland “as the Bishops of Durham at any 
tyme heretofore ever had.”  In response to criticism that he intended “slavery” for the 
colonists with such expansive powers, he highlighted the existence of the assembly in 
Maryland and its various powers, including the requirement of its consent to any taxes.  
He also laid claim, in humanist terms, to personal virtue.  His actions in the colony, he 
hoped, had provided “sufficient Testimony” of his “sincere affection to [the Maryland 
colonists], and [his] reall desire to promote all the fitting meanes that may be, their 
happiness and welfare.”  He did not pursue an economic agenda in Maryland and was 
always prepared to put the colonists’ “Welfare before [his] particular advantage.”   So 
confident in his virtuous disposition and his continuing efforts to do what was best for the 
colony, Baltimore found it difficult to understand why “any Intelligent person that hold 
any thing vnder vs there should be soe blind” as to attack the rights of the proprietor. 36  
In their opposition to Lord Baltimore, the colonists were attacking someone whose only 
pursuit was their own good.   
         With Baltimore’s view that any encroachment on his powers in Maryland was 
inherently self-destructive, he turned to the only explanation that made any sense.  The 
dissent in the colony was self-interested acts of a minority faction, who were willing to 
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put personal interest ahead of the larger good of the community.  The likely malefactors, 
he argued, had purchased large tracts of land directly from native groups, but had not 
received official title from the proprietor.  In an effort to gain legal title, they hoped to 
inspire “Jellousies” among the colonists and so “exasperate” the people as to make them 
turn to “Violent proceedings, one against the other.”  The hoped for result was “division 
and ffaction” among the people of Maryland, leaving the colony in such a confused state 
that the malicious actors could then seize governmental control and secure their land 
claims.  In sharp contrast to his own intentions in the colony, Lord Baltimore claimed that 
they put their private goals before the public good, seeking to make “themselues Lords 
and Masters of the Province” at the risk of “the ruine of all the People there.”   
Baltimore’s explanation then for the challenges to his authority in Maryland involved the 
duplicitous actions of a few, who misled “well affected” and  “Wellmeaneing” colonists 
through “subtile  Suggestions,” “subtile Machinations,” and “evvell intention.”  They 
gained popular support by concealing their private ambitions and “pretending” to act on 
the “Peoples behalf.”37    
       The most useful tool for these malevolent actors, Baltimore reasoned, was the 
promise of liberty.  If “slavery” did emerge in the colony, it would not be because of his 
expansive powers as proprietor, but from the popular pursuit of liberty:   
By Wofull experience it hath bene found in divers nations that noe 
one thing hath soe certainely betrayed the People into true Slavery 
indeed, as the Deceiptfull Suggestions of Subtile Matchiavilians 
pretending . . . an extraordinary care of the Peoples liberty . . . the 
direct Roade to bondage is vusually found in specious pretences of 
Preservation of Liberty.
38
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Claims to liberty in Maryland, either by individual colonists or the assembly itself, were 
simply a ploy by self-interested individuals to gain power in the colony.  This contention 
was only exacerbated by the low quality of the average colonist and assemblyman.  In the 
1650s, he offered a revealing description of colonial populations, condemning them as 
the “necessitous factious people as usually new Plantations consist of.”39  For Baltimore, 
who personified himself as the paragon of virtuous leadership, any dilution of his 
authority meant the empowerment of a population particularly unsuited for political 
leadership and would only bring faction, discord, and personal interest into government.  
Baltimore called for unity as “one Body Politque” and argued that “By Concord and 
Vnion a small Collony may growe into a great and renouned Nation, whereas . . . by 
discord and Dissention Great and glorious kingdomes and Common Wealths decline, and 
come to nothing.”40  A strong, large, and independent assembly had no role to play in 
Baltimore’s vision of Maryland.  It had no legal basis in his interpretation of the charter 
and no political justification in that it allowed self-interested agendas into the body 
politic.   
        Despite the many tribulations that Baltimore’s colony suffered throughout the 1640s 
and 1650s, there was renewed reason for optimism for both Baltimore and his colony 
with the return of monarchy in England.  Concerning his control of the colony, the 
restoration meant that Baltimore’s position on his own autocratic powers in Maryland 
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were now more in line with the government at home.  During the interregnum for 
instance, he had been forced to explain how a “monarchical” government in Maryland 
could or should exist within a republican nation.
41
  These recent developments increased 
Baltimore’s confidence in the security of his charter and of crown support for his 
management of the colony.  The colony itself was also showing signs of growth.   The 
population in the 1630s and 1640s never exceeded 500 people, but by 1660, there were 
approximately 2,500 inhabitants, and within the next fifteen years, that number would 
climb to 13,000.
42
  All of this offered a promising moment for Baltimore, who now had 
over twenty years experience in the colonizing endeavor, to deal with the most persistent 
political problem in Maryland: the power hungry assembly.  But in his promotion of the 
colony, Baltimore was unable to escape the ambiguities and tensions that had existed in 
the original charter.  Sandys’s objections to an autocratic colonial government were as 
relevant in the 1660s as they had been in the 1620s.  Baltimore wanted absolute power in 
the colony, but he also wanted it to grow.  Those goals would continue work at cross 
purposes, even as the colony was slowly becoming more established. 
      In 1666, a new Maryland promotional tract was published in England, written by a 
former indentured servant of the colony and in all likelihood financed by Baltimore.  The 
author, George Alsop, had migrated to Maryland in 1658 as an indentured servant to 
Captain Thomas Stockett, one of the earliest settlers of Baltimore County and an exiled 
royalist.  Stockett was a fixture in both county and provincial government, serving as a 
Burgess from 1661 to 1665, as elected spokesman of the lower house in 1663, and as 
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judge of the Baltimore County Court in 1664.  Alsop completed his indenture to Stockett 
in 1664, returned to England, and provided only positive reports about his years of 
servitude.  Baltimore was anxious to attract servants to the colony, so Alsop’s rosy 
depiction of his time in the colony would have been a welcome challenge to the region’s 
reputation for servant abuse and hard labor.   Much of Alsop’s background is unknown, 
but it appears that he was born into moderate or humble circumstances and had served a 
brief and probably unfinished apprenticeship in some handicraft.  He displayed some 
level of education: he knew the bible, some Latin, and probably French as well as 
displaying some familiarity with new Copernican science and contemporary literature.  
Alsop, like so many other American colonists, first migrated to London to try his luck as 
a craftsman before eventually relocating to Maryland several years later.  Baltimore was 
likely thrilled to have Alsop as the mouthpiece of his colony and the added credibility 
that Alsop’s authorship brought to his claims of order and prosperity in Maryland.43 
       Alsop wasted little time putting himself squarely on the side of monarchical 
government.  He had, he wrote, “lived with sorrow to see the Anointed of the Lord tore 
from his Throne by the hands of Paricides, and in contempt haled, in the view of God, 
Angels and Men, upon a publick Theatre, and there murthered.”44  For Alsop, the 
household was still the appropriate metaphor, as his use of the word parricide indicates as 
well as his frequent analogies to family, by which to understand political authority.  He 
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rejected the contractual, political language that was emerging among radical sects in the 
1650s and posited instead a naturalized hierarchy of “Degrees and Diversities” and the 
“acknowledging of a Superiority from Inferiors to Superiors.”45  There was “was no truer 
Emblem of Confusion either in Monarchy or Domestick Governments, then when . . . the 
Subject . . . strives for the upper hand of his Prince,” which is exactly what had happened 
in England.  “Base Mechanicks” had overthrown the “King and Crown” and now 
“Brewers and Coblers, that have scarce an eye, / Walk hand in hand in thy Supremacy.”  
Alsop underscored the ludicrousness of the world turned upside down: “To see a 
Drayman that knows nought but Yeast, / Set in a throne like Babylons red Beast.”  Day in 
England had turned to “dismal Night” and its leaders had been transformed into “lustful 
sodomites” who sought only “to satisfie each dark unsatiate will.”46  England’s 
deterioration, Alsop claimed, was the reason that he finally decided to leave.  Refusing to 
live in the shadow of “such base actions,” he traveled to Maryland, hoping to find the 
ordered society that had been lost in England. 
         Alsop claimed to have found what he was looking for in Maryland.  “MARY-
LAND,” he claimed, “not from the remoteness of her situation, but from the regularity of 
her well ordered Government, may . . . be called Singular.”  In Maryland, there was a 
“Superiority with a meek and yet commanding power sitting at the Helme, steering the 
actions of State quietly” that was so unique for the age that observers had declared the 
colony the “Miracle of this Age.”  Alsop admitted Maryland’s religious diversity (“the 
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several Opinions and Sects that Lodge within this Government”), but asserted that, unlike 
in England, they caused no trouble and obeyed the “legal commands of Authority” with 
“a reverend quietness.”  Quietness was how Alsop repeatedly described Maryland’s 
political scene: the colony existed in “reserved silence” and “enjoys as  much quietness 
from the disturbances of Rebellious Opinions, as most States or Kingdoms do in the 
world”; the government, he described, as “quiet and sober”; and the people in the colony, 
he reported, “live[] quietly.”  The result, not surprisingly, was a society living in the 
“blessed Harmony of quietness.”  Any noise in the colony in the form of dissent was 
“mutinous contempts,” “corroding humors,” or “unwarranted and tumultuous opinions.”  
As Baltimore had earlier asserted in his declaration to the assembly, Alsop worried about 
how the notions of liberty could act as a cover for these ulterior motives.  These 
malcontents, he wrote, “would predominate upon the least smile of Liberty.”47  Fendall’s 
rebellion was the worst example of how the chimerical pursuit of liberty could destroy a 
community by empowering the unqualified.  The rebellion was led by “weak-witted men, 
which thought to have traced the steps of Oliver in Rebellion.”  And just like the “base 
mechanics” and ludicrous “drayman,” they pursued only personal gain and illegitimate 
power.  The malcontents, he wrote, “began to be might stiff and hidebound in their 
proceedings, clothing themselves with the flashy pretences of future and imaginary 
honor.”  Had the rebellion not been quickly put down, they would “have done so [much] 
mischief . . . that nothing but utter ruine could have ransomed their headlong follies.”48  
Baltimore could not have agreed more.  An attack on Baltimore’s authority, which the 
assembly’s consistent pursuit of more power represented, meant the infusion of the 
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unqualified into government, who revealed their inadequacy for such authority by 
pursuing hidden agendas and private interests. 
      Alsop’s support for Baltimore’s autocratic control of the Maryland society was, as 
with the charter, only half of the colonial equation.  Alsop’s text carried with it the 
conflicting agenda of colonial promotion.  Baltimore’s power had to be asserted, but 
individuals also had to be offered encouragement to migrate.  This side of the equation 
surfaced in Alsop’s depiction of the assembly, which sounds a distinctly different tone 
than the majority of his tract and blatantly contradicts Baltimore’s governing philosophy 
in Maryland.  Alsop’s tract extends and elaborates on the central tension that had existed 
in the charter and had plagued Baltimore’s leadership in Maryland. 
      When Alsop discussed the assembly in Maryland, he veered away from his focus on 
Baltimore’s singular leadership of the colony and embraced a more popular conception of 
a commonwealth.  Alsop reported that an assembly was called in the colony “once every 
year” with “every respective County” choosing a number of men, and to them is deliver’d 
up the Grievances of the Country.”  In reality, the assembly in Maryland did not meet 
every year, and if it did, Baltimore would have insisted that it did so only at his pleasure.  
The assemblymen, Alsop continued, “maturely debate the matters, and according to their 
Consciences make Laws for the general good of the people.”49  This again was 
misleading.  The colonists did not “make” the laws in the Maryland; Baltimore had 
consistently challenged any claim by the assembly to the right of legislative initiation.  
The only power willingly granted to the assembly was the power to assent to his laws and 
regulations.   
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     After detailing the political powers of the assembly, Alsop offered a social description 
of the assemblymen: “These men that determine on these matters for the Republique, are 
called Burgesses . . . being for the most part good ordinary Householders of the several 
Counties, which do more by a plain and honest Conscience, then by artificial Syllogisms 
drest up in gilded Orations.”50  This depiction of the colonists in Maryland was a far cry 
from Baltimore’s description of his colonists as a “factious people.”  Alsop, however, 
continued this praise of the Maryland colonist later in the tract, writing that they were 
“generally conveniently confident, reservedly subtle, quick in apprehending, but slow in 
resolving.”51  Praising the “natural” abilities of the common sort as opposed to the 
learned attributes of the elite was one strategy used by commonwealth men and 
democratically inclined urban citizens to justify the political participation of the wider 
population.  Compare Alsop’s passage, for instance, to the humanist scholar, Richard 
Stanihurst, and his description of the citizens of Waterford as “very heedy in all their 
public affairs, slow in determining of matters of weight, loving to look ere they leap.”52  
The use of the word “Republique” is even more suggestive.  In the mid-seventeenth 
century, the word could refer to the community generally or to the larger common good, 
but it also possessed a contemporary meaning that specifically indicated a “state in which 
power rests with the people or their representatives.”53   Within Alsop’s encomiums to 
Baltimore’s authority was a passage that clearly intimated the people’s power in the 
colony.  Alsop’s text reveals in glaring fashion the schizophrenic nature of English 
colonization.  Through colonization, political leaders gained an additional rationale for 
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the politics of exclusion because so many believed that the colonies attracted the self-
interested and the uneducated.  But for those colonies to survive, they needed to promise 
an inclusive political environment to attract the very people that they planned to exclude.  
A Character of the Province of Maryland is confused and contradictory because at its 
foundation, so was the colonial endeavor.  Despite Baltimore’s clear political preference 
for a weak and compliant assembly, he was unable to avoid employing a democratic 
language to advertize his colony in 1666 and was forced to promote an ideology that 
worked against his pretensions of power in the colony. 
*** 
 In the Maryland’s charter and its promotion, colonization had pushed political 
thought in conflicting directions.  For some, the New World demanded more autocratic 
political institutions; for others, just the opposite.  This ideological division among the 
colonists would fully emerge in the colony's politics during the Restoration period.  As 
acting governor of the colony from 1661 to 1676, Charles Calvert, son of Lord Baltimore, 
was even more determined than his predecessors to establish aristocratic rule in the 
colony.  Dissenting colonists would respond to these efforts with a full articulation of 
their own political aims in a dissident document, entitled the “Complaint from Heaven,” 
which surfaced in late 1676.  On the surface, this conflict appeared to be an extension of 
the same sorts of political debates that were occurring in Ludlow and England's many 
other urban corporations.  But there was a new colonial element emerging in Maryland’s 
political discourse.  Both Baltimore and his colonists outlined their own contributions to 
colonization and implicitly referenced Baltimore’s original observation about political 
power as a necessary motivation for colonial participation. They threatened on that basis, 
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if their demands were not met, to withdraw their support.  Both sides justified their 
political ambitions through a liberal argument made possible by this particular 
understanding of how colonization worked.  The same element that had made the colonial 
promotion so contradictory exacerbated the practice of English politics in America.  The 
nature of the colonial experience among the English population would have to change 
before a political stability would be possible in Maryland. 
 Charles Calvert’s tenure as governor was marked by his desires to overcome the 
political problems of Maryland’s past through the construction of a functioning 
aristocracy.
 54
  He immediately began the process of getting more qualified people in 
government for longer periods of time.
55
  With its smaller numbers, this goal would be 
easier to accomplish with the Privy Council than the assembly.  In 1666, he considered 
the superficial solution of requiring the councilors to wear “habbits medales or 
otherwise” so that “some visible distinction or distinctions might be drawn.”56   That this 
initiative even had to be considered underscored Calvert’s concerns about the social 
credentials of Maryland’s leaders.  To ensure their loyalty and help bolster the social 
status of his favored colonists, Baltimore became more assertive with his powers of 
patronage during this period.  He also began to arrange marriages to create political 
alliances, including the marriage of his daughter Anne Calvert to councilman Baker 
Brooke.  After 1676, membership on the council in nearly all cases necessitated some 
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relation to the Calverts, either by blood or marriage.  The council also trended heavily 
Catholic.  The development of a wealthy and loyal council would be a long process, and 
although Calvert did not have one in place by 1676 that he could easily control, his 
efforts to stack the council with close associates began in earnest in the 1660s.
57
 
      Calvert’s efforts to exercise more control over the assembly were even more 
pronounced.  The liberal franchise in Maryland, which David Jordan has argued created a 
“more fluid political arena than prevailed elsewhere in the English-speaking world,” was 
one target.
58
  In 1670, Calvert moved unilaterally to restrict the suffrage to property 
owners with “visible seated Plantations” of at least fifty acres.  Massachusetts and 
Virginia had made similar moves, but in both cases, their respective assemblies had 
pushed the new laws.  Calvert also looked to shrink the size of the assembly.  In 1676, he 
summoned only two of the elected fours delegates from each county.
59
  Both actions 
demonstrated Calvert’s twin goals of restricting the voice of the common colonists as 
well as ensuring a higher quality representative.  With the colony’s population growth, 
the transition to a wealthier and more elite body was already occurring.  In 1658, for 
instance, twelve of the sixteen assembly members possessed more than 400 acres, none 
possessed less than 200 acres, and only one individual’s literacy was in question.60  With 
his new electoral policies, Calvert hoped to accelerate this process. 
       As with his efforts with the Privy Council, Calvert’s efforts to exercise more control 
over the assembly would take time, and he had made few concrete gains by the 1670s.  
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The assembly of 1671 was a good example of the limits of Baltimore’s influence in 
government.  That assembly proved so satisfactory to the proprietor that he continued the 
same body, instead of calling for new elections, for four consecutive sessions over the 
next five years, the longest such period in Maryland’s history.61  During that year, 
however, the colonists declined to elect many of Baltimore’s favorites, a list that included 
two prominent proprietary proponents, Thomas Notley and John Morecroft; Nathaniel 
Utie of Baltimore County, who would quickly be appointed to the council after failing to 
be elected a burgess; and William Stevens of Somerset and Robert Dunn of Kent, both 
dependable proprietary supporters.  Several of the assembly’s new members that year had 
never received a proprietary commission.  The makeup of the assembly suggests that 
Maryland’s colonists continued to rebuke incumbents in favor of sending new men to the 
assembly and seemed disinclined to support men currently enjoying the governor’s favor.  
The political quiescence in the early 1670s was due to the lack of the serious economic 
problems that had dominated the tense assembly meetings of 1666 and 1669, not to any 
early returns on Calvert’s efforts to increase his control of government.62  When Calvert, 
after the death of his father, called for new elections in 1676, the same year that the 
“Complaint” would surface, he was in a precarious political position.  He had taken 
conspicuous steps to try and increase his influence in government by filling the council 
and the assembly with family members and favorites, but that process had not yet been 
completed. 
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The year of 1676 was particularly tumultuous for the entire Chesapeake region.  To the 
south, Bacon’s Rebellion exploded onto the scene in Virginia, leading to wars with the 
local Indians and the overthrow of its government.  Maryland’s government was 
vulnerable to the same sort of uprising and its leaders openly worried about the contagion 
of revolt spreading to Maryland.  Thomas Notley, the acting governor during this period 
due to Charles Calvert’s departure to handle his father’s estate, wrote that the colony only 
lacked a “monstrous head to their monstrous body.”63  Despite this, there was only one 
attempt at rebellion that occurred late in August when an armed group, led by colonists 
William Davyes and John Pate, met in Calvert County to protest against proprietary 
leadership.  The group refused to lay down their arms, but offered little real resistance.  
The two leaders were tracked down and hanged in their own county, sending a powerful 
message to any future dissidence.  Their chief complaint was the high taxes of that year, 
297 pounds of tobacco per poll, the highest ever levied in the colony.
64
   
 In late 1676, Notley issued a remonstrance to the colony following the uprising 
and laid out a defense of proprietary government in the colony.  The speech hit many of 
the same themes a Baltimore's proclamation had in 1649.  Davyes, Pate, and their 
supporters were “desperate and ill Affected persons” and constituted a “malignant 
Spiritt,” who threatened the larger society through their actions.  They were “rotten 
members” of the body politic and “doe Endanger the whole.”  They concealed their 
malevolent intentions and only pretended to pursue the common good.  If the rebellion 
had not been put down in Maryland, the colony would have met the same fate as its 
southern neighbor, which had been “torne in peeces under the maske of publique 
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Reformacon & ease from taxes” and suffered the “Calamityes of Intestine Warre.”  Lord 
Baltimore’s leadership, on the other hand, had only the larger interest of the community 
in mind.  He pursued the “Reall & permanent” prosperity of Maryland society: “That this 
happy day may once arive hath bn the long & unwaryed Endeavor of my Lords deceased 
ffather And . . . will be the constant Employ of my Lord that now is.”  Lord Baltimore 
offered a “Paternall care” that extended throughout society, even to the “meanest of the 
People.”  It was in the people’s best interest for Baltimore to retain his authority in the 
colony.  They needed to regain the “quiett demeanour” that Alsop had described because 
the “peace & plenty of every individuall in the Province,” Notley maintained, “truly 
consists in the due preservacon of his Lordshipps rights.”65  
       Importantly though, the proclamation did not rest with a declaration of Baltimore’s 
virtuous leadership and a reminder of his absolute authority in the colony.  Notley did 
point to the “many Condescentions of his Lordshipp” in his “Absolute Comand” of the 
colony and admitted that the Council was disappointed by the “ingratitude of the People.”  
But Notley also repeatedly pointed to assembly approval as evidence of the legitimacy of 
the contested laws.  Notley addressed the three central grievances of the disaffected 
population: high taxes, the new suffrage restrictions, and the poll tax that the dissidents’ 
claimed unjustly taxed the poor and the rich at equal rates.  Concerning the initiatives that 
had raised the tax rate, these were, he asserted, “begun by consent of an Assembly.”  And 
regarding the equality of tax rates, Notley asked: “why must my Lord or his Governor & 
Councell beare the blame of this which my Lord himselfe cannot helpe without the 
consent of an Assembly?”  If the “Wisdom of future Assembly shall thinke fitt to alter” 
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the rate, then Notley was sure that the proprietor would “consent to itt.”66  What was so 
notable about Notley’s proclamation was how the presence of an independent assembly 
had become, even for a defender of the proprietor, the most powerful indicator of a just 
government in Maryland.  Notley assumed the presence of such an assembly and 
assigned full culpability for any nefarious law on the people and their representatives.  
Baltimore’s conspicuous and concerted efforts, however, to exert more control over the 
assembly undercut the effectiveness of Notley’s proclamation and left the proprietary 
position open to charges of deception and hypocrisy, which the “Complaint” would 
attempt to exploit at every turn.  
        The “Complaint” surfaced in Maryland in late 1676 as both a defense of the 
rebellion and a response to Notley’s proclamation.  The vitriolic nature of the tract has 
captured the attention of most historians.  For one historian, the author[s] “bared their 
suppressed emotions” and composed a “frenetic letter” that gave vent to “their collective 
spleen.”67  It has alternately been described as an “anti-proprietary screed,” a “colorful 
indictment,” a “bitter document,” and as “half literate and charged with emotion.”68  
Beyond its emotive language, historians of early Maryland have chosen to focus on the 
document either as a statement of the social and economic grievances in the colony or as 
an example of early modern anti-Catholic invective.
69
  Both of these themes, however, 
                                                          
66
 Ibid., XV, 137-141. 
67
 Krugler, English and Catholic, 237-238 
68
 Sutto, “Built upon Smoke,” 393; Jordan, Foundations, 95; Carr and Jordan, Maryland’s Revolution of 
Government, 1689-1692 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 31: and Land, Colonial Maryland, 79. 
69
 John Krugler and Antoinette Sutto give high importance to the language of anti-Catholicism and how it 
offered an organizational framework for their attacks on Baltimore and an explanation for his autocratic 
policies.   Carr and Jordan focus instead on the myriad political complaints of the colonists, including the 
suffrage restrictions, and give little attention to the anti-Catholic rhetoric.  Stephen Saunders Webb 
mentions both but clearly views the economic grievances as primary.  The dissidents, as in Virginia, 
attacked misgovernment, but in Maryland, he argued, they “added the indelible dye of religious hatred” 
 
201 
 
were subsumed by the larger attack on Baltimore’s attempt to construct a ruling 
aristocracy.  Baltimore’s Catholicism and the economic struggles of the colony supported 
and substantiated the charge of self-interested and exclusive leadership.  When the 
authors of the “Complaint” asked the king to revoke Baltimore’ charter, they also 
included a request that the “free men” in the colony be able to “choose their delegates . . . 
in the Assemblys; to enact for the comon Generall good for the people and Country.”70  
Embedded in their request for imperial intervention was an assertion of the societal 
benefits of a more democratic government.  The “Complaint” ultimately ended up in 
Whitehall with the Lords of Trade and was there considered important enough to keep.
71
  
The “Complaint” was not simply an emotional outburst from the disaffected in Maryland, 
but a rational argument for the authorities in London to consider a different political 
organization for the colony, a plea that evidently did not fall on deaf ears. 
 The “Complaint” targeted almost all of Baltimore’s efforts to gain more 
governing control.  With the council, the “Complaint” criticized Baltimore’s policy of 
promoting relatives, listing some of its current members for effect: “Young child charles 
Baltemore . . . son in law Deputy Governor . . . Philip Calvert . . . William Calvert 
nephew, secretary . . . Brooks surveyor generall, kindsman.”72  Baltimore’s recent efforts 
in the assembly also faced scrutiny.  In decreasing the makeup of the assembly from four 
representatives per county to two, Baltimore gained the power to select the men that best 
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served “his purpose,” which for the authors of the “Complaint” resulted in the election of 
“either papists, owne creatures and familiars or ignoramuses.”  His use of patronage to 
influence assemblymen was particularly egregious, using “all Arts and devises . . . to 
perswade and create fit turne-coats.”  Too many men had proved susceptible to these 
tactics and “betray[ed] [their] trust to [their] Country, for a Collonell’s or Captains name 
and office, or peculiar favour, to the oppression and ruyn of many of the King’s poore 
subjects.”  Thomas Notley was a prime example.  He had earned his position by his past 
support of proprietary policies as speaker of the assembly.   In a previous meeting, he had 
led assembly support for a “2 shilling custom per hogshead to my Lords Heyre . . . and 
made it heriditary.”73  His reward was the deputy governorship.  The complaint also 
accused Baltimore of intimidation, which had been effective as well.  If any 
assemblyman “stands out or up for the comon good,” they reported, then from the upper 
house “perswadinge spirits goe forth” and through “frowns and treathnings scares them to 
be quieth.”   
 Through the twin forces of patronage and coercion, Baltimore had gained control 
over the council and the assembly, so that the two bodies were not willing to do anything 
other than submit to Baltimore’s wishes.  In the “Complaint,” the target was rarely 
Baltimore alone, but more often the “Lord and his Champions in their Prince-ship,” the 
Lord Proprietary and his “cloake of mutiniers and disaffected persons,” or the 
“proprietary with his familiars.”74  The attack was not simply on a autocratic individual, 
but on the small group of people, who now occupied both the council and the assembly 
and were enabling Baltimore’s governing agenda.   The “Complaint” paid particular 
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attention to the role of the assembly in giving sanction to Baltimore’s nefarious plots.  
When a plan was “hatched” in the “popish chamber,” they claimed, the proprietor 
immediately called an assembly to provide a “Country cloack.”  When he wanted the 
power to raise a force for an ill-fated military expedition, he “overswaded an Assembly” 
into compliance.  When he unjustly attacked a neighboring Dutch community, the 
“tyranny” was retroactively approved and “chalked over with an Assembly.”  Concerning 
the Indian controversies connected to Bacon’s Rebellion, Baltimore again sought “to 
cloake his policy with an Assembly” and convinced them to take measures to conceal his 
transgressions.  Baltimore had succeeded in maintaining a political structure that 
ostensibly gave the colonists a voice in government, when in reality the “Assent of the 
freemen within the Province . . .  [was] utterly denyed.”75  Even with the presence of an 
assembly, which Notley and Baltimore had both emphasized in their earlier 
proclamations, the government of the colony was run by Baltimore and a small, exclusive 
group of his subordinates.   
 Where Baltimore argued for the presence of a beneficent aristocracy, however, 
the dissidents saw only oligarchy.  They accused Baltimore of selecting a small group of 
individuals to help run the government, not for the common good of the colony, but so 
that his selfish interests would go unchecked.  His magnanimous intentions for the 
colony, they asserted, were as fraudulent as its political institutions.  His only concern 
was how best to “convert the comon good to his privat ends.”76  They claimed that tax 
rates were high because Baltimore had used the local Indian conflicts as a pretense for 
raising an army whose only purpose was to enrich the proprietor.  He had “raysed the 
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People in Armes for his privat gain and Interest, onely to oppress the king’s subjects with 
great taxes in his and own creatures pocket.”  Maryland’s laws, they argued, were 
inconsistently administered because Baltimore’s “selfe interest” was “irrevocable and 
perpetuall.”  When noting the lack of towns, they again accused Baltimore and his 
supporters of self-interest, having “made Merchandize of the land and now it is passed all 
most remedy.”77  The dissidents offered an inverse interpretation of Baltimore’s actions 
in the colony.  It was private interests, not a concern for the common good, which 
explained his governing philosophy in the colony.   
 On the surface, the contours of this debate seem to be simply an extension of 
English politics in America. Like the democrats in Ludlow, the authors of the 
“Complaint” decried an emerging oligarchic power in their community.  Baltimore 
pursued an agenda of political exclusion, they asserted, not for the sake of the common 
good, but for the easier fulfillment of his self-interested pursuits.  Baltimore, like the 
aristocrats in Ludlow, argued conversely that it was too democratic a government that 
would bring self-interest into the political realm through the participation of the 
unqualified.  But during these debates in Maryland a new type of political argument was 
beginning to emerge.  The same premise that had made Alsop’s promotional tract so 
contradictory allowed both sides in Maryland to infuse these conventional English 
debates with an early American liberalism.  These liberal political demands, which would 
polarize the political debate in Maryland, began with two very different understandings 
of Maryland’s early history.  
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        In Baltimore’s depiction of the inaugural migration in Lord Baltemores Case, he 
reported that, at great cost, he had “sent two of his own brothers with about 200 people to 
begin and seat a Plantation there.”  He claimed expenditures for the colony of over 
20,000 pounds “out of his own purse” and pointed to his familial sacrifices, noting the 
deaths of both “his said two brothers,” who had lost their lives in “prosecution thereof.”  
Outside of himself and his family members, few people had played an important role in 
the colony’s beginnings.78  The two hundred non-Calvert colonists, for instance, were 
static entities who did not act, but instead were acted upon.  They arrived in the colony 
because Baltimore had sent them there.  He had put the plan in motion, he had provided 
the necessary finances, and he had taken all the risks.   
 The dissidents in the “Complaint” offered a strikingly different account of 
Maryland’s early history.  They posited a far different role to the common settler:  
wee ourselves thereuppon have transported our selves and our 
estates into this Country, purchased the land from the Indians with 
loss of Estate and many hundred mens lives (yea thousands) and 
must defend ourselves continually without the Lord Baltemore’s 
ability, whereby our land and possessions are become owr Owne.
79
  
 
It was not Baltimore’s sacrifices that had built the colony, but the labor and courage of 
the common settlers.  They, not Baltimore, had risked their “estates” and had gotten their 
“poore living with hard labour out of the ground in a terrible Wildernis.”80  The dissidents 
in Maryland anticipated Locke’s theorization of property as the creation of human labor, 
in this case their labor.  They did so because it erased Baltimore from the colonial 
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narrative.
81
  Throughout the “Complaint,” the dissident position was defiantly exclusive: 
“wee have made it a country for the glory and enlargement of the Dominion and 
Emperial Crowne of England.”82  There was no middle ground in these two depictions of 
early Maryland.  For the dissidents, the labor of the colonist was everything.  For 
Baltimore, it was nothing.   
 For Baltimore, he had played a vital role in the creation of Maryland, with all the 
risks and sacrifices that that entailed, and the promise of vast governmental authority had 
been crucial to eliciting his participation.  If colonial governments trended towards 
democracy, as they had in the past, and allowed “factious people . . . [to] have power to 
make Lawes to dispose of him, and all his estate there,” then leading figures like himself 
would disengage from such endeavors.  “Such a chargeable and hazardous things as 
Plantations are,” he continued, “will not be undertaken by any, whether it be a Company 
or a single man, without as great incouragements of priviledges as are in the Lo. 
Baltemore’s Patent of Maryland.”  He admitted that it “may not be convenient for any 
one man” in England to have such power, but it was “necessary for any . . . that 
undertakes a plantation, in so remote and wild a place as Mariland.”83  Baltimore was 
attempting to carve out an exceptional status for Maryland on the basis of the broader 
circumstances of colonization.  For Baltimore, his colony would be comprised of English 
settlers, but that did not make it a miniature England.  What worked at home did not 
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necessarily make sense abroad.  If England wanted prosperous colonies, it would have to 
attract the support of men like Baltimore, and to do so, it would have to give them a 
political authority that exceeded English norms.  If not, and English norms were strictly 
applied in Maryland and throughout the other colonies, they would begin a period of 
inevitable decline and deterioration.   
 The dissidents in Maryland countered with their own attempt to use their colonial 
contributions as justification for their political demands.  They had already identified the 
importance of their role in Maryland’s early history, but the benefits of their labor, they 
claimed, extended far beyond the Chesapeake.  They noted the “considerable custome” 
that the king received “out off the fruit of owr labours and industry.”  They turned to the 
merchants of London next, “whom owr labour and industry affords in exchance for the 
merchandize many a thousands of thousands of returnes, and employment for a great 
numbre of ships and men, which will increas by God’s permission as wee increas and 
decreas iff wee decreas.” 84  Having put themselves at the center of the colonial narrative, 
it stood to reason that they were also responsible for its many benefits.  Their 
contributions deserved to be supported, and as with Baltimore, the necessary 
encouragement needed to take the form of increased political power.  The dissidents 
acknowledged that they pursued a level of political participation that, by English 
standards, exceeded their social station.  In the “Complaint,” they admitted their low 
social origins, confessing that “many of [them] came [to Maryland] servants to others,” 
but ignored the attendant political limitations on the basis of their colonial sacrifices: “but 
we [have] adventured owr lives for it.”  English norms did not contain political 
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aspirations for the common colonists any more than they had for Baltimore.  The 
dissidents threatened that without this sort of political empowerment the common 
colonist would abandon the colony, claiming that many intended “to leave the Country” 
if they could get the “reall [value] for [their] estates.”  Baltimore’s aristocratic governing 
approach would “depopulate the Country in stead of increasinge [it]” and would “not 
houlde longe, nor maintain the Country, [nor be] profitable to [the king’s] reelm of 
England.”   For both Baltimore and the dissidents, their contributions had created the 
colony and their absence could just as easily destroy it.   
 The attempts to capitalize politically on the colonial experience is ultimately what 
distinguished colonial politics from its English counterpart.  They infused the 
predominantly humanist political culture of the early modern world with a potent strand 
of liberal political thought.
85
  At important moments in the political debate, both sides 
conceptualized the ideal form of government in Maryland as the one that best protected 
their own interests.  The foundation of this claim was Baltimore’s original observation 
about why people were willing to migrate to America, which provided the crucial link 
between personal, even selfish, ambitions and the larger good of colonization.  That 
colonial characteristic opened up new possibilities for justifying political participation 
that were particularly useful at the extremes of English politics.  When Baltimore 
consciously pursued an individual governing authority in Maryland that had all but 
disappeared in England, he utilized a liberal argument.  When the dissidents admitted that 
their social standing worked against their political aspirations, they too resorted to a 
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liberal logic.  The result in the promotional literature was a set of contradictory promises 
emanating in all directions.  In colonial politics, the consequence was a perpetual 
instability.  There was an ever-present possibility of extremism in Maryland that could 
work in both directions, but whose intellectual justification always took the same liberal 
form.   
 This colonial liberalism did not overtake the classical language and political 
typology that still dominated early modern politics.  It was an insurgent political 
philosophy that was empowered by colonial circumstances and applied only selectively.  
Appeals to virtue and the common good were omnipresent in Maryland’s political 
discourse.  Baltimore aspired throughout his proprietorship to meet the classical 
definition of virtue and the colonists just as frequently attacked him on the basis that he 
had not met those expectations.  In this intellectual context, their liberal political demands 
were easily misunderstood as the worst sort of individual corruption, which was why the 
one-sided, historical accounts of colonization were so important.  Baltimore and his 
political opponents were very specific about their own contributions because they needed 
to limit the applicability of their own logic.  The larger job of government was still to 
pursue the common good, and political leaders still needed to be virtuous; but in this one 
exceptional case, the protection of their private agenda was perfectly aligned with the 
larger goals of the community. For their opponents, however, they marshaled the highest 
forms of invective to disparage their political ambitions.  What worked towards the 
common good for one was naked self-interest in another.
86
  The humanist condemnations 
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of self-interest still reverberated, but the liberal argument had gained legitimacy through 
the particular demands of colonization.  The result was a politics in America that was 
operating at extremes, both substantively and rhetorically.  The colonial experience and 
its many ramifications had polarized politics in Maryland.   
 Political stability would eventually emerge in Maryland by the end of the century, 
however, as a new group of political leaders rose to power.  During the closing decades 
of the seventeenth century, wages rose in England and economic opportunities declined 
in the Chesapeake, leading to a decrease in English migration to Maryland.  This migrant 
pool was replaced by the increasing importation of African slaves.  From 1680 to 1720, 
the enslaved population in the region grew at almost twice the rate of the white 
population, increasing as a proportion of society from 7 percent in 1680 to 25 percent in 
1720.  The white population took the opposite trajectory.  By the 1690s, Maryland born 
creoles, not English migrants, were the adult majority.
87
  The native-born creoles would 
become the crucial component in the formation of a new political order.  They began to 
take advantage of their greater access to land and wealth and to separate themselves, both 
socially and economically, from the larger population.  Slavery “facilitated and 
accelerated” this process, which resulted in an increasingly stratified society, sustained by 
the expansive economic power of the richest planters.  Through wealth and patronage, 
these wealthy merchant-planters successfully established an alliance with the yeomanry 
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that allowed them to ignore, and even antagonize, the rest of white society.  Edmund 
Morgan offered an additional explanation, positing a newly institutionalized racism as the 
reason the poorer planters were increasingly quiescent, having chosen race over class.  
What emerged in the colony at the turn of the century was an exclusive governing 
authority capable of exercising power without the intrusions of the wider population, the 
colonial aristocracy Baltimore had long dreamed of.
88
 
 Maryland’s polarized past, however, offers a new perspective on the rise of 
stability in the colony that emphasizes the ideological consequences of the transition to 
slavery for the average colonist.  Due to the decreasing migration of white settlers in 
favor of black slaves, most English colonists were no longer migrants and their labor was 
no longer vital to the success of the colony.  These sacrifices and contributions had been 
crucial to how they conceived of and ultimately justified their claims to political power.  
Both had been erased from their colonial experience and now resided with a people 
preemptively excluded from the body politic on the basis of race.  The shift in the 
immigrant labor from white to black had completely undercut the foundation of the 
liberal arguments for an inclusive, democratic government in Maryland.  There was a 
new elite in the colony with more wealth and cultural authority, but there was also a 
wider population unable to argue for their political inclusion on the terms that had been 
developed by their predecessors over the course of the century.    
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 Unfortunately for Charles Calvert, he would lose control of the colony in 1689, 
just as the demographics in the colony were becoming more favorable for the 
construction of a ruling elite.  His loss only further stabilized the colony’s politics, 
however, as it removed his liberal argumentation from the political discourse. The colony 
would no longer be led by an individual intent on translating his personal contributions 
into political power, but by a royal governor who would not lay claim to authority in the 
same way.  By the end of the century, the common colonists were not the only ones who 
had lost the colonial foundation of their liberal demands for political power.  Both 
Maryland’s governor and its colonists could no longer claim such a vital importance to 
the colony or its recent past, and with their contributions diminished, so too was the 
potency of any liberal political demands.  The early American liberalism, which had been 
used to justify the most extreme claims for democracy and aristocracy and had rendered 
the politics of the colony so unstable, had been removed.  In Baltemore’s Case, Baltimore 
had argued that nobody who was “well in his wits” would participate in colonization 
without demanding increased political rights.  The observation was as salient after 1680 
as before, but what had changed was colonization itself.  The central problem posed by 
the colonial experience in early America had not been solved.  It had simply disappeared.   
To understand the political turbulence of seventeenth century Maryland as part of a larger 
movement among colonists to establish English rights abroad is to misunderstand the 
nature of the early colonial experience and to perpetuate the exclusiveness of Baltimore’s 
original observation.  Colonial circumstances provided the opportunity to create new 
arguments for political power that all colonists were interested in taking advantage of.  
For most of the century, the imposition of English norms would have been no more 
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satisfactory to the average colonist than they would have been to Baltimore.  What 
happened at the end of the century was a fundamental shift in the political opportunities 
afforded by colonization.  At the same time that almost everything in Maryland was 
getting bigger, from its population to its territorial holdings, the scope of its politics was 
getting much smaller.  The political ambitions of colonial leaders and average colonists 
would be more limited going forward.  The polarized, unstable political world of the 
seventeenth century was gone, and so too was its expansive possibilities
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
BY "VOICE, AND VOTE, AND CONSENT OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE":  THE NEW 
ENGLAND REBELLION OF 1689 AND THE CREATION OF "THE PEOPLE" IN 
EARLY AMERICA 
 
 
 
 In 1689, New England colonists staged a rebellion against lawful authority.  On 
April 18, colonists streamed into Boston to express their discontent with the leadership of 
the colony under Edward Andros, the governor duly appointed by the recently deposed 
James II.  The rebelling colonists quickly accepted the leadership of a Council of Safety, 
filled with many of the leading members of society who had dominated the political 
scene before the arrival of Andros.  These leaders, empowered by their leadership of "the 
people," soon restored the government in Massachusetts to its former ways.  The colony 
now again operated as it had under the original charter, which had been revoked in 1684.  
This would remain the uneasy status quo until the English government and the new 
sovereigns decided on a resolution.  Both sides waited on imperial intervention, which 
would be decisive in answering the question of who would rule in New England.  With so 
much at stake, both sides did not remain silent, but launched aggressive polemical 
campaigns offering their various viewpoints on the rebellion and the future of the colony.  
This local controversy over authority and rebellion quickly became a proxy for matters of 
empire.  The political arrangement that was best for Massachusetts carried with it a 
parallel claim of what was best for the empire.  Both sides had to fit their local political 
claims into a coherent and appealing vision of English colonization.   
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 The two factions offered competing imperial visions and disagreed most directly 
on the issue of extending "English Rights" to American colonists.   The pro-Andros 
faction wanted a centralized empire, whereas the colonial authors underscored the 
importance of local political authority, employing an argument for such privileges based 
on their natural rights as English subjects.
1
  The key "English right" at issue was 
representative government in the colonies.  The colonial leaders supported an empire 
based broadly on the equality of Englishmen, so that the colonies would have elected 
assemblies and a colonial elite.  This call for the equality of Englishmen within the 
empire has received considerable attention from colonial historians, who have exposed 
many of the inconsistencies that existed between the rhetoric and actions of the colonial 
leaders.
2
  The Bay Colony, in particular, had long demonstrated a willingness to stray 
from English custom and example, even flirting at times with a claim of independence.  
The claim of "English Rights" in America, for many historians, reeks of political 
opportunism and has alternately been described as self-serving, hollow, and of equal 
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usefulness to everyone, making it unhelpful even in distinguishing between the two 
sides.
3
    
 The question of the colonial leaders' commitment to the full implications of their 
professed ideology is of limited usefulness, however, in understanding the political 
debates in New England.
4
  The colonists were not the first group to point to an abstract 
right in order to procure political power for themselves, nor would they be the last, once 
in power, to try and limit the scope of the promised governing agenda that had helped 
bring them to power.  Whether or not they were fully dedicated to their own rhetoric 
should not discount the importance of the language and ideas that they employed.  The 
evident hypocrisy of their position is less important for what it says about the character of 
colonial leaders, but than for how it illuminates the structure of colonial politics and the 
particular challenges of maintaining local political power in a growing empire.  Before 
the revocation of the Massachusetts charter, the colony's leaders had implemented the 
most restrictive suffrage requirements in English America, but in 1689 they mobilized a 
vision of empire that, to their opponents, was dangerously "popular."  Instead of 
understanding this fact as an analytic endpoint, indicting, as it does, the ideological 
consistency of the colony's leaders, this chapter will examine how and why they were 
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forced into such a position.  That the colonial leaders pursued their own political power 
by whatever means necessary is not surprising.  More interesting is why and how the 
rapidly changing English empire required the colonists to embrace these political 
strategies in order to maintain their local authority. 
 The structure of imperial politics, with its many ramifications, becomes clear in 
the extensive pamphlet wars that followed the rebellion.  Both sides published multiple 
tracts intended to destroy the governing legitimacy of their opponents, attacking each 
other in a conventional humanist language and accusing the other of a pursuing a self-
interested agenda to the detriment of the common good.  But when the colonists switched 
from attacking their opponents to justifying their own political power, their argument 
took a liberal form and depended upon a populist understanding of colonization.  As the 
Maryland rebels of 1676 had done before them, the New England dissidents emphasized 
the colonists' labor and argued that political liberty and its protection of self-interest were 
vital to their continued participation.   
 This vision of empire put forth by the New England colonists led to a depiction 
and conceptualization of the colonial population that differed dramatically from their 
opponents.  For the pro-Andros authors, the people were uneducated, highly emotional, 
and easily misled, but for the colonial authors, imperial history argued otherwise.  They 
used their understanding of the colonial past to create an idealized conception of "the 
people" in America.  The political conception of "the people" in America was not an 
eighteenth century development, but a colonial phenomenon that surfaced originally in 
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1689.
5
  The narrative of colonization put forth by colonial leaders offered such an 
empowering conception of "the people" that they actually ran the risk of destabilizing 
their own authority in the colony, but it was necessary to secure their local authority 
within the larger empire.  Going forward, the claims of authority by colonial leaders 
would continue to be linked to an idealistic perception of "the people."   
*** 
 For the many critics of the colony, the rebellion in 1689 had been perfectly 
predictable.  The leaders of the colony had long demonstrated a complete disregard for 
any and all imperial obligations and, at times, seemed committed to a republican political 
ideology that threatened even a nominal loyalty to the king.  For these critics, the 
rebellion itself had revealed the character of the Massachusetts colonists and had offered 
a justification, ex post facto, of their harsh appraisals of the colony's leadership.  The 
colonial leaders offered a different interpretation of the rebellion.  The rebellious subjects 
were a persecuted population, determined to save themselves from the treachery of the 
Andros administration. They declared that their "English Rights" had been under attack 
in the colony and that they rebelled only to secure their birthright.  The sincerity, even the 
coherence, of this mantra of "English Rights," so popular among the dissenting colonists, 
has been questioned by historians, but it represented a real distinction between the 
colonial authors and imperial officers about the type of government most suitable for the 
colonies.   
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 In March of 1689, news had begun to arrive in Boston, via West Indian merchant 
vessels trading in New England, that the prince of Orange had invaded England, landing 
in Torbay.  Edmund Andros, governor of the Dominion of New England, had not 
received any official word of William's invasion or on his own governing status.  Largely 
due to the efforts of Increase Mather, the colony's agent in London and implacable enemy 
of the Andros regime, William's administration had not yet sent word to Boston of 
Andros's continuing authority.  Matters worsened for Andros on April 4, 1689, when 
John Winslow arrived in Boston with copies of William's famous declaration, "The 
Liberties of England and the Protestant Religion I will Maintain," issued the previous fall.  
For reasons that remain unclear, Andros threw Winslow in jail, but not before the copies 
of the declaration began to circulate throughout the town.  This was not the first time that 
news of a rumored invasion in England had reached Massachusetts.  Erroneous reports 
had circulated in 1686, claiming that Monmouth and Argyles had successfully 
overthrown James II, much to the delight of much of the colony's population.  But acting 
on the basis of rumor was always a dangerous move, as had been the case in 1686.  
Andros was in an impossible position, unwilling to act until official news arrived but put 
in an increasingly vulnerable situation as the reports became more credible.  Andros's 
government to this point had been heavy-handed and effective, giving those who opposed 
his leadership little to work with.  His enemies in Boston would not miss the opportunity 
to exploit his newfound vulnerability.  His opponents were now in a position to use 
Andros's silence on the news from England to argue that he sided with the deposed 
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Catholic king.  The opponents of Andros argued that a conspiracy was afoot and Andros's 
silence on William's invasion was the key piece of evidence.
6
 
 With conspiratorial fears gaining steam in Boston, even a minor incident had the 
ability to ignite a rebellion.  On April 17, a disgruntled seaman aboard the royal frigate, 
Rose, abandoned his ship and the town, but found time during his exodus to spread 
rumors that the captain of the ship was plotting to set fire to Boston.  The Captain's 
accomplice, he claimed, was no other than Edmund Andros.  This unsubstantiated and 
doubtful claim was enough to put the wheel of rebellion into motion.  On the morning of 
April 18, the captain of the Rose was seized at eight in the morning, as soon as he stepped 
foot on shore.  New rumors of dark conspiracies began to spread throughout the town.  In 
northern Boston, the inhabitants heard tales of their southern neighbors rising in 
rebellion.  The south heard similar reports about activity in the north.  As one 
contemporary observer put it, "a Strange Disposition entered in the Body of the People."  
Deserting soldiers from the frontier, who had been streaming into Boston for months, 
added another combustible element to the situation and added to the fears that a "bloody 
Revolution" was in the colony's future.
7
  Hundreds of people gathered in the streets and 
began arming themselves, beating drums, and organizing themselves into militia 
companies.   
 Out of these circumstances, there quickly arose a leadership committee at the 
head of these armed colonists.  They took the title of Council of Safety.  Out of its fifteen 
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members, five had actually served under Andros as councilors in the Dominion, five had 
been magistrates under the preceding government, and five were merchants who had held 
no political power under either regime.  The council attempted to strike a balance 
between those most opposed to the revocation of the charter and those persons, known as 
"moderates," who had attempted to varying degrees to work with the Dominion 
government.  As the crowds were coming together at midday, the Council issued The 
Declaration of the Gentlemen, Merchants and Inhabitants of Boston, and the County 
Adjacent.  The opening passage referenced an expansive "popish plot" that sought the 
"Extinction of the Protestant Religion."  Not since the "death of Queen Mary" had the 
"Hopes of Success" for such a plot been as high as they now were "in [their] days."  New 
England was an important mark for this worldwide conspiracy because, they argued, the 
colony was renowned and "so remarkable for the true Profession and pure Exercise of the 
Protestant Religion."
8
  Andros and his appointees had been connected to this Catholic 
conspiracy to destroy New England and its Protestant colonists.  In pursuit of this goal, 
they accused "Popish Commanders" and "papists" in the Dominion government, for 
instance, of purposefully sabotaging military efforts against the neighboring French and 
Indian enemies.
9
    By the end of the second day of the rebellion, the Council of Safety 
was now in full control of the colony as Andros and the leading figures of his government 
had all been incarcerated.  Only a few of the men imprisoned were New Englanders; the 
vast majority were military officers and officials appointed by the crown.  On May 2, the 
Council of Safety voted to resume the government of the old charter without actually 
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reinstating it, and on May 22, the colony held an election for deputies, putting many of 
the same people in power who had risen to prominence under the charter government.  
 For the longtime imperial observers of Massachusetts, especially its erstwhile 
critic Edward Randolph, these rebellious actions of the people of New England were 
predictable.
10
  The colony had long demonstrated an independent streak and took an 
uncompromising view of the its rights as guaranteed by the founding charter.  The Bay 
Colony Charter issued in 1629, which on its face was no different than an ordinary 
trading company patent, had quickly become for the Puritan settlers something much 
more than that.  It was part of their covenant with God, and the governing independence 
promised by the charter, especially after it traveled with the first settlers to New England, 
was necessary in their efforts to create a holy commonwealth that would meet with God's 
approval.  In John Winthrop's speech on the Arbella, he asserted that all of Europe would 
be taking note of whether they met with success or failure.  The Council of Safety 
exhibited the same self-importance with their claim that New England, because of its 
religious purity and virtue, would be a target of utmost importance for Catholic 
conspirators.  The charter was an integral part of their sacred mission, any attack on 
which would be resisted on both secular and religious terms. 
 The leaders of New England understood the charter as a grant of near total 
independence, providing the necessary freedom in their efforts to erect a godly 
community.  They organized their society and their political institutions around these 
religious goals, and the resulting body politic quickly began to take on some republican 
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characteristics.  The suffrage requirements were based on church membership, not 
property ownership, and this voting population elected deputies, who sat in the lower 
house, and the governor and magistrates, who formed the upper house.  The colony's 
officials stood for election in the General Court on an annual basis.  It quickly became the 
only polity in all of King Charles I's realms where a representative assembly had final 
control over all of the officials who directly affected their daily lives.  One recent 
historian has described the ideological foundation of New England's political order as 
"godly republicanism."
11
  Michael Winship has connected the constitutional 
republicanism in Massachusetts to the ecclesiastical congregationalism that was widely 
dispersed among Puritans, as they feared the corruption that attended a church leadership 
given too much power, a phenomenon that was on display, of course, in the Catholic 
Church.  At the heart of these fears was the humanist concern with excessive power and 
its corrupting potential.  In the Massachusetts body politic, the church members were 
given extensive powers designed to check the authority of both the colony's political and 
religious leaders.  In 1637, John Wintrop, for instance, referred to the colony's political 
organization as a "popular state" and to the people as a power "unlimited in its own 
nature."
12
 
 Winship is careful, however, to note that a level of governmental accountability, a 
rejection of hereditary rule, and rhetoric that emphasized the people did not necessarily 
add up to constitutional republicanism.  Other English localities, especially urban centers 
and their chartered self-governments, defended their governing practices and traditions 
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through a classical republican language.  The key difference was that the chartered 
communities in England, unlike the Puritans in Massachusetts, never disputed that 
ultimate authority rested with the monarch.  In 1644, for instance, an argument took place 
in the General Court over whether Parliament had the right to countermand the decisions 
of the assembly.  There was a range of opinions on the matter with Winthrop's being 
particularly influential.  Ideologically, he was sympathetic to the claims of independence 
but worried about the logistical consequences of such a move.  He considered what the 
loss of English citizenship would mean for the individual, but was most concerned with 
loss of England's military protection.  He was not yet confident that New England could 
adequately defend itself against the many potential threats to the colony.  Winthrop ended 
up accepting the idea of Parliamentary influence in New England, but only in an 
extremely limited way and, it seemed, only for a limited time.  As Massachusetts grew in 
size and military power, those logistical reasons to stay in the empire would diminish, 
giving the colony a better opportunity at a later date to assert its independence.  In the 
1640s, however, the independent posture of New England had caused few problems 
within the empire because the Crown rarely made any demands of the colony, although 
there was conflict over some minor issues, such as a parliamentary commission granted 
to a privateer in the area.  When a Stuart returned to the throne in 1660, the General Court 
welcomed the new king with a restatement of their understandings of their rights within 
the empire.  In its Report of 1661, the General Court asserted the "pattent . . . to be the 
first and maine foundation of our civil politye here . . . [and] the Governor and Company 
are, by the pattent, a body politicke, in fact and name," and then listed the "rights" of the 
colonists as they understood them, which included the power of the "freemen" to "choose 
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annually" their political leaders.    These rights and privileges would soon come under 
attack by the new sovereign.   
 Conflict between the increasingly assertive monarch and the New England colony 
was inevitable and began soon after the Restoration.
13
  A Royal Commission arrived in 
the colonies in 1664 with the primary objective of conquering New Netherland, a task 
with which Massachusetts proved to be of little assistance.  They were also given the 
task, however, of observing the colonists' compliance with the English laws.  New 
England was of prime interest.  There were numerous rumors that the leaders in 
Massachusetts ignored the Navigation Acts and had little intention of complying with two 
recent royal commands to extend the suffrage requirements beyond church membership 
and to stop discriminating against Anglicans more generally.  Massachusetts, more so 
than any of the surrounding New England colonies, openly resisted the intrusion of the 
Commissioners into their local affairs, asserting that the presence of the commissioners 
alone was a violation of their chartered privileges.  The colony gained a temporary 
reprieve from any immediate royal action, however, when a Dutch ship attacked the 
vessel carrying the Commissioner's reports, leading to their preemptive destruction so 
they would not fall into enemy hands.  The commissioners themselves were later 
captured by the Dutch, but even if delayed and delivered only through second-hand 
reports, news of the colony's intransigence eventually reached the king.
14
  A second 
commission, determined to be more forceful than the first, was planned for 1672, but this 
too was delayed by war with the Dutch.  The logistical difficulties of managing a 
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transatlantic empire had helped to protect the status quo in Massachusetts in the short 
term.  The colony had not yet had to assert openly how they understood and justified their 
resistance to imperial regulations. 
 By the middle of the 1670s, however, the colony would have to deal with an 
improved imperial bureaucracy.  The Lords of Trade replaced the Council for Plantations 
in 1675 and would pursue its agenda with more determination and diligence.  On order of 
the Lords of Trade, Edward Randolph arrived in Boston in June of 1676, hoping that 
King Phillip's War had significantly weakened the Bay Colony and made its leaders more 
amenable to imperial demands.  The war had taken an extraordinary toll on the colony, 
both economically and psychologically.
15
  Tellingly though, as formidable as its Indian 
opponents were, the colony never asked for English assistance.  The colony's leaders 
understood, as Winthrop had observed earlier, that such military dependence would 
undercut their claims to full local authority.  That action would constitute one piece of 
evidence, among many others, that Randolph would compile in his efforts to convince 
crown officials that Massachusetts brazenly defied its imperial role and responsibilities. 
His arrival would mark the beginning of the English government's more sustained attack 
on the Massachusetts charter.   
 The report filed by Randolph, condemning the colony and its leaders had an 
immediate effect.  In the summer of 1677, two agents for the colony were compelled to 
appear before the Lords of Trade in order to listen to the many accusations being levied 
against the colony by Randolph.  The Lords of Trade listed the numerous demands of the 
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crown, which included renouncing any land claims in the surrounding area, begging the 
King's pardon for coining money, repealing all laws repugnant to England, and closely 
observing the Navigation Acts.  The representatives dutifully reported these demands to 
the General Court, and to the surprise of no one, especially Edward Randolph, the 
General Court remained intransigent.  The Court in 1678 demonstrated, as had the 
colony's earlier leaders, a supreme confidence in the sanctity of the colony's mission.  In 
1637, Winthrop had written, "That which the King is pleased to bestow upon us, and we 
have accepted, is truly our owne."
16
  For the Puritan leaders throughout the century, the 
charter represented an integral part of a very complicated and tenuous endeavor.  No 
single part of their current situation, including their chartered privileges, could be altered 
without risking the collapse of the entire undertaking.  In 1678, the General Court 
captured the interdependent nature of the colony and its charter: "his majestjes charter 
being, vnder God, our only security against the malice of our adversarjes . . . any litle 
breach in the wall would endainger the whole, and therefore . . .  wee would not that . . . 
any the least stone should be put out of the wall."
17
  The Puritan leaders refused to isolate 
the charter and its individual privileges.  Everything was inextricably connected.  The 
colony, their society, and their prosperity had all been the "genuine ofspring of his 
majestys charter."  To attack the charter was to attack the colony and god.  This logic 
made for a fervent resistance to unwanted change and any sort of proposed compromise. 
 Even with Randolph's presence in the colony, the Massachusetts leaders hoped 
that the tactics of delay would still be effective and prevent any need for open and direct 
confrontation.  Unfortunately for them, however, there appeared to be no fourth war with 
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the Dutch on the near horizon.  After the return of the original two agents, the king 
demanded the return of individuals with more powers of negotiation.  The General Court 
delayed, earning a stern admonition from the King.  They finally sent over two new 
agents in the summer of 1682 but with hardly any more authority than the original two.   
The king saw through the dilatory behavior and threatened a quo warranto against the 
charter.  Edward Randolph presented official letters to the General Court in 1683, 
indicating that if concessions were not made, the quo warranto would be pursued to its 
conclusion.  Faced with this difficult choice, the General Court chose to stay firm.  
Increase Mather led the opposition against any sort of compromise, arguing that 
surrendering to the King's demands in any one particular "would offend God."
18
  The 
elections of 1684, influenced heavily by Mather's preaching, put a new government in 
place that was committed to defiance.  They sent a missive to London, requesting a delay 
in the proceedings and hoping for an alteration in imperial policy.  Charles II had long 
tired of delays, and because of some concerns about how the sheriff of London could 
deliver a summons outside of his jurisdiction, the Court of Chancery issued a scire facias, 
instead of a quo warranto, in 1684.  Judgment was entered for the King, and New 
England was offered the opportunity to respond later in the year.  The company failed to 
plead and the decision was confirmed on October 23, 1684.  The charter had been 
revoked.  Charles II died in 1685, causing some delay in the resolution of matters, but a 
new governor, Joseph Dudley, chosen by the James II, took office in May of 1686.  He 
would rule with the assistance of an appointed council, marking the beginnings of the 
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autocratic Dominion of New England.  There would be no representative assembly in 
Massachusetts; the colony would no longer be governed and controlled by the elect.     
 Some in the Bay Colony responded with disbelief and a certain level of denial as 
this government entrenched itself in the colony.  The government only grew stronger 
however.  Edmund Andros would soon replace Dudley as governor of the Dominion in 
December of 1686, bringing a military efficiency to the position, and by 1688, the 
Dominion included New York as well as all of New England.  The changes brought in by 
the new government were many.  They taxed without the vote of elected representatives, 
restricted town meetings, instituted religious toleration, brought many Anglicans into 
power, reorganized the militia, challenged property holdings in the colony, and carefully 
enforced the Navigation Acts.  Resistance to the new government emerged almost 
immediately as a new rallying cry of "English Rights" began to surface.  Not surprisingly, 
new taxes brought about the most public early resistance to the actions of the Dominion 
government.  In March of 1687, Andros pushed for a new revenue bill that received 
Council approval only reluctantly.  The town of Ipswich, one among many towns 
unhappy with the new bill, refused to comply.  They justified their resistance through the 
natural right of Englishmen to be taxed only with the approval of an elected assembly.  
Andros responded quickly and forcefully, throwing many in jail, and fining the ringleader 
John Wise an additional 50 pounds and demanding 1000 pounds surety for future good 
behavior.  During their trials, the Magna Carta and the rights of Englishmen were a 
frequent refrain, but to no avail.  The governmental response sent an effective message.  
There would be no more tax revolts led by town leaders.  The power of the town 
assemblies, which could now meet only once a year for the purposes of electing 
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selectmen and other necessary officers, had been successfully curtailed.  Andros's 
attempts to centralize political power in the colony and to establish his own personal 
authority were moving forward at a rate alarming to most New Englanders.      
 In the Declaration of the Gentlemen, the manifesto of the 1689 rebellion against 
the Dominion government, the authors reiterated many of the claims from the Ipswich 
protest.  The document of rebellion declared that their English rights had migrated with 
the colonists to America, making the governing agenda of Andros and his supporters 
illegal.  They decried the testimonials of Andros's council, which asserted that the 
colonists should "not think the Priviledges of English men would follow us to the end of 
the World."   Echoing the complaints of the Ipswich dissidents, they laid claim to the 
"Rights" of the "Magna Charta," which had suffered "multiplied contradictions" in the 
colony.  They spoke of honest people wrongly punished and fined for peacefully 
protesting the tax rates, of "packt and pickt Juries," and of persons incarcerated "without 
any the least Information appearing against them, or an Habeas Corpus allowed unto 
them."
19
  The comments of both the Ipswich rebels and the leading dissidents of 1689 
give the distinct impression of a people confident and proud of their English heritage and 
determined to acquire the rights that accompanied that distinction.   
 In light of the consistent efforts of the colony's leaders to achieve independence, 
however, and secure their rights to diverge from English political norms, the sincerity of 
their claim to "English Rights" has come under consistent criticism from historians.  
David Lovejoy has noted the irony of the colonists, who as a last regard, championed the 
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mantra of "English Rights," which they had consistently denied to others.
20
  Much of the 
changes Andros was instituting, after all, were intended to bring New England more in 
line with English standards, such as swearing on the bible and tolerating, if not 
supporting, the Church of England.
21
  Despite Lovejoy's attention to their opportunistic 
embrace of this rhetoric and the role played by self-interest, J.M. Sosin argues that 
Lovejoy still gives too much credit to an emerging "republican ideology" in the colonies.  
Sosin argues that Lovejoy fails to distinguish "rationalizations and mere professions of 
belief from actual commitment to ideas as tested by consistent behavior."
22
  He contends 
that both colonist and imperial official were both equally happy to employ the language 
of English rights to serve their particular agendas.  "English Rights" did not form the 
basis of a distinct colonial ideology, but instead offered a rhetorical device available to 
both sides to be used whenever possible.  He argues that the New England colonists, if 
given the opportunity, would have happily returned to government by the "consent of a 
minority" and reinstalled the strict religious qualifications of political participation.  In 
Sosin's view, the New England colonists were not any more committed to republican 
ideology and individual rights than the people that they argued were threatening to 
deprive them of those privileges. 
 Lost in this focus on the sincerity of the colonists and their new colonial ideology 
was that fact that the call for "English Rights" in America was a conclusion more often 
than it was an argument.  The colonists did at times pursue their political agenda through 
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a "rights" argument.  They cited natural law and laid claim to their natural rights.
23
  But 
the Massachusetts leaders were rightly hesitant to justify their argument solely on the 
basis of abstract claims to certain rights.  They had already witnessed how easily the 
sacred "right" of the charter could be ignored, once it began to run against the larger aims 
of empire.  Accordingly, in the political debates that followed the rebellion, the colonial 
authors began to put forth an understanding of empire that made "English Rights" abroad 
sound imperial policy.  The imperial officials would do the same thing with the opposite 
goal as both sides debated the nature of the empire and its most profitable organization.  
The pro-Andros and colonial authors would square off after the rebellion in a series of 
polemical political tracts.  They would condemn and vilify each other, but they would do 
so in the context of empire.  Both sides argued that their opponents represented the 
extremes of a faulty imperial organization.  More than a natural right, representative 
government came to be understood as a key component of either colonial success or 
imperial failure.        
*** 
  In the wake of the rebellion, both sides launched aggressive printed attacks 
against each other.  The charges of self-interest and oligarchy were omnipresent in the 
various tracts.  The pro-Andros authors portrayed the colonial faction as upstarts, 
individuals lacking in personal virtue and in the other expected characteristics of the elite.  
As leaders of a community, they ignored their responsibilities on the local level by 
pursuing their own personal interests.  On the imperial level, their lack of virtue surfaced 
again as they disregarded the greater good of the empire and refused to abide by and 
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enforce the Navigation Acts.  These were the types of men, the pro-Andros authors 
asserted, that were likely to rise to power in a decentralized empire.  The colonial 
dissidents responded with their own charges of oligarchy.  They constantly depicted 
imperial officials, such as Andros, as "strangers" to the community, who confirmed their 
outsider status by demonstrating little concern for the good of the local community.  They 
were the exploiters, the colonial faction maintained, who would come to power in a 
centralized empire to the ruin of both the colony and the empire.  As hyperbolic and 
personal as the attacks from both sides were, the imperial implications of these aspersions 
were always in view.   
 The pro-Andros tracts hammered away at the colonial leaders as a self-interested 
minority faction, who had secured their political power early in the colony's history.  In a 
Short Account of the Present State of New England, the author detailed their rise to 
power, a process that was intertwined with the colony's religious pretensions.  The first 
government under the charter had been dominated by religious leaders, whom the author 
referred to as the "teachers."
24
  They translated their religious leadership into political 
power through their influence over elected officials.  Any magistrate who was "ſo ſturdy 
as to preſume to act of himſelf without taking [the teachers'] advice and direction, [the 
magistrate] might be ſure of it, his Magiſtracy ended with the Year."  The author noted 
that the world rightly condemns the "Uſurped Power of the Popiſh Clergy over the Laity," 
but the power of the "teachers" in Massachusetts "over the people" was even more 
extreme.  The teachers imposed voting restrictions onto the people to "perpetuate the 
Government to themſelves."  To vote in the colony, an individual had to be a "freeman," 
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which you could only qualify for by being in "full communion with their Churches," or in 
other words for the author, "in all points be[ing] of the Preacher's Opinion."  Any colonist 
who resisted the "Independent persuasion," no matter how "ſober in Life and 
Converſation," was denied the status of freeman and declared the "Enemy to the Church 
and State."  The colony's leaders perpetuated their authority by limiting participation in 
government to only those who met their approval.  This allowed only the obsequious and 
ambitious into the body politic of Massachusetts.  Those granted freeman status were 
"hypocrites, who were ambitious of Honour and Preferment," and willing to appease the 
ministers, through "many coſtly Treats and Preſents" for the sake of their own selfish 
motives.  With a sarcastic tone, the author described a common scene in the colony: "It 
was pleaſant to behold poor Coblers and pitiful Mechanics, which had neither Houſe nor 
Land, ſtruting and making no mean Figure at their Elections; and ſome of the richeſt 
Merchants and wealthieſt People ſtand by as insignificant Cypers."25  The author offered 
a startling reinterpretation of the godly community in Massachusetts.  The New England 
leaders were petit tyrants, who through a tightly managed oligarchy, constructed a 
government and led a rebellion where "Self-interest was the first and principal motive."
26
  
Everything that had previously been explained by their religious dedication was in fact 
the selfish actions of an oligarchic power, intent on protecting their "arbitrary pleasure" 
through exclusion and intimidation and squeezing as much material wealth out of the 
population as possible.
27
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 There were few protections for anyone outside of this ruling faction.  The pro-
Andros writers provided numerous examples of persecution by the Puritans.  In a Short 
Account, the author recounted the origins of Rhode Island to emphasize the many 
sufferings of the Quakers in the colony.  "The people of Boſton," he wrote, "who always 
had a perfect hatred againſt those who differed in Opinion from them," banished a group 
of "Quakers" from the colony with the hopes that the Quakers would either perish "with 
hunger, or elſe be deſtroyed by the Heathens."28  Miraculously, the author claimed, they 
survived the early months of their banishment and established a new colony.  Members of 
the Church of England had fared little better in the colony.  Before the appointment of 
Andros, members of the church were "punished with Fines, Imprisonment, Stripes, 
Banishment, and Death, and all for matters of meer Conscience and Religion only."  
Andros had protected the Church of England during the Dominion years, but the rebellion 
restored a Puritan leadership even more intent on its destruction.  Church members "were 
seized and barbarously Imprisoned" and the church building "receive the marks of [New 
England's] indignation and scorn, by having the Windows broke to pieces, and the Doors 
and Walls daubed with dung, and other filth, in the rudest and basest manner 
imaginable."
29
  The Church of England minister was forced to abandon his congregation 
and leave the colony.  Another author claimed that one preacher recommended "cutting 
the throats of all the Established Church" so that the colony would "never bee troubled 
with them again."
30
  A religion "that did not comply with their Independency" had no 
protection in the colony.  These attacks extended beyond the realm of religion.  The New 
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England leaders, one author claimed, had no regard for "Religion, Liberty, and 
Property."
31
  The laws established by the Puritans were the only ones that mattered: "The 
Laws of England are of no credit among them, and when pleaded in their Courts are little 
regarded."
32
  No one in colony, no matter how rich or English, was safe within the 
boundaries of Puritan control. 
 The colonial leaders in Massachusetts were even willing to risk the destruction of 
the colony for self-gain.  In a manuscript account of the rebellion in 1689, the author 
reported their treachery during a war with the Indians, while Andros served the colony 
honorably.  Andros had led a colonial force north to meet the Indians, suffering every 
hardship of the average soldier and treating them as a "tender father" would "his family."  
His successful tactics included blockading rivers and routing habitations, and the Indians, 
threatened by starvation, would soon have had little choice but to surrender if Andros had 
not been prematurely called back to Boston.  While Andros was busy fighting Indians, 
the author claimed, the former leaders of the colony sought advantage in his absence and 
littered the city with "false storys" about the Governor, who they depicted as the "great 
Enemy of the Country."  Most disturbingly, some Bostoners even seized the opportunity 
for profit.  Seeing the desperate situation of the Indians, they "supplied them with all such 
things as they wanted, whereby they put weapons in the Enemy's hand to destroy 
hundreds of the King's Subjects and lay the whole Country desolate."  The author could 
not believe that these colonists, "who were so damnably treacherous and wicked," were 
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now the same individuals "reputed [to be] great Patriots of the Country and Restorers of 
the English Liberties and Privileges."
33
   
 The colonial leaders in Massachusetts sacrificed the greater good of the 
community for personal gain and would do the same in the matters of empire, especially 
in regards to the enforcement of the Navigation Acts.  Supporters of Andros claimed that 
he had prosecuted violations of the Acts of Trade and that his "prohibition of these 
irregularitys [had] made his Government intolerable."  When the leaders under the charter 
government regained control of the colony, they immediately began to reestablish their 
former ways.  Men who were imprisoned for debt were "set at liberty" and "Pirates and 
Murderers [were] freely discharged from jail."  The "Acts of Trade," the author 
continued, "were publickly broken, and boats loaden with hogsheads of Tobacco went up 
the River at noon-day."  Bostoners were again guilty of trading arms with the enemy.  
They sold "Ammunition and Provision" to the French and Indians," which in turn "killed 
many of their Majesty's Subjects and destroyed the best part of the Country."  The new 
leaders of the government were the worst offenders: "some of the chief in Government 
[are] the very Men, which most notoriously break the Acts of Trade." 
34
  In Andros's own 
report, he contended that New Englanders now tolerated "an unlimited irregular trade" 
contrary to the Acts of Trade, which were "now as little regarded as in the time of their 
former Charter Government."
35
  The leadership in Boston not only threatened the local 
community but also diminished the King's revenues.  An imperial organization that 
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allowed these types of men to run a colony was at best inefficient and, at worst, self-
destructive. 
 The supporters of the Dominion accused the colonial faction of resisting even the 
smallest obligations of empire and even at times seemed to pursue independence.  John 
Palmer, in his tract, Considerations humbly offered to Parliament, laid out what he surely 
considered to be an obvious and reasonable expectation of a colony:   
All his Majeſties Plantations in America, have either Diſcovered, or 
Peopled under the Engouragement of Charters from the Crown of 
England, and ſeveral Great Powers and Priviledges have been 
Granted to . . . Corporations with reſtrictions, nevertheleſs . . . it was 
always underſtood that thoſe Priviledges, and eſpecially the Powers 
of Government ſhould be exerciſed ſo by the particular . . . 
Corporations, as not to prejudice the Intereſt of England.36   
 
New England's leaders, however, disputed even this minimal subordination.  One pro-
Andros author accused the New Englanders of claiming to be a "free people" and of 
asserting that England had no "dominion over them."
37
  Another contended that they 
wanted to reestablish their "old Arbitrary Commonwealth Government" in order to free 
"themselves from the Authority of England."
38
  To the supporters of the Dominion, it was 
"most plain that the late Subverters of the Government had no manner of regard to Their 
Majesty's Interest or Service."  The interests of the England would be obviously be 
"ruined and destroyed" by such leaders in the colony.  The "whole country," they added, 
would be put at risk.  The colonial leaders were doubly damaging to the future of the 
empire.  They were destroying the colony and ignoring the Navigation Acts at the same 
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time.  They sought their "English Liberties" only so that they would be "free" to continue 
oppressing the population of Massachusetts.   
 A decentralized empire provided no corrective for this type of colonial 
mismanagement.  In depicting the colonial leaders in such a negative light, the pro-
Andros writers criticized an imperial vision that would be able to do little about it.  The 
colonies needed direct oversight from England so that such unqualified leaders, like the 
ones in Massachusetts, would not rise to power.  The colony could be saved, they 
claimed, only by "the KING's Superintendancy, whose Officers may have ſuch 
Instructions, as shalt divert them from all prejudicial Trade, and incourage ſuch as may 
redound, as well to theirs, as to the Advantage of Old England."
39
  The imperial officers, 
on the instructions of the king, would provide the virtuous leadership so needed in the 
colony.  This would benefit the local community as much as it would bolster imperial 
revenues.  Enforcement of the Navigation Acts by an imperial officer was the action of an 
individual more concerned with the greater good of the empire than any opportunities for 
personal profit, a virtuous disposition that would also be extended to the local 
community.  For the pro-Andros authors, local and imperial needs worked together, and 
accordingly, a decentralized imperial organization made little sense. 
 The colonial dissidents countered with an equally vitriolic attack on Andros and 
his supporters.  Their attacks were a mirror image of the criticisms levied by Palmer and 
the other supporters of Andros.  They portrayed the imperial officers as exploiters of the 
colonial communities.
 40
  Like the accusations directed at the colonial leaders, the 
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imperial officers were accused of lacking virtue and pursuing their own private gain at 
the expense of the common good.  There was a grander scope to some the attacks on 
Andros, as he and his supporters could be tied to larger popish conspiracies, but the key 
target was a centralized imperial organization.  As they had symbolized to their 
opponents the flaws of a decentralized empire, Andros and his faction would represent 
the type of disruptive leadership likely to arise within a more centralized empire. 
 Throughout the colonial tracts, the governor and his supporters were constantly 
referred to as "strangers" and accused of harboring only self-interested intentions towards 
the New England community.  In the Declaration of the Gentlemen, the authors described 
the Dominion government as being in the hands of "such Men as were Strangers and 
Haters of the People."
41
  A later pamphlet, published in 1690, referred to the colony's 
former governors as "a Company of Strangers" and as a "few little men."  In one tract, 
Increase Mather pointed out that the governor was "wholly a stranger to New England" 
and many of his "Councellors [were] Strangers, and the others of them such as were 
Andross's Creatures."
42
  In a separate tract, he referred to them as a "little gang . . . who 
went by the Name of the Church of England."
43
  The implication was clear.  Andros and 
his supporters had no connection to the community Massachusetts and therefore had little 
inclination to sacrifice their own personal interest for the larger good of the society.  The 
appellation of stranger was often quickly followed with the charge of self-interest.  Some 
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of the former council members, who had turned against Andros during the rebellion, 
published their own account of how the council had worked during the Dominion:  
The Governour did so quickly neglect the great number of the 
Council, and chiefly adhere unto and Govern by the advice only of a 
few others, the principal of them Strangers to the Countrey, without 
Estates or Interest therein to oblige them, persons of know Prejudices 
against us, and that had plainly laid their chiefest Designs and Hopes 
to make unreasonable profit of this poor People.
44
 
 
A separate tract made the same claim in the same language, asserting that "a Company of 
Strangers, who had all manner of Civility and Protection, and are growing rich under the 
preſent Government."45  To Increase Mather, the Dominion government had allowed 
"ſome ſtrangers . . . to raise (to themſelves) Eſtates amongſt (the people of New 
England)."
46
  The Puritan faction chose to attack the Andros faction by establishing their 
outsider status, which was difficult to dispute, and then attaching a self-interested agenda 
to that characteristic.   
 The colonial leaders accused Andros and his supporters of a whole range of 
governmental abuses in pursuit of their personal aggrandizement.  The Declaration 
pointed to "intollerable Fees extorted from every one upon all Occasions, with any Rules 
but those of their own insatiable Avarice and Beggary."
47
  The fees passed by Andros's 
government were "Extraordinary," "Oppressive," and "taken in all matters by indigent 
and exacting Officers."
48
  One pamphlet, for instance, accused the Dominion government 
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of making "poor Widows and [the] Fatherleſs" pay fifty shillings for the probate of the 
will, whereas the former government had charged only five.
49
  Another detailed a story of 
how governmental officials would visit "honest houses in the country" and request a "cup 
of drink."  Upon receiving one, they would then toss a "3 pence" into the corner of the 
room and then swear under oath that they had bought a drink there, bringing a necessary 
fine upon the household.
50
  The governor and his associates attacked landholdings in the 
colony as well, declaring that "all mens Titles in effect quite null and void."  They 
particularly targeted the town common lands, which had led to the "impoveriſhing, if not 
utter ruining of whole Townſhips."51  They also packed juries when possible.  They 
would fill juries with "meer Strangers of the Country, and no Freeholders" so that they 
could be "ſure to effect their Pernitious Deſigns."52  The whole government had "become 
a meer Engine , a sort of Machin contriv'd only to enrich a crew of Abject Strangers, 
upon the Ruines of a miserable people."
53
  The result of these various measures was that 
the wealth of the community was expropriated by Andros and his supporters.   Andros's 
"far-fetched Instruments grew rich among [the people of Boston]."  They were "fleecing" 
the people, making "unreasonable profit of this poor People, "growing rich under the 
preſent government," or "raising their own fortunes upon their Neighbors ruines."54  The 
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Dominion government employed every aspect of their governing power to take as much 
advantage of the people as possible.   
 Sustaining a government so injurious to the community was a difficult task and 
necessitated maintaining an exclusive and oppressive governing style.  Andros had 
established a small, exclusive coterie of advisers, where "only here and there a good Man 
was used."  Repeatedly throughout the anti-Andros pamphlets, the dissidents accused the 
governor of ruling with the help of only a small group of four to five persons.
55
  Some of 
his former councilors, who had since turned against Andros, reported that the process of 
passing laws and other bills under the Andros administration had been highly irregular.  
"Bills of the greatest concernment" were first considered in private and then only 
"unexpectedly brought into Council" to the great disadvantage of those who potentially 
opposed it.  The result was "that in effect four or five persons . . . bear the Rule over, and 
gave Law" to the entire colony.  The laws themselves were not publicized.  A later 
pamphlet contended that the "People [were] at a great losſ what the law is, and what 
not."
56
  By these methods, the law in New England, one author claimed, had been made 
into a "tool to manage the deſigns of Robbery."57  Beyond disingenuous governmental 
tactics, Andros also employed straight-forward intimidation to protect his interests.  His 
stern reaction to the Ipswich protest was offered as a leading example.  The offending 
actors had been given a punishment disproportionate to the crime, having been "ſeverely 
handled, not only impriſoned for ſeveral weeks, but fined and bound to their good 
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behavior."  Other examples indicated the same streak of oppressive behavior.  Another 
anti-Andros author claimed that a colonist had been imprisoned and fined for signing "a 
modeſt Paper," in which he had laid a simple claim to the rights of an Englishman.58   
 At their most extreme, the colonial authors even accused Andros and his 
supporters of being papal conspirators against England and Protestantism.  Andros 
attacked English Rights and erected a "French-Government" in New England, not just 
because he was selfish, but because of his involvement in a much more insidious plot.
59
  
Everything that had been happening in New England, by this interpretation, including the 
appointment of Andros, was part of a larger conspiracy.  The forces of "Slavery as well as 
Popery" that William had recently vanquished in England had also been at work in the 
colony.  The colonial authors argued that many of the policies that James had hoped to 
enact in England had first been attempted in New England.  James had sent his 
"Creatures" out and empowered them to rule by illegal means.  The "commiſſion" that 
granted Andros governing power, they claimed, was "more Illegal and Arbitrary, than 
that granted . . . by any one that ever ſwayed the Engliſh Scepter."60  The revocation of 
the Massachusetts charter had been part of the larger attack on English charters by James 
II, which one author termed "the moſt conſiderable Branches of the late Popish Plot, for 
the ſubversion and utter extinction of the Protestant Religion."61  The crown's imperial 
actions during the 1680s had been early indications of a larger conspiracy to overthrow 
English institutions and religion.  One author asserted that this "French-Government" was 
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a "Specimen of what was intended for the whole English Nation."
62
  The claim was 
repeated in an earlier tract, which claimed that this "French Government" was intended to 
come to England "as soon as the times would bear it."
63
  A centralized empire had 
empowered individuals like Andros, whose power could not be checked or restrained by 
the local population.  The fact that these imperial officials were involved, as the colonial 
authors claimed, in larger papist conspiracy demonstrated just how far colonial leadership 
could stray from the common good when completely detached from any local 
accountability.  The results could be devastating for the empire.      
 In many ways, these rival accusations of oligarchy were thoroughly conventional.  
They utilized a humanist political language, decrying self-interest and claiming complete 
dedication to the common good, just as numerous political actors did across early modern 
England, but the imperial context added a new element to this discourse.
64
  Both sides 
wanted the mechanisms that had brought their opponents to power to be understood as 
bad imperial policy.  A poorly governed colony in New England hurt the English empire 
and ultimately Crown revenues.  Both sides launched their attacks with the clear intention 
of winning the approval of the king.  The pro-Andros authors argued that a decentralized 
government would bring the unqualified to power, who would then exploit and abuse the 
local population, ignore imperial responsibilities, and render the colony of the little 
advantage to England.  The colonial authors, on the other hand, claimed that a centralized 
empire would bring an arbitrary power into the colony with no accountability to the local 
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community.  This would lead to the rule of "strangers" in the colony, who, if not already 
corrupt, would soon be corrupted by their expansive power.   Tapping into the long 
history of republican rhetoric and thought that had existed in the colony, the colonial 
authors asserted that local populations in the colonies had an important political role to 
play in the colonies.  The two sides understood the people in Massachusetts very 
differently.  To justify their separate visions for empire and their own political power, 
both sides had to posit a vastly different depiction of the colonial population, which 
would become an enduring distinction in the imperial debates between the center and 
periphery.  The debate between centralized and decentralized empire depended to a large 
degree on how each sided understood the colonial population, their labor, and their 
character.  
*** 
 From the viewpoint of the imperial officials, the colonial population was 
dangerously misinformed and out-of-control.  The imperial officers largely ignored the 
contributions of the common colonists in their understandings of colonization and 
promised to make their lives better by doing the exact opposite of what the population 
seemed to want.  The colonial authors, on the other hand, described the colonial 
population as virtuous, reasonable, and most importantly, in the context of empire, 
productive.  Their labor had been and still was vital to colonization.  The colonial elite, 
who had the most to lose under regimes like the Dominion of New England, argued for 
the legitimacy of their political authority through this popular understanding of the 
empire.  The people's labor, they claimed, was contingent on the honoring of their 
"English Rights" in America.  Representative government was necessary to sustain it; 
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autocratic government would greatly diminish it.
65
  The logic of this justification for local 
autonomy and their role in the empire would establish an important pattern in the 
conflicts between center and periphery throughout the remainder of the colonial period.  
When pushed, the colonial elites would have to turn to the people and their importance to 
the larger empire.  The political power of colonial elites and this conception of "the 
people" would rise or fall together.   
 The pro-Andros pamphlets presented a version of early colonial history almost 
completely devoid of the people.  John Palmer understood the English colonies in terms 
of conquest and its laws: "'Tis a Fundamentall Point consented unto by all Christian 
Nations, that the First Discovery of a Countrey inhabited by Infidells, gives a right and 
Dominion of that Countrey to the Prince in whose service and Employment the 
Discoverers were sent."  He then went through all the various European conquests of the 
New World, the Spaniards claimed the West Indies, the Portuguese Brazil, and the 
English the "Northern parts of America."  The upshot of this fact was that the land 
belonged exclusively to the King and was "from the Grace and Favour of the Crowne 
alone that all these flow and are dispensed at the pleasure of him that sits on the Throne."  
For Palmer, colonial lands had an inherent value.  The conquered territories were the 
spoils of war and had been given to certain individuals as such.  Palmer's narrative of 
colonial beginnings had little space for the exploits of the individual and placed minimal 
emphasis on the transformation of the American landscape by the English colonists.    
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 For colonial writers, the story of early colonization was much more dynamic.  The 
element of change was the colonial population, who were very much present at the 
creation of an English America.  The omnipresent conception of America as a 
"wilderness" was so important to the colonial position because it highlighted the fact that 
the colonies necessitated an act of creation to bring them into being.  For one author, the 
first settlers were not given a great gift by the King but were "a poor Diſtressed People" 
that fled to "a Wilderneſs, where cold, Hunger, Savages, and innumerable Evils and 
Dangers muſt needs attend them."  Many people, the author claimed, were sure that the 
"Sea, the Savages, cold, or the Country would eat them up."
66
  Increase Mather made a 
similar claim, but instead of describing the early colonists as distressed, he referred to 
them as "Honourable perſons" and noted that some were "Famous for learning."  This 
early group had "transplanted themſelves from their deſirable Native Country, into that 
Howling wilderneſs of America. . . [and] in little time that Wilderneſs was by their great 
Endeavors & Expense, improved into a habitable country."
67
  The colonists had, another 
author claimed, "ſubdued a Wilderneſs, built [their] Houſes, and planted Orchards."  The 
English settlements, as they existed late in the seventeenth century, had not been given by 
the King, but were better understood as the product of colonial labor.  This had clear 
implications for property claims in the New World, but carried important imperial 
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implications as well.
68
  The empire was expanding and developing in America through 
the actions of common settlers, not through the conquests or discoveries of English 
armies.  The colonists had created the colony "with their own hands."
 69
  In their 
historical narrative of early colonization, the colonial writers posited an essential role to 
the colonists and their labor. 
 After emphasizing the importance of the people to early colonization, the colonial 
authors argued that the political rights promised by the charter had played a crucial role 
in eliciting this all-important participation.  In a petition by John Gibson, an eighty-seven 
year old settler, included in the pamphlet A Narrative of the Miseries of New England, the 
aged colonist revisited the challenges of early colonization and the motivations for men 
like himself: "That your Majeſty's good Subjects, with much hard labour and great 
disburſements, have ſubdued a Wilderneſs, built our Houſes, and planted Orchards, being 
incouraged by our indubitable right to the Soil by the Royal Charter granted unto the Firſt 
Planters."
70
  John Gibson was not alone in his identifying a direct link between the 
charter and colonial participation.  Increase Mather claimed that the "Report of this 
Charter, did encourage many very deserving people to Transplant themselves and their 
families to New England."
71
  Another author extended the point well beyond the borders 
of New England: "All his Majeſties Plantations in America, have been either Diſcovered, 
or Peopled under the Encouragement of Charters from the Crown of England."
72
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Another author extended the importance of the charters temporally, instead of 
geographically: "The firſt Planters in that America Deſart . . . inlarge[d] the King's 
Dominions, in Confidence that not themſelves only, but their Poſterity ſhould enjoy thoſe 
Priviledges which by their Charters were aſſured to them."  The promise of political rights 
in America had been necessary to attracting sufficient migration.  It would be morally 
wrong to revoke these promises after the colonists had "performed their part, and been at 
vaſt Charges, whereby the Crown and the English Nation have been many wayes 
advantaged."
73
  It would also put the colony at risk. The colonists could abandon the 
colony at any moment.  One author threatened that if they became "slaves" in the colony 
and lost their chartered privileges to have an "intereſt in [the] making of Laws," then the 
"ſmarting part of them . . . [could] agree to break up the Plantation, and march home for 
England again."
74
  For the colonial authors, the people had created the colonies, and there 
would have been no settlers without the charter.  When John Palmer wrote that "New 
England had a Charter but no one will be so stupid to imagine that the King was bound to 
grant it," he revealed his perception of Massachusetts as an entity which existed before 
and apart from the charter.  For the colonial authors, there was no colony before the 
charter. 
 The charter had promised rights crucial to encouraging migration, but had also 
helped to install a government well suited to encourage the further development of the 
colony.   As Increase Mather outlined, the New England settlers had been, through the 
charter, "Empower'd to Elect" their own governmental leaders on an annual basis, just as 
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in any other corporate town in England.  Their elected leaders had supreme lawmaking 
powers with the ability to pass laws "most proper and suitable for the Plantation."  The 
resulting political arrangement, as Mather termed it, was a "good and easie Government," 
under which the Plantation "increased, and prospered wonderfully."
75
  A later tract 
elaborated on what exactly constituted a "good and easy" government.  The author 
claimed that with the charter the colony "had a Sweet, Eaſie, and Gentle Government."  
Its defining characteristic was that it was "made and Conſtituted by, as well as for the 
People; A Government, that knew no Intereſt inconſiſtant with that of their Country and 
their Charge."  The author had divided political groups into two categories: "republicans" 
and "publicans."  Republicans, the author contended, were "clearly for keeping what you 
have; but your Publicans are for taking it away.
76
  The charter government had clearly 
been a "republican" regime, as the author defined the term.  The people's selection of 
their leaders had ensured a virtuous leadership in the colony, defined by their pursuit of 
the good of the larger community.  The success of the government that was empowered 
by the people was clear.  Over the century, New England had been transformed from "a 
Barren Wilderneſs into a Fruitful Field" and now constituted "a famous & flouriſhing 
Teritory."
77
 
 If a "sweet and easy" political regime had encouraged such great 
accomplishments, then an oppressive government, the colonial authors claimed, would 
work in the opposite direction and turn "a fruitful Field into a barren Wilderneſs."  The 
author of the Humble Address described how imperial officials, such as Andros, 
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exercised power in the colonies: "A poor naked hungry Governour comes uſually from 
the Court every three years, with a troop of miſerable debauched Followers, and for the 
moſt part guilty of one Crime or other, whoſe Debaucheries, Ignorance, and Neceſſities, 
provoke them to innumerable Practices of Fraud."  In these governments, only 
membership in the small ruling group, which was very limited in number, had any sort of 
security in their property.  "No Rich Man is ſafe," the author maintained, "unleſs he be 
Partners with the Governour."  These governing regimes had deprived "Mankind at once 
of the only valuable thing in the World, precious Liberty."  The result was devastating for 
the colony's development.  The people were victims to this "Dabauchery and Malignity 
of the Government" and the colony began to "decrease daily, both in Riches and People."  
It forced the people in the colonies to have only a short-term interest in remaining.  Once 
individual colonists "begin to get any thing of an Eſtate, they are fain to forſake thoſe 
places."  The charter government, in contrast, had encouraged "young Men [to be] 
industrious" through the opportunity of "every one improving himſelf in his way, and 
preſerved from Idleneſs and Debauchery."  The author declared that it was "not ſo much 
the Air which people live in that corrupts their manners . . . but it's the Evil Government . 
. . by which men corrupt one another."
78
   For the colonial authors, the colonies and their 
prosperity depended on the people, and their industrious disposition, so important to 
imperial successes up to this point, was a not a given.  A change in government could 
quickly diminish it and turn back the colonial progress that had resulted from it. 
 The colonial critique of imperial officers like Andros and Edward Randolph was 
that by focusing so emphatically on the enforcement of the Navigation Acts, they missed 
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the bigger picture of colonial production and imperial profits.  John Palmer, among 
others, accused the New Englanders of violating the Navigation Acts, so it was clear to 
him that increased enforcement, which he claimed had occurred under Andros, would 
result in a "considerable Advance of His Majesties Revenue."
79
  The focus of Andros, 
Randolph, and other imperial officials on the better enforcement of the Navigation Acts 
and the arbitrary, external power within colonial society necessary to achieve this was, to 
the colonial writers, a shortsighted approach to increasing colonial revenues.  In the 
common seventeenth century English analogy to the bee hive, the author of The Humble 
Address called Andros and his supporters "drones," whose policies were so "inhumane 
and cruel as to deſtroy the very Bees that feed them."  These types of men were 
particularly unsuited for the challenges of building and sustaining communities in the 
New World because their "rapacious nature of theſe [men] are inſatiable, ſo that a few 
Publicans are capable to ruine a great People, and yet not make themſelves; for they have 
the right Talent to make a great city little, but never to make a little one great."
80
  
Improving the enforcement of the Navigation Acts was a logical means to increase 
revenues (the colonial authors all claimed that New Englanders did in fact comply with 
those regulations), but to do so through the imposition of an autocratic government 
undercut their larger goals.  The negative effect of these imperial policies would be to 
discourage the very behavior by the people that had made New England so prosperous.  
The small gains that would come through improved enforcement would be outweighed 
by the much broader damage it would do to the community, which would eventually 
diminish imperial revenues on a far greater scale. 
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 This narrative of the people, their labor, and motivations led to a broader 
commentary on the character of the colonists who had thrived under the charter 
government and helped to establish such a prosperous colony.  For the colonial authors, 
the colonists in New England were "generally Sober, Industrious, well-Diſciplined, and 
apt for Martial Affairs" or were a "loyall, Quiet, and Virtuous people."
81
   The uprising 
that occurred on April 18, which Andros and his supporters had described as the actions 
of a mob, was presented by the colonial authors as a defining example of the restraint and 
virtue of the colonists.  Even though Andros and his government were "objects of 
Universal Hatred and Indignation," the people as a "whole armed body . . . Marched . . . 
with so composed a Sobriety, that I question whether America has ever seen what might 
equal it."  The colonial authors maintained that with few exceptions, there was no 
bloodshed or plunder but that "the people generally gave a Demonstration, That they 
designed nothing but the securing of some great Malefactors, for the Justice which a 
course of Law would exposed them to."
82
  The people in the colonies were not only 
productive, but fair-minded and reasonable as well.   
 The colonial authors needed this depiction of the people because it was the only 
way to justify local authority in the colony.  If the people were bad, there was little reason 
to extend English liberties to America and grant the colonists the right to representative 
government.  If they were good, however, and if their labor, so crucial to the empire, was 
dependent on certain liberties, then self-government in America made good imperial 
sense.  The colonial authors put forth this imperial vision, with a productive and 
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industrious people at its center, and then attempted to corral and mobilize the power of 
their support and approbation. The colonial authors claimed that they acted with the full 
support of the people, acting only on their behalf.  Under the charter government, they 
claimed, the power of colonial leaders had been by the "voice, and vote, and conſent of 
the whole people" and only the restoration of the former charter would "ſatiſfy the 
generality of the inhabitants, as is manifest by the unanimous Declaration of the 
Convention there, publiſhed at Boſton."83  The leaders of the Council of Safety, who 
seized political control of the colony after the rebellion, only "accepted" that charge 
because the "Inhabitants . . . (as one man)" had demanded it.  The importance of 
communal support even lent itself at times to numerical estimations of the people's 
support.  One author argued that the "Temper of that People, do confidently affirm, That 
there is not one in an hundred amongſt the Inhabitants in that territory, which does not 
deſire that their Government by Charter might be continued to them."84  Another author 
claimed that the Andros government was disliked by the "biggest part of the Plantation 
more than ſeven to one."85    
 The pro-Andros authors were forced into an entirely different position as it 
involved the people.  The virtue of the people in the colony, who had risen up in support 
of the colonial dissidents, needed to be brought into question.  Their depiction of the 
colonial population was resoundingly negative and thoroughly conventional, referring to 
them as "deluded Countrey men," "an ignorant people," a "Vulgar and Ignorant People," 
or even a "perverſe people," who were prone to "Folly and Rashness" and easily 
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"amuse[d] & deceive[d]."
86
  The colonial leaders, the pro-Andros authors argued, had 
proven to be demagogues, intent on exploiting the credulity and simplicity of the 
common people to further their own personal agendas.  To gratify their "Malice, 
Ambition or Revenge," John Palmer asserted, the "plotters & contrivers" in colony "have 
made use of the deluded Countrey men, as the Monkey did the Cat's foot to pluck the 
Chesnut our of the fire."
87
  In the preface of the second edition, he made the same point: 
"the meanest things" in Massachusetts had made a "deep Impression on the vulgar and 
Ignorant People."
88
  The fact that the people would support the rebellious leaders 
confirmed for Palmer their baseness.  He continued his attack on their abilities throughout 
his tract.  He finds the substance of the Declaration so riddled with inaccuracies and lies 
that its real intention could only have been to "amuse & deceive ignorant people."  
Palmer rejected the right of subjects to rebel against political authority under any 
circumstances.  Following a Hobbesian logic, he argued that once a civil society has been 
"Instituted for the Preservation of Peace," the individual grants that authority a "certain 
great Right over [theirs]."  If "forcible resistance" was tolerated, then he hypothesized a 
terrible result of a "confused rabble" where "All are speakers and none hearers."
89
   
 Now that the people had been brought into the public realm and able to exert their 
influence on colonial politics, the pro-Andros authors predicted the quick destruction of 
the colony.  In A Particular Account of the Late Revolution, the author contends that the 
rebellious leaders awakened the "ignorant multitude" and brought forth a "detestable 
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Monster."  The "Multitude," the author explained, was always "prone to do mischief," but 
had formerly been under control.  Now the author compared the "rabble" in the colony to 
"a destroying hurricane."  The masses were so bloodthirsty and difficult to predict that 
they even at times scared the dissident leaders.  A group of men from the town of Lynn, 
led by Rev. Jeremiah Shepherd, appeared in the Boston "like soe many wild bears and the 
leader mad with passion, or rather drunk with Brandy, more savage than any of his 
followers."  They demanded that Andros be turned over to them directly and threatened 
violence if the demand went unmet.  This scared the Council of Safety, and these terrified 
colonial leaders, the author claimed, actually came to Andros for help, who responded 
that "if they had raised the Rabble, which they could not govern, it behooved them to 
look to it."
90
  The people's support had to be attacked as much as the colony's leaders, and 
this resulted in a persistently critical depiction of the colonial population.  The result was 
that the pro-Andros attacks of the dissident leaders in Massachusetts were withering, but 
so were their attacks on the broader colonial population. 
 These contrasting depictions of the people would become a lasting fault line 
between colonial and imperial voices.  Whenever the colonial elite were challenged and 
their privileges or rights brought into question, colonial leaders would resort to popular 
conception of colonization to help justify their claims to political authority.
91
  In 1684, 
the colonial leaders had lost their power with the revocation of the charter, and they 
clearly wanted it back.  The only way that would happen after 1686 would be through the 
extension of "English rights" throughout the empire, so that they again could be elected 
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to their positions of power by their neighbors.  They had few claims to elite status on 
traditional terms and were vulnerable to attacks by Edward Randolph, among others, who 
claimed that he knew "but one man [in the colonial faction], who was not himself a 
Servant, or a Servants Son" and that the colonials were on average of "of mean 
Extraction . . . at their first Planting here."
92
 They had to justify representative 
government through the people, not themselves.  The dangerous implications of this logic 
were clear to their opponents.  An Andros supporter maintained that "The Vote and 
Conſent fo Ten Thousand tho it may give greater force and violence; yet gives no more 
right or power in Law than the vote or conſent of one private perſon."93  The people could 
not be so empowered. The pro-Andros authors referred to the colonial leaders as "young 
conjurors, who had raised a devil they could not govern."
94
  The puritan government had 
been more exclusive than any other government in English America in terms of suffrage 
restrictions up to 1686, but their arguments for political power in 1689 had forced them 
into a new position.  They now put forth such an idealized conception they were 
frequently accused of rabble-rousing.   
 The new rhetoric of "the people" echoed the republican language of the colony's 
early leaders, but with one major difference.   When Winthrop talked about the people, 
the community of individuals to which he referred existed only of the elect.  Winthrop 
could talk about "the people" then as uniform entity because in a large part it was.  The 
religious restrictions on who participated in the body politic made it much easier to 
embrace a positive depiction of the people and ultimately to embrace a republican 
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political ideology.  This had changed irreversibly with the Dominion government and the 
rebellion of 1689.  The earlier suffrage restrictions were relaxed, giving the non-elect the 
right to vote and to participate in government.  The Council of Safety put into place after 
the rebellion included several merchants who had not served in any political capacity 
under the charter regime.  Even with those most optimistic about the return to their 
former privileges under a new charter, there was little hope of return to the earlier 
suffrage restrictions.  When the New England leaders of 1689 referenced "the people," 
they were referring to a much larger and more diverse community.   
 Early colonization provided the experience by which the population in America 
could be conceptualized as a virtuous and unified entity.  The stories of migration and the 
early dangers of colonization became evidence of the people's character.  The emphasis 
on the importance of the colonists' labor that was so present in the both promotional 
literature and in the language of dissent in Maryland in 1676 had been elevated from an 
argument about imperial policy to a larger political statement about the character of the 
colonists.
95
  The progress that all the colonies had demonstrated as the English settlers 
transformed a "wilderness" into a habitable region provided undeniable proof of their 
sacrifice, labor, and resolve.  No longer a community of the elect, they were now 
portrayed as a community of colonists, which would lay a similar groundwork on which a 
republican ideology could emerge and thrive.  Far from running away from the dangers 
of this rhetoric, later colonists would resort to the same narrative and the same depiction 
of the people when necessary.  When the Board of Trade attacked colonial charters in the 
first decades of the eighteenth century, the most sophisticated response came from 
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Jeremiah Dummer in 1721.  In his pamphlet A Defence of the New-England Charter, he 
fell back on the same narrative of early colonization that emphasized the role of the 
colonists.  "To increaſe the Nation's Commerce and enlarge her Dominions," he wrote, 
"muſt be allow'd a Work of no little Merit, if we conſider the Hardſhips to which the 
Adventurers were expoſed; or the Expence in making their Setlements; or laſtly, the great 
Advantages thence accruing to the Crown and Nation."  The early colonists had faced the 
"many Dangers in their Voyages over the Atlantick," "an Inhoſpitable Shore and waſte 
Wilderneſs," an "extreme" climate, and were "inevitably engag'd in a War with the 
Natives."
96
  In 1765, another New Englander, John Adams wrote A Dissertation of the 
Canon and Feudal Law in response to new imperial intrusions and pointed to the same 
sacrifices of the early colonists, who had left "their native country for a dreary, 
inhospitable wilderness."  "Recollect their amazing fortitude," he wrote, "their bitter 
sufferings, -- the hunger the nakedness, the cold, which they patiently endured, -- the 
severe labors of clearing their grounds, building their houses, raising their provisions, 
amidst the dangers from wild beasts and savage men."  The insertion of "the people" into 
the political discourse was not new to the English politics and had clear classical 
precedents, but colonial circumstances defined its trajectory in America.
97
  No matter 
how elite and aristocratic the worldview of the colonial leaders, they would have to be 
proponents of the importance of "the people" to justify their authority effectively.  Not 
only did colonial circumstances push them into this position, their understanding of the 
colonial past and imperial profits provided the means by which to defend and explain 
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their position.  As the Maryland dissidents had done before them, the colonial authors 
mobilized a history of America that ignored any evidence of English assistance and the 
important roles of wealthy colonial planners and leaders, and instead focused on the labor 
and bravery of the common settler.  They promulgated and further developed this 
contested narrative, which would be repeated by colonists like Dummer and Adams, to 
serve their political agenda.  And because of the structure of colonial politics, where 
every colonial leader across the various colonies was equally invested in supporting this 
narrative, it quickly rose to the level uncontested truth in the colonies.   
 The goal of the colonial faction in 1689 was to secure "English rights" in 
America, but the populist narrative of early colonization employed to substantiate that 
claim was potentially much more radical.  In his recent study of the American 
Revolution, Michal Rozbicki has noted that colonial leaders embraced a "symbolic 
partnership with 'the people'" as a practical political strategy to enhance their claims to 
local authority, even if they risked the "greater politicization of the masses" at home.
98
  
This tactic and its risks were not new to the eighteenth century, however, and dated back 
to 1689.  Colonial leaders throughout the eighteenth century developed and elaborated on 
this colonial political strategy, the ideological origins of which were already in place at 
the turn of the century.  If colonial leaders wanted to maintain their authority in the face 
of imperial challenges, they would have to espouse a republican, and even at times a 
populist, political ideology.  The structure of politics in the empire demanded it.  In 1689, 
the contributions of "the people," both past and present, to the empire was the most 
important reason to grant to the colonists of Massachusetts the right to an elected 
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assembly, which would reestablish the political power of the colonial elite.  To maintain 
their authority then, colonial leaders had to describe the people in non-traditional terms 
and claim that they governed only by their approbation.  In doing so, the New England 
authors created a coherent political conception of "the people" in America of lasting 
political importance.  To procure their privileges within the empire, they had to risk 
destabilizing their authority at home.  This was the enduring tradeoff of colonial protest 
and rebellion that would continue throughout the remainder of the colonial period.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
THE POLITICS OF "PEOPLING" THE NEW WORLD 
 
 "We Sweat and Toil" has traced the development of a liberal political ideology in 
the colonial literature and tracked its emergence in the political discourse by the end of 
the century.  This colonial vision, first promulgated in the midcentury promotional 
literature for the English colonies, outlined a new approach to colonial success, one that 
displaced the previous focus on virtue, emphasizing instead the importance of the 
industriousness of the individual.  This ideology transformed how self-interest came to be 
understood in the colonies.  Previously interpreted as the most dangerous threat to virtue 
and ultimately the success of the colonies, interest was now interpreted as providing a 
crucial spur to industrious behaviors.  Once interest was reconceptualized in this way, 
representative government and its promised protection of private property took on a new 
economic justification.  The Scottish enlightenment thinkers, the great proponents of a 
liberal political economy in the eighteenth century, would fully expand on the many 
ramifications of this type of societal organization.  Sir James Steuart, for instance, 
identified a clear opposition to arbitrary rule in a liberal political economy and its 
demands for law, regularity, and individual initiative.  A "modern oeconomy," he 
summarized, was the "most effective bridle ever invented against the folly of despotism."  
Steuart observed a great irony in this observation.  The pursuit of wealth and trade, in his 
analysis, had originated with "princes" determined to augment their own power, but once 
"the fund of the prince's wealth" had become the possession of an "opulent, bold, and 
spirited people," those subordinates now had it within their power to "shake off" the 
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power of their leaders.
1
  By the end of the seventeenth century, a liberal economic 
ideology had taken hold in the colonies and would constitute, as Steuart would theorize a 
century later, the most powerful argument for colonists' rights and liberties.   
 The radical economic ideology that would become so important to colonial 
politics by the end of the century first emerged in England during the 1650s and quickly 
supplanted the providential approach that had dominated promotion of the colonies up to 
that point.  In the early promotion of the English colonies, God's approval had been 
considered crucial to their ultimate success.  This godly approach to colonization 
reinforced much that was socially orthodox in early modern England, including the 
importance of an individual's willingness to suppress private interest for the common 
good.  The proponents of the new economic ideology at mid-century were no less 
concerned with the common good, but argued for a new criterion for the health of a 
nation.  Wealth was the new measure of state power and the wealth-producing individual, 
for these commentators, soon displaced the virtuous subject as the key component of 
powerful nations.  Self-interest and its invaluable encouragement of labor now needed to 
be protected by the state.  Colonial promoters found this reappraisal of self-interest 
particularly useful because it allowed for a more direct appeal to the ambitions of 
potential migrants in a way that had not been possible within the providential approach to 
colonization.  The promotional writers who first embraced this ideology pursued many of 
the same ends as their predecessors had, but their means were now interest and industry.  
By the 1680s, this ideology was in full ascendency in the promotional literature.  
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Carolina, East Jersey, and Pennsylvania launched substantial promotional campaigns and, 
despite the wide variety of their religious and political backgrounds of the respective 
proprietary groups, they all embraced a colonial vision that prioritized the labor and 
promised the protection of property through representative government. 
 This understanding of colonization, as it had developed in the colonial literature, 
eventually surfaced in the colonial political discourse.  The political contests in Maryland 
in 1676 and New England in 1689 provided two important examples.  The colonists 
repeated the key principles of the economic ideology in their understanding of the 
colonial past and in its prospects for future success.  As the engine of their labor and 
industriousness, now understood to be the crucial element of colonial development, the 
self-interest of the colonists had to be secured, they maintained, through the guarantee of 
representative government or the empire would quickly decline.  Colonists in Maryland 
and New England used the importance of their labor, which they asserted was directly 
contingent on certain political rights, to challenge autocratic institutions and proposed a 
political economy for the colonies that connected their political liberties to the larger 
goals of empire.  This coherent and plausible understanding of colonization, supported as 
it was so prominently in the colonial literature, worked against any form of centralized 
power in America.  When dissident colonists in Maryland attacked Lord Baltimore's 
stewardship of the colony, for instance, they did so on the basis of their labor.  When the 
New England colonists attacked James II's much broader attempt to reorganize the 
empire, they did so through a broader application of the same logic.   
 In focusing on the development of this economic ideology and its political 
ramifications, "We Sweat and Toil" does not dismiss the importance of the colonists' 
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claims to "English Rights" in America, but argues that the mimetic implications of the 
colonists' position has been overstated by colonial historians.
2
  The idea that colonists 
pursued their political rights in America through a claim of identity to the native 
privileges of English subjects imposes a confrontational relationship between center and 
periphery that did not exist in the seventeenth century.  Independence was not a feasible 
alternative for the colonists in the first century of settlement, as it would be in 1776.  The 
colonists could lay claim to certain rights, but they could not threaten an imperial break 
because there was no feasible opportunity for the continued existence of their 
communities outside of the empire.  The most salient threat put forth by the colonists in 
the seventeenth century was actually to abandon the empire by leaving their respective 
colonies or potentially North America altogether.
3
  Given the circumstances of the 
colonists' position in the seventeenth century, they are better understood as aspiring 
imperialists, desperate to align their own interests on the right side of imperial policy.  
The political contests of the late seventeenth century were predominantly a battle to 
understand and define empire, not resist it. 
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 The language of "English Rights" on the part of the colonists has also led to the 
conclusion by historians that their political position within the empire was 
"fundamentally reactive," but this claim makes sense only if the form and framework of 
the political discourse in 1776 is applied retroactively to the political protestations of the 
seventeenth century.
4
  Approaching the colonial rebellions of 1689 from the perspective 
of the early history of colonization, however, offers a new interpretation of how the 
colonists pursued their political power in the New World.  The fundamental challenge 
faced by colonial leaders and promoters throughout the seventeenth century was the 
successful "peopling" of the colonies.  When the challenges of this process and the 
reluctance of so many to migrate are highlighted through an analysis of the promotional 
literature, a central feature of colonization becomes the expectation of settlers for self-
advancement as a condition of migration.  To be effective, the task of attracting migrants 
had to include the promise of something new or different, whether it was economic gain, 
political empowerment, or religious freedom.  The political mobilization of the English 
colonists' self-interest through their importance to the project of "peopling" America 
would quickly impose adverse ideas and conditions on enslaved and indigenous people 
with long-lasting implications. The consequences for the English settlers, however, in 
their political disputes within the empire was that the leading colonists were often 
understood to be "new men," wholly void, in the eyes of their critics, of the markings of a 
legitimate elite.  When colonists pursued political power within the empire, their 
credentials as leading members of a community and the privileges that that entailed were 
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the frequent targets of their political opponents.  Lord Baltimore, for instance, in his 
pursuit of autocratic power in Maryland, attacked the character of Maryland's settlers to 
justify his governing ambitions.
5
  John Palmer and Edward Randolph would launch 
similar attacks against the New England elite in 1689.
6
  The colonists needed an 
explanation for local political power that rendered their lack of social credentials to be 
inconsequential, which is exactly what the new economic ideology did by justifying 
political participation through labor and material production, instead of education, virtue, 
or heredity.  In the political discourse at the close of the century, "English Rights" was 
synonymous with a claim to local political authority, but its justification was not an 
assertion of a common English identity.  Far from a static claim to English liberties 
abroad, the colonists' argument unleashed a justification for political power that was 
proto-liberal in its attention to individual rights and potentially radical in its emphasis on 
labor.  The language of "English Rights" has served to conceal the fact that the colonists 
were actually attempting to dissolve the conventional criteria for political leadership, 
opening up the political arena to a much larger portion of the population.           
 Before John Locke's publication of Two Treatises on Government and nearly one 
hundred years before Steuart's writings on political economy, dissident colonists were 
using a liberal understanding of society to justify their political rights.  The fact that this 
ideology took root so quickly in the colonial literature was inextricably connected to the 
circumstances of empire.  A primary purpose of the colonies from their earliest 
conception was to deliver concrete returns to the English exchequer.  With this 
                                                          
5
 See Cecil Calvert (Lord Baltimore), The Lord Baltemores case concerning the province of Maryland 
(London, 1653). 
6
 See John Palmer, An impartial account of the State of New-England (London, 1690). 
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originating rationale for their very existence, it was much easier to conceive of colonial 
society in economic terms than it was for other longstanding English communities, such 
as England's many urban corporations or even English society more broadly conceived.  
With the colonies always evaluated with an eye towards their production of wealth, they 
became fruitful grounds for an economic ideology to serve as a dynamic justification for 
new political rights.
7
  The economic subordination of the colonies in the seventeenth 
century opened up new avenues for political liberties, instead of, as would be the case in 
the eighteenth century, threatening those freedoms.    
 The economic ideology did not only displace the older language of virtue, but also 
allowed for a new conception of the ideal individual.  Edmund Morgan and more recently 
Michael Rozbicki have both identified 1776 as the moment that "the people" were created 
in America and have put forth a top-down understanding of the origins of this conception 
and its political importance.  For both historians, the revolutionary leaders created "the 
people" to bolster their claims to political authority with little real intention of 
empowering the wider population.  The elite, however, having created "the people" in 
print also did so in actuality, as the populace, inspired by this rhetoric of their own 
importance, soon began to agitate for a larger role in government.  "We Sweat and Toil" 
has argued for a much earlier and more complex history of this political conception in 
North American political thought, and the emergent economic ideology was crucial to its 
earliest iterations in print.  In 1689, the claims of local leaders in New England that the 
                                                          
7
 Elizabeth Mancke argues against understanding political rights in the colonies as a transmission or 
transplantation of English liberties abroad and argues instead that the colonies has broadly points to the 
possibility of the colonies as a place of the "active creation of liberties."  This dissertation has presented 
an argument for one example of the empire could function in a such a capacity.  See Mancke, "The 
Languages of Liberty in British North America," in Jack P. Greene, ed., Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty 
Overseas, 1600-1900 (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25-49, quotation on 49.    
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colonists' labors had sustained the empire quickly transformed into a broader comment on 
the character of the English colonists.  The colonies had thrived in a state of freedom, 
they argued.  The liberty granted to the colonists had not led to depravity or idleness, but 
instead to an industrious population.  When freed to pursue their own self-interest, they 
argued, the colonists had diligently labored and in the process demonstrated such 
characteristics as courage, perseverance, and rationality.  The economic behaviors that 
were producing wealth for England were also crucial to redeeming the reputation of the 
colonists, offering a new set of characteristics by which to identify the ideal subject and 
giving rise to an idea of "the people" in America that differed dramatically from 
analogous definitions in England.   
 Morgan and Rozbicki have rightly pointed to the destabilizing potential of this 
populist rhetoric for colonial leaders, but it was much more than a case of philosophically 
insincere, political opportunism.  The economic ideology that they relied on for their 
populist language, for instance, had been developed and promulgated, not by colonial 
elites aspiring for political power, but by promotional authors, many of them intent on not 
ceding away too much authority to the colonists.  The promotional authors at mid-century 
had looked for a way to work with self-interest, instead of against it, because potential 
settlers from all ranks of society had demanded to benefit from their migration.  The 
promotional authors needed an intellectual approach to colonization that was more 
accommodating to both social mobility and broader political participation.  The language 
that they found most useful in appealing to potential migrants was the same language that 
the political leaders would use to define "the people."  The promotional authors, who 
were on the front lines of dealing with the many challenges of "peopling" the New 
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World, defined and described colonial development in a way that made the language of 
"the people" a compelling and plausible political strategy.   
 The "peopling" project inherent in English colonization during the seventeenth 
century had a transformative potential for those who migrated.  Much like the 
contributions of the ordinary soldier in the New Model army, the act of migration had the 
power to dignify those of even the most modest origins through their involvement in such 
a risky and impactful undertaking and carried with it the potential to raise the 
expectations of "the people" in America.
8
  The politicization of the colonial population 
did not occur in 1689, however, but first surfaced in print in the numerous promises 
extended in the promotional literature, including the widespread guarantee of elected 
assemblies alongside standard, English suffrage restrictions, even though land in America 
was more available to the wider percentage of the population.  When the New England 
dissidents began to idealize "the people" in print, they did so with a new coherence and 
broader scope that marked an important moment in colonial political history, but they did 
not create an empowered populace through this rhetoric.  The "peopling" of the New 
World had already done that.  The colonial leaders in New England corralled the power 
of "the people," which was already evident to most colonial planners and promoters, and 
attempted to make that work to their advantage.   When the imperial officers accused the 
New England leaders of being "young conjurors," who through their dangerously popular 
language, "had raised a devil they could not govern," they misunderstood the much more 
                                                          
8
 On the New Model Army, Ian Gentles, The New Model Army in England, Ireland, and Scotland, 1645-
1653 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).  On the intersection of the politicizing nature of the New Model Army and 
colonization, see Carla Pestana, "English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design," Early American 
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complex history of the New England leaders' political maneuverings.
9
  The 
empowerment of the people in North America had been made possible, not by the 
demagoguery of a displaced leadership intent on regaining power, but through the nature 
of English colonization itself.  The politics of "peopling" the New World was a 
dangerous business for both imperial officers and colonial leaders, as both would have to 
straddle the importance of "the people" to the endeavor and their resulting political 
empowerment alongside traditional pretensions to elite governance.  This tension was the 
defining characteristic of North American politics and its lasting legacy for future 
generations of English colonists in a new world.    
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Anon., A particular Account, in Charles McLean Andrews, ed., Narratives of Insurrections (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), 191-210. 
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